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PRELIMINARY NOTE 
The research presented in this thesis includes four experiments that have either been 
published or are currently under review. These studies have been incorporated here in 
relatively unaltered form, which raises several issues that readers need to be aware of. First, 
the order in which the experiments are presented here does not correspond with the order in 
which the studies were submitted for publication. As a result some of the experimental 
chapters refer to work that is presented only at later stages of the thesis. In relation to this 
point, it is also important to acknowledge that the studies that have been published (or are 
under review) do not refer to any work that appeared in the literature after the manuscripts 
were accepted for publication. Thus, studies are mentioned in the Literature Review (Chapter 
1) which, despite being relevant, are not acknowledged in some of the empirical chapters. A 
second point concerns the use of pronouns. Since the published and submitted manuscripts 
are all co-authored by my supervisor Prof. Dermot Bowler, the relevant sections in this thesis 
make use of the pronoun 'we' rather than '1', whilst the latter is used in the remainder of this 
thesis. 
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ABSTRACT 
The current thesis presents five experiments which suggest that Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) are characterised by abnormalities in the processes necessary for the 
acquisition of emotionally distinct representations of environmental stimuli. In the context of a 
long standing theoretical debate about the role of emotional disturbances in the development 
of ASD, this evidence supports the notion that abnormalities in emotional rather than socio-
cognitive development lie at the root of the disorder. The findings also provide indirect 
support. ior the \dea that aonorma\\t\es \n am~9da\a iunct\on\n9 ma~ p\a~ a centra\ ro\e \n the 
neuropatho\ogy under\ying ASD, since this \imbic structure is we\\ Known to be in'lo\'1ed in the 
mediation of emotional learning processes. Based on the evidence presented in this thesis 
and in the relevant literature, I develop the argument that developmental abnormalities in 
basic emotional learning processes may not only explain the socio-emotional disturbances 
characterising the disorder but also account for some of the non-social manifestations of the 
ASD phenotype. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Ever since Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) were first described more than six 
decades ago, atypicalities in affective behaviours have been regarded as hallmark features of 
their clinical manifestations. Both Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) concluded their 
seminal case descriptions with the suggestion that disturbances of affective development 
constituted an important element underlying the atypical social behaviour characterising the 
disorder and to this date abnormalities in emotional conduct continue to be considered 
diagnostically sensitive manifestations of ASD. At the neural level, many authors now agree 
that abnormalities in the functional integrity of the amygdala may be responsible for this facet 
of the disorder (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore, 
Wheelwright, Ashwin & Williams, 2000; Schultz, 2005) but in developmental terms the role of 
affective disturbances in the ontogenesis of ASD remains the matter of debate. More 
specifically, some authors continue to share the views of Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944) 
in suggesting that abnormalities in emotional development lie at the heart of the condition 
(e.g. Hobson, 1993, 2002; Loveland, 2005, Mundy & Sigman, 1989). Others, by contrast, 
have adopted the view that abnormal emotional behaviours merely represent a consequence 
of disturbances in the development of socio-cognitive capacities (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Frith, 2003; Leslie & Frith, 1990). 
The principal aim of the work presented in the subsequent chapters is to contribute to 
the formulation of a developmentally and neurologically plausible framework regarding the 
role of affective disturbances in ASD. To make such a contribution ultimately requires a 
consideration of how affective processes shape typical development and to what extent 
disturbances of these processes may give rise to the particular developmental trajectory that 
characterises ASD. Hobson (1993, 2002) offers a useful framework in this context. He argues 
that various facets of human cognition are anchored in the affectively patterned interpersonal 
relations that infants enjoy from the minute they are born. ASD, so this argument goes, is the 
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consequence of disturbances in such relatedness. The current thesis attempts to elaborate 
on Hobson's views by further specifying the cognitive and neural mechanisms that may 
underlie the ability to affectively relate to others. I will ultimately come to the conclusion that 
considering ASD as a disorder of these mechanisms holds far more promise for our 
endeavours to understand the disorder than nativist alternatives that view ASD as the result 
of dysfunctional socio-cognitive 'modules' (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2003). Before I 
justify this position, however, it is important to review and furnish the empirical basis on which 
my arguments will rest. 
Literature Review 
In order to provide the relevant context for the subsequent chapters, the literature 
reviewed below will centre around the following issues. In the first section, a summary of the 
evidence pertaining to the emotional disturbances in ASD will demonstrate that it is now 
widely accepted that this spectrum of disorders is characterised by often very severe 
limitations in various aspects of affectively patterned communication. The second section will 
show that whilst most authors agree that abnormalities in the functioning of the amygdala 
most probably underlie this facet of the disorder, the developmental significance of abnormal 
emotional processes remains the matter of debate. More specifically, I will demonstrate that 
the currently available evidence can be accommodated within competing theoretical 
frameworks that consider abnormalities in emotional processes either as a cause for, or 
consequence of, the developmental trajectory of ASD. The third section will provide a closer 
examination of how the concept of emotion is currently operationalised and how current 
frameworks regarding the constitutional components of affective behaviours and processes 
may be exploited for the study of ASD. This section will focus on the longstanding consensus 
that emotional processes are the result of the interplay between primitive autonomic 
responses and cognition. Since this interplay is known to involve neural processes that are 
mediated by the amygdala and because the amygdala is widely acknowledged to play an 
important role in the neuropathology associated with ASD, I will argue that the distinction 
between autonomic and cognitive emotional processes offers a useful heuristic device for the 
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further exploration of the nature of emotional disturbances in this disorder. In the final section 
I will recapitulate some of the earlier points in order to formulate the principal hypothesis of 
the current thesis, namely that autistic atypicalities in emotional conduct are the result of 
abnormalities in how the amygdala mediates the integration of physiological and cognitive 
aspects of emotional experiences. A brief summary of research pertaining to the influence of 
stimulus induced arousal on learning, memory and perception will show how this hypothesis 
can be tested empirically thus setting the scene for the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Before I turn to these issues, however, it is necessary to provide a more thorough description 
of what the autism spectrum actually is. 
What is the Autism Spectrum? 
The Autism Spectrum describes a set of related pervasive developmental disorders 
that all share a triad of impairments in the domains of communication, reciprocal social 
behaviour and imagination in the presence of a restricted and sometimes obsessive pattern 
of interests and activities (e.g. Wing & Gould, 1979). The disorders subsumed under this 
spectrum include Autistic Disorder, Asperger's Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (POD-NOS), which together affect approximately 1% of the 
population and are around three to four times more common in males than females (Baird, 
Simonoff, Pickles, Chandler, Loucas, Meldrum et aI., 2006; Bertrand, Mars, Boyle, Bove, 
Yeargin-Allsopp & Decoufle, 2001). Current diagnostic criteria (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) specify that a necessary feature of all three disorders is a 
severe impairment in the development of reciprocal social behaviour, which includes 
abnormalities in developing peer relations, deploying non-verbal communicative acts to 
modulate social interaction (e.g. eye-contact, gestures, facial expressions, etc ... ), mastering 
pragmatic aspects of language (Le. modulating language use according to the social context 
and the listener's needs) and developing joint attentional behaviours (e.g. showing, pointing, 
bringing, following gaze, etc ... ). Autistic Disorder and Asperger's Disorder furthermore share 
an early onset of symptoms (Le. before age 3 years) and the presence of repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour such as motor stereotypies (e.g. finger-flicking, rocking, 
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etc ... ), preoccupations with highly specific topics (e.g. acquiring an encyclopaedic knowledge 
of high-voltage power cables) and an inflexible adherence to non-functional routines and 
rituals (e.g. arranging food in a certain manner prior to eating it). What distinguishes these 
two disorders are language and general cognitive development, both of which are 
significantly compromised in Autistic Disorder but not Asperger's Disorder. The classification 
of POD-NOS is used for individuals who present with the characteristic reciprocal social 
impairment but do not meet the full criteria for a specific pervasive developmental disorder, 
either because of sub-threshold manifestations or late onset of symptoms. 
In addition to the clinically defining symptoms set out above, all subtypes of ASD also 
share a uniquely patterned cognitive profile, which includes difficulties in understanding 
behaviour in terms of mental states, such as beliefs and desires (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Frith, 2003), difficulties in deploying cognitive resources 
flexibly in order to plan and execute goal directed behaviours (e.g. Hill, 2004; Ozonoff, 
Pennington & Rogers, 1991a), and a tendency to process information in a piecemeal and 
perceptually driven rather than holistic and conceptually driven fashion (e.g. Frith, 2003; 
Mottron & Burack, 2001; Shah & Frith, 1993). The existence of this characteristic 
endophenotype (Le. the heritable characteristics of a condition that are not necessarily direct 
symptoms) together with the absence of any consistent evidence supporting a differentiation 
of subtypes of autistic pathologies has led to the widely held view that all three disorders 
described above represent different instances of the same underlying syndrome (see Bowler, 
2007; Prior, Eisenmajer, Leekam, Wing, Gould & Ong, 1998; Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, 5chultz & 
Klin, 2004; Wing ,1993 for recent reviews; see also Wing & Gould, 1979). To reflect this shift 
in the conceptualisation of the disorder the current thesis will adopt the term 'Autism 
Spectrum Disorder' (ASD) to cover all conditions and use the word 'autistic' to describe the 
characteristics that defines them. If distinctions are necessary, only those provided by the 
current diagnostic classification system (see above) will be employed. Other terminologies 
such as 'Low-Functioning Autism' (LFA) and 'High-Functioning Autism' (HFA) will be 
avoided 1. 
1 This terminology originally distinguished between individuals whose intellectual abilities fell within the 'extremely 
low' range (i.e. IQ < 70) and those whose abilities fell above that. The spectrum view of ASD, now encompasses 
individuals with truly superior abilities (i.e. IQ> 130) rendering the term 'High-Functioning' nothing but misleading. 
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There is one more aspect of ASD worth noting before concluding the preliminaries 
and that is the extreme heterogeneity with which the syndrome manifests. In the domain of 
reciprocal social behaviour, for example, we find individuals who seem entirely oblivious to 
the existence of other people at one end of the spectrum, whilst at the other end we find 
those who make at least some attempts (even if awkward) to engage socially (Wing & Gould, 
1979). Similarly, the domain of language development includes individuals who never acquire 
any linguistic competence at all and those who publish academic books or insightful 
autobiographies (e.g. Grandin, 2006; Mukhopadhyay, 2007). And the realm of repetitive and 
stereotyped behaviours ranges from manifestations such as the spinning of the wheels of toy-
cars for hours on end to an almost obsessive acquisition of encyclopaedic knowledge about 
specific topiCS. No matter what domain or cognitive ability one focuses on, the autistic 
spectrum encompasses individuals who exhibit marked abnormalities and those who do not. 
In part this heterogeneity most likely reflects the underlying variability in the genetic, 
neurological and biochemical factors associated with the disorder (for reviews see 
Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Tuchman & Rapin, 2006; Schultz & Anderson, 2004). But only 
in part. A considerable proportion of the disorder's symptom inconsistency seems to be the 
result of the idiosyncratic way in which affected individuals acquire knowledge and organise 
their experiences (see Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008a). This idiosyncrasy needs to be 
explained in developmental terms and an explanation in terms of emotional processes has 
much to offer in this respect. But more on this later. First, let me consider the evidence 
pertaining to the affective abnormalities characterising the autistic spectrum. 
Autistic disturbances In affective conduct 
When Kanner (1943) published his landmark clinical accounts of the 11 children who 
came to be considered the first officially identified cases of ASD he was not only the first to 
systematically describe the disorder but also to note that affective disturbances constituted a 
core feature underlying the condition. Kanner eloquently emphasised this point in the final 
paragraph of his publication where he wrote: 
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'We must then assume that these children come into the world with innate inability to 
fann the usual, biologically provided affective contact with people, just as other 
children come into the world with innate physical or intellectual handicaps. If this 
assumption is correct, a further study of our children may help to furnish concrete 
criteria regarding the still diffuse notions about the constitutional components of 
emotional reactivity. For here we seem to have pure-culture examples of inborn 
autistic disturbances of affective contact.· (p.250; italics appear as in original) 
Unfortunately it was to take several years before Kanner's insights were fully 
appreciated. During the two decades immediately following his publication the influential 
psychodynamic approach to human behaviour identified early childhood experiences as the 
origin of emotional disturbances and so gave rise to the unfortunate idea that autistic 
abnormalities were the result of pathological parenting (e.g. Bettelheim, 1967). During the 
1960s this erroneous view was finally abandoned (Rimland, 1964; cited in Dawson, 1989) 
and the focus returned to Kanner's original proposal that ASD was a biologically determined 
developmental disorder. Laboratory and field based experiments (e.g. Hermelin & O'Connor, 
1967; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1967; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; Bartak, Rutter & Cox, 1975) 
as well as meticulous epidemiological studies (e.g. Rutter, 1968; Wing & Gould, 1979) 
replaced the psychoanalytic approach of the previous years and in 1980 ASD was finally 
recognised as a distinct developmental disorder and added, under the label of 'infantile 
autism', to the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-III; APA, 1980). From this point onwards research into the causes of autistic 
pathologies increased at an exponential rate and it was not long before Kanner's emphasis 
on affective disturbances found support in experimental studies. 
Amongst the earliest investigations to address the affective capacities of individuals 
with ASD were a series of studies by Hobson and his colleagues who showed that children 
with ASD were limited in understanding the emotional expressions of others. Hobson (1986a, 
1986b) and Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988a), for example, showed that compared to 
children with moderate learning difficulties and typically developing children, those with a 
diagnosis of ASD experienced unusual difficulties in matching emotional expressions across 
different modalities. More specifically, these authors found that whilst children with and 
without ASD performed similarly on tasks in which drawings of objects (e.g. a bird, train) had 
to be paired with sound recordings or blurred video sequences of the same objects, children 
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with ASD performed significantly worse on matching facial, vocal and gestural expressions of 
emotions with one another. Subsequent studies suggested that this difficulty reflected a 
fundamental difference in how children with ASD actually perceived emotional expressions in 
the first place. Weeks and Hobson (1987), for instance, asked children simply to sort a series 
of photographs of faces into different groups. The photographs varied on several dimensions 
including the age and gender of the person depicted, the type of hat worn by that person and 
the facial expression of emotion portrayed. Whilst non-autistic children readily opted to sort 
these photographs according to the emotional dimension, children with ASD were more 
inclined to sort them according to one of the other features, suggesting that emotional 
expressions were not particularly salient to them. Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988b) 
furthermore showed that even when children with ASD did sort faces according to their 
emotional expressions, they seemed to deploy qualitatively deviant perceptual processes in 
order to do so. In this rather complicated experiment, children were again asked to sort 
photographs of faces into different groups but this time they were explicitly instructed either to 
sort the photographs according to the identity of the individuals or the emotional expressions 
they portrayed. The photographs were either of whole faces, of faces with the mouth area 
blanked out, of faces with both the mouth and forehead areas blanked out or of whole faces 
presented upside down. The results revealed that with increasing degradation of the upright 
face photographs, performance in sorting according to identity steadily declined by a similar 
margin in both groups of children. When the photographs had to be sorted according to the 
emotional expressions, however, children with ASD exhibited a more marked decline in their 
performance. This, together with the observation that children with ASD were better than the 
comparison children at sorting upside down faces according to their emotional expressions, 
led the authors to suggest that children with ASD may rely on qualitatively different processes 
in order to identify expressions of emotion, a conclusion I will return to in more detail shortly. 
Since the studies by Hobson and colleagues more than 40 investigations relevant to 
the emotion perception abilities of individuals with ASD have appeared in the literature. Some 
of these have failed to support the initial conclusions (Adolphs, Sears & Piven, 2001; Ashwin, 
Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Castelli, 2005; Hillier & Allinson, 2002; Loveland, Tunali-
Kotoski, Chen, Ortegon, Pearson, Brelsford et aI., 1997; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 
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1990; Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires, 1990; Serra, Minderaa, van Geert, & Jackson, 1999), but 
the vast majority of studies leaves little doubt that individuals with ASD perceive emotional 
expressions differently and often not as readily as comparison groups (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Q'Riordan & Bullmore, 2007; Ashwin, Chapman, Co lie & Baron-Cohen, 2006; 
Begeer, Rieffe, Terwogt & Stockmann, 2006; Bormann-Kischkel, Vilsmeier & Baude, 1995; 
Braverman, Fein, Lucci & Waterhouse, 1989; BOIte & Poustka, 2003; Buitelaar, van der 
Wees, Swaab-Barneveld & van der Gaag, 1999; Capps, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992; Celani, 
Battachi & Arcidiacono, 1999; Critchley, Daly, Bullmore, Williams, van Amelsvoort, 
Robertson, et al., 2000; Da Fonseca, Santos, Bastard-Rosset, Rondan, Poinso, & Deruelle, 
2008; Davis, Bishop, Manstead & Tantam, 1994; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Tardif, 2004; 
Dennis, Lockyer & Lazenby, 2000; Dziobek, Rogers, Fleck, Bahnemann, Heekeren, Wolf, et 
al., 2008; Fein, Lucci, Braverman & Waterhouse, 1992; Golan, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006; 
Gross, 2004; Gross, 2005; Grossman, Klin, Carter & Volkmar, 2000; Hubert, Wicker, Moore, 
Monfardine, Duverger, Da Fonseca, et al., 2007; Kamio, Wolf & Fein, 2006; Lindner & Rosen, 
2006; Losh & Capps, 2003; Moore, Hobson & Lee, 1997; Macdonald, Rutter, Howlin, Rios, Le 
Couteur, Evered et aI., 1989; Njiokiktjien, Vershoor, de Sonneville, Huyser, Op het Veld & 
Toorenaar, 2001; Qzonoff, et al., 1991a; Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991b; Pelphrey, 
Sasson, Reznick, Paul, Goldman & Piven, 2002; Piggot, Kwon, Mobbs, Blasey, Lotspeich, 
Menon, et al., 2004; Rosset, Rondan, Da Fonseca, Santos, Assouline & Deruelle, 2008; 
Smalley & Asarnow, 1990; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson & Stirling, 1989; Teunisse & de 
Gelder, 2001; Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari & Mundy, 1992). Table 1.1 below provides a brief 
summary of this literature and sets out information regarding the participant groups, 
experimental paradigms and emotional expressions studied in each of the relevant 
publications. First, Table 1.1 lists reports that have failed to show ASD-specific difficulties in 
the emotion perception domain (Le. no difference between ASD and comparison groups). 
Next are listed studies that suggest that individuals with ASD experience difficulties not only 
with the perception of emotional expressions but also with non-emotional properties of 
complex visual stimuli, whilst the remaining entries concern reports that have demonstrated 
either quantitative or qualitative differences between ASD and comparison partiCipants that 
seem relatively specific to the perception of emotional expressions. 
17 
Table 1.1 
(X) 
..-
Summary of studies of emotion perception abilities in ASD 
Emotional expressions 
Reference Participant Groups N Matching Paradigm studied 
Studies failing to note ASD-specific atypicalities 
Cl) 
->- ... 
IJ) IJ) 
Co Cl) ·c J ... L- a. Cl) Co "0 e> as L- e> L: as as c: Cl) J IJ) 
-:::c en ~ u. en is 0 
Braverman et al. (1989) ASDIPDD; Typical 15; 15 VA Match facial expressions with one another and identify Comparison 1 facial expressions x x x x 
Ozonoff et al. (1990) ASD; Typical 
Sort photographs of faces according to emotional 
Experiment 1 14; 14 VA expression; Match facial expressions with one another, with x x x 
vocalisations and with situational contexts 
Prior et al. (1990) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 20; 20 VA Match schematic facial expressions with vocalisations, x gestures and contexts x x x 
Loveland et al. (1997) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 35;23; 18 VA Identify expressions from dynamic verbal and non-verbal 
signals x x x x 
Serra et al. (1999) POD-NOS; Typical 31; 31 CA;FSA Explain how situational contexts influence a protagonist's Not specified 
actual and displayed emotions 
Buitelaar et al. (1999) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 40;20;20 CA; FSA, VA, NVA Match facial expressions with one another and with 
situational contexts x x x x x x x 
Adolphs et al. (2001) ASD; Typical; Amygdala 6; 28;3 FSA Discriminate facial expressions of various intensities Experiment 1 lesion x x x x x x 
Adolphs et al. (2001) ASD; Typical; Amygdala 7,18,8 Not specified Experiment 2 lesion Identify facial expressions x x x x x x 
Hillier & Allison (2002) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 10;20; 10 CA;VA,NVA Influence of audience on judgements of embarrassment of 
a protagonist x 
Castelli (2005) ASD; Typical 20;20 VA Match facial expressions with one another and identify x x facial expressions x x x x 
Ashwin et al. (2006) ASD; Typical 18; 18 CA; FSA Visual search for schematic facial expressions x x 
Begeer et al. (2006) Test 2 ASD; Typical 28;32 CA Select photographs of faces according to what person is 
most likely to offer a sweet or tell someone off x x 
Table 1.1 Continued Cl) 
tii 
c 
Emotional expressions 0 ~ 
Reference Participant Groups N Matching Paradigm studied E CD 
I C 
0 
Cl) c 
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.9 >- .... III III Studies failing to note emotion-specific difficulties in ASO Cl. Cl) ·c ~ .... c .... Cl. Cl Cl) .2 Cl. "C Cl tu .... .c cv cv c Cl) ~ III ..... iii 
I Cl) « LL en is 0 ~ 
Tantam et al. (1989) .5 ASD; Dev. Delay 10; 10 CA;NVA Identify mismatching facial expressions x x x x x x u Experiment 1 I;::: 
·0 
CD 
Ozonoff et al. (1990): Match facial expressions with one another, with Cl. ASD; Typical III Experiment 2 14; 14 NVA vocalisations and with situational contexts x x x !!! CD 
~ 
Davis et al. (1994) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 20; 10; 10 CA;VA,NVA Match face photographs varying on emotional and non- 0 Experiment 1 emotional dimensions according to a sample match x x x Cl) et: 
Davis et al. (1994) .5 ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 19; 11; 20 CA;VA,NVA Match facial expressions with one another x x x X III~ Experiment 2 CD>-.- .c: 
""'u 
Moore et al. (1997)2 Describe point-light displays of people enacting G~ ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 13; 13 CA;VA x x x x x IEciI emotional and non-emotional behaviours 
'OGi 
c~ 
Match facial expressions with one another and identify 0 111 Njiokiktjien et al. (2001) ASD 3 .- CD facial expressions x x x x Q.iG B-;; 
'->-
Deruelle et al. (2004) ASD; Typical 11; 22 CA;VA Match facial expressions with one another x x x ~ .. g c.o 0_ 
:::«1 
OC 
E.Q 
CD '0 
>-E 
Studies demonstrating specific emotion perception difficulties in ASD -g" cng 
.!! c: 
.c:_ 
-0 
cc 
Match schematic facial expressions with gestures, i~ Hobson (1986a) ASD; Typical; Dev. Delay 23; 38; 11 CA;VA,NVA .c:.o 
vocalisations and situational contexts x x x x -~ Cl Cl 
c.s 
:g~ 
Match schematic drawings of gestures with videos of c Hobson (1986b) ASD; Dev. Delay 13; 13 CA;NVA x x x X .c:~ 
vocalisations and facial expressions t:CD o~ 
~III 
Weeks & Hobson (1987) ASD; Dev. Delay 15; 15 CA;VA Sort face photographs varying on emotional and non- x x .!I!.§ 
emotional dimensions according to preference ::::0 
... as 
Table 1.1 Continued 
Reference Participant Groups N Matching Paradigm 
Studies demonstrating specific emotion perception difficulties in ASO 
Hobson et a!. (1988a) ASO; Oev. Delay 21;21 
Hobson et al. (1988b) ASO; Dev. Delay 17;17 Experiment 1 
Hobson et a!. (1988b) ASO; Dev. Delay 17; 17 Experiment 2 
Braverman et a!. (1989): ASOIPOD; Typical 15; 15 Comparison 2 
Macdonald et al. (1989) ASO; Typical 10; 10 
Tantam et at (1989) ASO; Dev. Delay 10; 10 Experiment 2 
Smalley & Asamow ASO; Typical 9;9 (1990) 
Ozonoff et at (1991 a) ASO; Oev. Oelay 20;20 
Ozonoff et al. (1991 b) ASO; Dev. Delay 23;20 
Capps et a!. (1992) ASO; Typical 18; 14 
Fein et a!. (1992) ASOIPDD; Typical 15;30 
Yirmiya et at (1992) ASO; Typical 18; 14 
CA;VA Match vocal expressions with facial expressions 
CA;VA Sort whole or partial photographs of facial expressions 
according to emotion 
CA;VA Sort upright and inverted facial expressions according 
emotion or identity 
NVA Match facial expressions with one another and identify facial expressions 
CA;NVA Identify emotion from situational contexts and vocal 
recordings 
CA;NVA Identify upright and inverted facial expressions 
CA;NVA Match facial expressions with one another and identify facial expressions 
CA; FSA, VA, NVA Match facial expressions with one another 
CA; FSA,VA,NVA Match facial expressions with one another 
CA; FSA, VA, NVA Oescribe personal experiences of certain emotions 
VA,NVA 
CA; FSA,VA,NVA 
Match facial expressions with situational contexts 
Label emotion experienced by protagonists in video 
segments and report own emotional readion to it 
Emotional expressions 
0 
studied N 
Cl) 
->- ..... 
fI) If) 
·c :::J ..... a. Cl) ..... a. C) Cl) a. 
-0 C) tU ..... ~ tU tU C Cl) :::J If) 
-I Cl) « u. Cl) 0 0 
x x x x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x x x 
Not specified 
x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x 
x x x 
x x x x 
x x x x x 
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Reference Participant Groups N Matching Paradigm studied N 
Cl) 
-Studies demonstrating specific emotion perception difficulties in ASD >- .... 
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Baron-Cohen et al. ASD; Typical, Dev. Delay 15; 15; 12 CA;VA Match shematic and photographed facial expressions with x x x (1993) one another 
Bormann-Kischkel et al. ASD; Dev. Delay 41; 41 CA;NVA Identify facial expressions x (1995) x x x x x x 
Celani et al. (1999) ASD; Down; Typical 10; 10; 10 CA;VA Match facial expressions with one another and select x x preferred expression 
Critchley et al. (2000) ASD; Typical 9;9 CA; FSA Distinguish between emotionally expressive and neutral x x facial expressions 
loentrty me emotional expression OT a story cnaraaers 
Dennis et al. (2000) ASD; Typical 8;8 CA;VA actual feeling and the emotion that would be expressed for x x 
the oumose of deceotion 
Grossman et al. (2000) ASD; Typical 13; 13 CA;FSA,VA Label facial expressions accompanied by no, congruent or x x x x x inconguent verbal labels 
Teunisse & deGelder ASD; Typical 17; 48 not specified Match facial expressions with one another and identify x x x x (2001) facial expressions 
Pelphrey et al. (2002) ASD; Typical 5;5 CA Identify facial expressions x x x x x x 
BOlte & Poustka (2003) ASD; Typical; 35;22;21 NVA Label facial expressions x x x x x x 
Schizophrenia 
Label emotion experienced by protagonist in video 
Losh & Capps (2003) ASD; Typical 28;22 CA;VA segments and define emotions through verbal descriptions x x x x x x x 
Gross (2004) ASD; Language Delay; 27;28;26;27 CA; FSA Identify facial expressions of humans, orangutans and x x x x Experiment 1 Dev. Delay; Clinical canines 
Gross (2004) ASD; Language Delay; 18;9; 12;9 CA; FSA Identify facial expressions from whole, top-half or bottom- x x x x Experiment 2 Dev. Delay; Clinical half of human, orangutan or canine faces 
Piggot et al. (2004) ASD; Typical 14; 10 CA; FSA, VA, NVA Match facial expressions with one another and label facial x x x 
expressions 
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Emotional expressions 
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Gross (2005) ASO; Language Delay; 24;20; 18;21 CA;FSA Match facial expressions of humans or canines with one x x x Dev. Delay; Clinical another 
Ashwin et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 26; 26 CA; FSA,VA Identify facial expressions x x x x x x 
Begeer et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 28; 31 CA Match face photographs varying on emotional and non- x x Test 1 emotional dimensions according to preference 
Golan et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 21; 17 CA; FSA, VA, NVA Label facial expressions and vocalisations x x x x x x x 
Kamio et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 18; 18 CA; FSA Rate likeability of japanese ideographs preceeded by x x 
subliminal or supraliminal facial expressions 
Lindner & Rosen (2006) ASO; Typical 14; 16 CA;VA Match facial expressions with static or dynamic facial x x x 
expressions and with vocalisations 
Ashwin et a!. (2007) ASO; Typical 13; 13 CA; FSA Label facial expressions x x x x x 
Hubert et al. (2007) ASO; Typical 19; 19 CA Describe point-light displays of people enacting emotional x x x x x 
and non-emotional behaviours 
Oziobek et al. (2008) ASO; Typical 17; 18 CA; FSA Label emotion experienced by protagonist in photographic Not specified 
scene and report own emotional reaction to it 
Rosset et a!. (2008) ASO; Typical 20;40 CA; FSA Categorise emotional expressions of upright and inverted x x x 
cartoon and human faces 
Oa Fonseca et al. (2008) ASO; Typical 19; 19 CA Describe point-light displays of people enacting emotional x x x x x 
and non-emotional behaviours 
Note: CA (Chronological Age), VA (Verbal Ability), NVA (Nonverbal Ability), FSA (Full-scale Ability). 
The obvious point of Table 1.1 is that emotion perception difficulties in ASD are now 
well replicated. The Table also serves to highlight methodological difficulties that are inherent 
to the study of ASD, however, and it is worth dwelling on these for a moment. Inspection of 
Table 1.1 reveals that many of the earliest studies that failed to observe ASD specific 
difficulties in the perception of emotional expressions, involved comparisons of individuals 
with and without ASD who were matched on measures of verbal ability. During the 1990s, 
this pattern led some authors to suggest that the emotion perception difficulties associated 
with ASD may not be a specific manifestation of the disorder but rather a more general 
reflection of abnormalities in language development (e.g. Prior et al., 1990; Ozonoff et al., 
1990). Although many subsequent studies demonstrated emotion perception difficulties in 
ASD even when participant groups were closely matched on verbal ability, the observation 
that performance on emotion perception tasks often correlates with performance on verbal 
ability tasks (e.g. Hobson, 1986b; Ozonoff, et al., 1990; Prior, et al., 1990; Smalley & 
Asarnow, 1990; Yirmiya, et al., 1992) lends some support to the 'language' hypothesis. More 
specifically, this association allows for the possibility that atypicalities in language 
development disproportionately alter the development of emotion perception abilities, such 
that, in some instances, individuals with ASD exhibit difficulties in the latter domain even 
when compared to language ability matched comparison groups. Whilst such an 
interpretation is to some extent legitimate, it is important to note that associations of the kind 
just described do not permit inferences of causality. That is, it would be a fallacy to conclude 
that abnormal language development is responsible for the atypical emotion perception 
abilities characterising ASD. Associations between domains reveal nothing about their causal 
relation in development and, in fact, do not even specify the ability or process that mediates 
the association. The point here is that the observation that individuals with ASD sometimes 
do not exhibit difficulties on emotion perception tasks vis-a-vis verbal ability tasks (or verbal 
ability matched comparison groups) does not preclude the possibility that atypical emotional 
processes are causally involved in the development of the disorder. In fact, one needs to 
consider this observation in relation to the finding that emotion perception difficulties in ASD 
are almost always evident when non-verbal ability tasks serve as the basis for comparison. 
This pattern suggests that verbal and non-verbal abilities relate to emotion perception abilities 
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in a qualitatively different way when an individual develops ASD rather than typically and this 
supports rather than contradicts the suggestion that there is something peculiar about the 
emotion perception abilities associated with ASD (as much as it confirms that there is 
something peculiar about the verbal and non-verbal abilities associated with the disorder). 
The issue discussed above raises the important question of how to best match 
groups of participants in order to determine whether specific emotion perception difficulties 
exist in ASD. Answering this question is notoriously difficult and several authors have 
discussed this topic at length (see Bowler, 2007; Burack, larocci, Flanagan & Bowler, 2004; 
Hobson, 1991a; Mottron, 2004). The bottom line of these discussions is that one must not 
draw premature conclusions from a single pattern of observations but rather consider the 
available evidence in its' entirety. In addition, one must not place too much emphasis on 
comparing groups of participants with one another but also to compare how individuals within 
a group perform on one vis-a-vis another task and how individuals go about trying to solve 
the problem posed by the experimental tasks. Table 1.1 lists several studies that have 
demonstrated that individuals with ASD sometimes experience difficulties not only on tasks 
revolving around emotion perception but also on tasks relying on non-emotional perceptual 
abilities. This pattern has given rise to a 'socio-perceptual' theory of ASD that I will describe 
shortly. For the moment it is worth repeating that concurrent difficulties on tasks assessing 
different but overlapping abilities does not reveal anything about the causal relation between 
these abilities in development and that observations of non-specific emotion perception 
difficulties need to be considered in relation to demonstrations where such specificity is 
evident. The studies by Hobson and colleagues, outlined earlier, were chosen as examples 
for illustrating that emotion perception difficulties do exist in ASD, because they exemplify the 
kind of variable methodological approach that is needed in order to probe this domain of 
functioning effectively. These studies either attempted to employ carefully designed control 
tasks that aimed to rule out the possibility that general task demands, rather than emotion 
specific difficulties, could account for the diminished performance of individuals with ASD 
(e.g. Hobson, 1986a,b; Hobson, et al., 1988a). Or they created situations that allowed the 
authors to determine whether such individuals have the same natural tendency as non-
autistic individuals to attend to, and act upon, the emotional expressions of others (e.g. 
24 
Weeks & Hobson, 1987). Because these studies, and many subsequent ones, suggest that 
individuals with ASD experience often disproportionate difficulties in their perception of 
emotional expressions, and that such individuals deploy qualitatively different processes in 
order to 'decode' certain configurations of facial features as emotional, it is now widely 
accepted that the disorder is associated with limitations in the perception of affect. 
What further strengthens the foregoing conclusion is the fact that virtually all studies 
to date that have assessed the emotional competences of individuals with ASD within 
naturalistic settings have documented abnormalities3. In fact most available diagnostic 
instruments and screening tools (Lord, Rutter, Goode, Heemsbergen, Jordan, Mawhood et 
al., 1989; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994; Robins, Fein, Barton & Green, 2001; Schopler, 
Reichler, DeVellis & Daly, 1980) recognise abnormalities in reciprocal affective behaviours as 
a diagnostically sensitive manifestation of the disorder. It is consistently reported that 
individuals with ASD are less likely than non-autistic individuals to direct emotional 
expressions at others during naturalistic interactions (Bieberich & Morgan, 1998; Dawson, 
Hill, Spence, Galpert & Watson, 1990; Dissanayake, Sigman & Kasari, 1996; Joseph & 
Tager-Flusberg, 1997; Kasari, Sigman, Baumgartner & Stipek, 1993; Kasari, Sigman, Mundy 
& Yirmiya, 1990; Macdonald et al., 1989; Mundy & Sigman, 1989; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & 
Yirmiya, 1992; Snow, Herzig & Shapiro, 1987; Yirmiya, Kasari, Sigman & Mundy, 1989; 
Zwaigenbaum, Bryson, Rogers, Roberts, Brian & Szatmari, 2005) and Macdonald et al. 
(1989) found that individuals with ASD experience difficulties in expressing emotions that 
would typically be elicited by different situations (e.g. receiving a present). In addition, 
individuals with ASD tend not to automatically mimic the facial expressions of others even 
though they can do so when explicitly instructed (Mclntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman 
& Wilbarger, 2006). What the association between affect perception and affect expression 
reminds us of, is that emotional expressions ultimately serve an important communicative 
function. Just as children who are born deaf experience difficulties in learning how to speak, 
so children with ASD seem to have problems in learning how to modulate reciprocal social 
interchanges through the use of emotional expressions. The real-life consequences of this 
3 To the best of my knowledge no studies actually report typical emotional conduct in naturalistic observations of 
individuals with ASO. 
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communicative limitation are nowhere as elegantly exposed as in the studies by Kasari and 
Sigman and their colleagues who observed children's reactions to the emotional displays of 
others during semi-structured naturalistic play periods. In one of their experiments (Kasari. et 
aI., 1993), these authors set up a scenario during which ASD and non-ASD children were 
asked to complete two puzzles. After having done so the children were praised for their 
accomplishments and independent judges were asked to rate each child's reaction to the 
adult's praise. The ratings revealed that whilst all children expressed positive affect to a 
similar extent immediately after having completed the puzzles, children with ASD were less 
likely than children without such a diagnosis to reCiprocate the adult's praise with an affective 
expression of their own. Not only that, children with ASD were also less likely than non-
autistic children to actively encourage such praise by drawing the adult's attention to their 
accomplishment. In other words, whilst children with ASD seemed to experience pleasure in 
having completed their puzzles4 (otherwise why would they express positive affect at all?), 
they appeared neither compelled to communicate this experience to others nor did they seem 
to realise that others were attempting to join them in this emotional episode. In a series of 
even more telling studies (Corona, Dissanayake, Arbelle, Wellington & Sigman, 1998; 
Dissanayake, et al., 1996; Sigman, et al., 1992; see also Bacon, Fein, Morris, Waterhouse & 
Alien, 1998; Loveland & Tunali, 1991) the authors extended these findings to situations in 
which adults displayed negative rather than positive affect. More specifically, children were 
videoed during interactions with an experimenter or parent who suddenly expressed distress, 
fear or discomfort and independent judges were again asked to rate each child's reactions to 
these emotional displays. Not surprisingly, children with learning difficulties and typical 
children responded to the adult's expressions by interrupting their play behaviour and 
orienting to the adult, often with marked concern. Children with ASD, on the other hand, were 
more inclined to keep playing with their toys and ignore the adult. In addition, the study by 
Corona and colleagues (1998) showed that children with ASD, unlike non-autistic children, 
did not even exhibit physiological orienting responses (i.e. changes in heart rate) to the 
adult's distress. In other words, children with ASD did not only appear to be inattentive to the 
emotional experiences of other individuals but they seemed to be generally less responsive to 
4 I stress the word seemed here because I do not believe that individuals with ASO subjectively experience emotional 
states in the same way as non-autistic individuals do. I will discuss this issue in more depth in the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
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them. What is also worth noting about these studies is that the authors were not only able to 
assess how children would react to the fearful or distressed adult but also how they would 
react to the object eliciting these emotions. Here too, children with ASD were found to react 
atypically in comparison to non-autistic children. 
The evidence set out thus far suggests that individuals with ASD are often very 
markedly limited in multiple aspects of affectively patterned communication. Laboratory 
experiments and naturalistic observations converge in showing that emotional expressions 
are not particularly salient to them and although such individuals seem to be able to identify 
emotional expressions following explicit instructions, they often appear to deploy qualitatively 
atypical perceptual processes in order to do so. Together with the relatively infrequent 
attempts of individuals with ASD to initiate affective interchanges, these perceptual limitations 
severely compromise the foundations of emotional communication, affording autistic 
individuals fewer opportunities to share their emotional experiences with others and to learn 
about the emotional significance of environmental stimuli through them (see also Hobson, 
1993; 2002). That these disturbances exist and that they have serious repercussions for the 
developmental trajectory of the disorder is no longer disputed. What continues to divide 
opinion is what causes these abnormalities in the first place and it is to this debate that the 
discussion will now turn. 
The role of affective disturbances in the development of ASD 
Currently, four major theories offer explanations for the affective disturbances 
associated with ASD. These include the idea that abnormalities in the development of a 
neural network mediating socio-perceptual capacities is responsible for the emotional 
disturbances described above (e.g. Schultz, 2005; Schultz, Grelotti, Klin, Kleinman, Van der 
Gaag, Marois, et al., 2003), the suggestion that abnormalities in the self-regulation of 
behaviour plays a critical role (e.g. Loveland, 2005; Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006), the view 
that a deficient mechanism for the understanding of mental states is to blame (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Frith, 2003; Leslie & Frith, 1990) and finally the idea 
that a disruption in the development of affectively patterned interpersonal relations lies at the 
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root of the problem (e.g. Hobson, 1993; Hobson, 2002; Loveland, 2005). It is beyond the 
scope of the current review to discuss the extensive literature that informs these theories in 
detail. Instead the principal aim of the following overview is to show 1) that these alternative 
viewpoints converge on the suggestion that abnormalities of the amygdala are most likely to 
blame for the emotional disturbances characterising ASO, 2) that the developmental 
significance of abnormal emotional processes in the emergence of the clinical manifestations 
of ASO remain the matter of debate and 3) that the evidence discussed thus far cannot 
distinguish between theoretical frameworks that consider emotional disturbances as either a 
cause or consequence of the development of ASO. 
The socio-perceptual account and the amygdala 
The idea that abnormalities in the development of socio-perceptual capaCities are 
responsible for the affective disturbances associated with ASO originates primarily from the 
finding that such individuals tend to perceive faces through qualitatively deviant perceptual 
processes (Behrmann, Avidan, Leonard, Kimchi, Luna, Humphreys, et aI., 2006; Behrmann, 
Thomas & Humphreys, 2006; Oawson, Webb & McPartland, 2005; Grelotti, Gauthier & 
Schultz, 2002; Jemel, Mottron & Oawson, 2006; Lahaie, Mottron, Arguin, Berthiaume, Jemel 
& Saumier, 2006; Schultz, 2005; Wallace, Coleman & Bailey, 2008). Studies, such as that by 
Hobson and colleagues (Hobson et aI., 1988b) outlined earlier, suggest that individuals with 
ASO rely more on a piecemeal and featural rather than holistic and configural analysis of a 
face in order to identify emotional expressions (see also Oavis et aI., 1994; Deruelle, Rondan, 
Salle-Collemiche, Bastard-Rosset & Oa Fonseca, 2008; Gross, 2005; Tantam et aI., 1989; 
Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001). What has also become apparent, however, is that this atypical 
manner of analysing faces does not only interfere with the perception of affect but also with 
the perception of non-emotional information such as the identity (e.g. Boucher & Lewis, 1992; 
Boucher, Lewis & Collis, 1998; Davis, et aI., 1994; Deruelle et aI., 2008; Joseph & Tanaka, 
2003; Wallace et al., 2008) age (Gross, 2002; Gross, 2005; Hobson, 1983) or gender 
(Deruelle et aI., 2004) of an individual (see also section 2 of Table 1.1). In addition, eye-
tracking studies suggest that individuals with ASO tend not to fixate on faces as much as non-
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autistic individuals when viewing complex social scenes and that, even when they do, they 
look less at the eye-region and more at the mouth or non-feature regions of the face (Dalton, 
Nacewicz, Johnstone, Schaefer, Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, et al., 2005; Klin, Jones, Schultz, 
Volkmar & Cohen, 2002; Pelphrey, et al., 2002; Speer, Cook, McMahon & Clark, 2007; 
Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley & Piven, 2006). Together with an increasing number of recent 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies, which show that the neural correlates of face 
perception in ASD are also abnormal (Critchley, et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 2005; McPartland, 
Dawson, Webb, Panagiotides & Carver, 2004; Pierce, MUlier, Ambrose, Alien & Courchesne, 
2001; Piggot, et al., 2004), this evidence strongly suggests that general face processing 
abilities are compromised in ASD (see Bowler, 2007 and Jemel et al., 2006 for detailed 
overviews of this literature). 
On the basis of the evidence just mentioned, and because it is well established that 
infants exhibit a strong preference to attend to social stimuli (particularly faces) from birth 
(see Walker-Andrews, 1997 for a review), Schultz and his colleagues (e.g. Schultz, 2005; 
Schultz et al., 2003) argue that the social and affective disturbances associated with ASD 
arise because of abnormalities in the development of a neural system that sub-serves the 
perception of social information. Central to this system is an area known as the Fusiform 
gyrus (FG), which is located on the inferior portion of the temporal lobes and widely believed 
to be functionally specialised for the perception of faces (see Kanwisher, 2000 for a review). 
Although the FG was originally thought to be innately hardwired for face perception, it is now 
thought to be more flexibly involved in the processing of visual expertise (Gauthier, 
Skudlarski, Core & Anderson, 2000). As such, the functional organisation (and face 
specialisation) of the FG is moderated by experience and it is in this experience driven neural 
specialisation that Schultz (2005) suspects the causes of the autistic socio-emotional 
abnormalities. More specifically, Schultz (2005) argues that an early emerging abnormality of 
the amygdala - a limbic structure known to be involved in the processing of emotionally 
salient stimuli (e.g. LeDoux, 1994) - results in individuals with ASD being relatively 
insensitive and inattentive to their social environment (see also Dawson et al., 2005). As a 
consequence, the functional organisation of systems such as the FG is compromised and the 
course of reciprocal social and emotional development altered. 
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What makes the account summarised above appealing is that it explains the affective 
disturbances associated with ASD within a broader neurodevelopmental framework of social 
cognition. As such, the theory is not only relevant to our understanding of ASD but also to our 
endeavour to comprehend the neural basis of the complex reciprocal socio-emotional 
capacities that uniquely define the human condition. The principal assumptions underlying 
this ambitious prospect are 1) that the amygdala and FG form part of a perceptual system 
that is necessary for the processing of socially relevant stimuli 2) that the maturation of this 
system necessitates attention to (and the perception of) social stimuli and 3) that a failure of 
such attention compromises the development of the system in such a way as to give rise to 
the clinical manifestations of ASD. A considerable amount of evidence validates all three of 
these assumptions. Studies of neurological patients who have suffered injury to the FG, for 
instance, show that such individuals are severely compromised in processing faces (Farah, 
Levinson & Klein, 1995) and several functional neuroimaging studies of typical individuals 
confirm that the FG is activated Significantly more during face perception than object 
perception tasks (see Kanwisher, 2000 for a review). Similar neuropsychological evidence 
regarding the amygdala, confirms that also this structure is involved in processing socially 
relevant information, particularly in relation to identifying emotional expressions (see Adolphs, 
2003 for a review). In relation to the 2nd and 3rd assumptions listed above, there is no direct 
evidence to support the idea that abnormalities in the perception of, or attention to, social 
stimuli compromises the neural maturation of the FG or other areas relevant to social 
behaviour. However, a considerable amount of work with congenitally blind children confirms 
that a lack of visual experience compromises the development of interpersonal skills (e.g. 
Cass, Sonksen & McConachie, 1994). In fact, several studies have noted a striking Similarity 
between the reciprocal social abnormalities associated with congenital blindness and ASD 
(Bishop, Hobson & Lee, 2005; Brown, Hobson, Lee & Stevenson, 1997; Hobson & Bishiop, 
2003; Hobson, Lee & Brown, 1999; Minter, Hobson & Bishop, 1998; Preisler, 1995). Together 
with the accumulating evidence documenting structural and functional abnormalities of the 
FG and amygdala in ASD (Bachevalier, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Bauman & Kemper, 2005; 
Critchley et aI., 2000; Dawson, Webb, Schellenberg, Dager, Friedman, Aylward, et aI., 2002; 
Schultz, 2005), this similarity between congenitally blind and ASD individuals lends strong 
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support to the suggestion that the clinically defining symptoms of ASD may be the result of 
abnormalities in early emerging socio-perceptual functioning. 
In addition to offering a plausible account of the reciprocal social impairments 
associated with ASD, the socio-perceptual framework can also account for some of the sub-
clinical manifestations of the disorder, such as the limitations in imitative behaviour (e.g. 
Hobson & Hobson, 2008; Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse & Wehner, 2003) and difficulties in 
understanding behaviour in terms of mental states (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995). Recent imaging 
studies suggest that the FG and amygdala play a role in such capacities (e.g. De Gelder, 
Snyder, Greve, Gerard & Hadjikhani, 2004; Lee, Josephs, Dolan & Critchley, 2006; Williams, 
Whiten, Waiter, Pechey & Perrett, 2007; Schultz et al., 2003) and congenitally blind 
individuals also exhibit developmental delays in these areas (Bishop et al., 2005; Minter et al., 
1998). Another important asset of the socio-perceptual framework is that it allows room for 
the possibility that additional abnormalities outside the socio-perceptual brain network are 
responsible for atypicalities in domains other than the socio-emotional sphere. The account is 
for example compatible with evidence suggesting that perceptual functions operate differently 
in ASD (e.g. Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawso, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack, 2006) and 
it may even be argued that abnormalities in socio-perceptual functioning constitute a specific 
instance of the autistic tendency to process information in a piecemeal and perceptually 
driven rather than holistic and conceptually driven manner (Behrman et al., 2006; Lahaie et 
al., 2006). Similarly, the account does not exclude the possibility that abnormalities of the 
frontal lobes contribute to the clinical manifestations of ASD (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 
2006) or that cerebellar or other brain-stem abnormalities are involved in the neuropathology 
underlying the disorder (e.g. Courchesne, 1997; Jou, Minshew, Melhem, Keshavan & 
Hardan, 2008). In other words, whilst the socio-perceptual account is specific enough to offer 
a neurologically plausible explanation for the clinically defining socio-emotional 
manifestations of the disorder, it is also sensitive to the fact that ASD is a complex 
multipathologic condition. 
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The role of behavioural self-regulation 
The view put forward by Loveland and her colleagues (Loveland, 2001, 2005; 
Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006) in many ways complements the ideas put forward by Schultz 
(2005) and so requires little introduction. Loveland pOints out that ASD is characterised by 
abnormalities not only with respect to the perception of socio-emotional signals but also with 
regards to the regulation of behaviour in accordance with these signals. This may seem a 
trivial point to make because it should come as no surprise that an individual who 
experiences difficulties in perceiving certain properties of the world should also respond to 
these properties differently. Loveland's arguments are far from trivial, however, because they 
stress that perception is not merely a passive process but one that is intimately linked with 
action, particularly in development (see also Fogel, 1993). Perceiving the emotional 
significance of someone else's facial and postural expressions is of little use if one does not 
know how to respond appropriately, and not understanding the behavioural affordances of 
emotional signals may be reason enough not to attend to them. Thus the difficulty in ASD 
may not arise from a dysfunctional perceptual process but from an abnormality in a system 
that regulates behaviour accordingly. As outlined earlier, individuals with ASD are 
consistently found to be rather unresponsive to the emotional displays of others (e.g. 
Loveland & Tunali, 1991; Sigman et aI., 1992; Yirmiya et al.,1992) and this passivity is often 
observed even when such individuals seem to be aware of the emotional displays in question 
(e.g. Bacon et aI., 1998; Corona et aI., 1998). Corona et al. (1998) for instance, found that 
although children with ASD were less likely than comparison children to look at an adult who 
simulated distress, both groups of children looked more often at the adult when s/he 
simulated distress than when s/he displayed an emotionally neutral expression. In other 
words, children with ASD differentiated between an adult's expressive displays but did not 
regulate their behaviour to the same extent as children without this disorder. 
Within the context described above, it becomes apparent that any account of the 
socio-emotional difficulties characterising ASD must acknowledge the role of behavioural self-
regulation, and Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) approach this challenge from a neural point 
of view. Based on evidence implicating aspects of the frontal cortex (in particular orbitofrontal 
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regions) in behavioural self-regulation, Bachevalier and Loveland (2006) argue that ASD may 
be characterised by abnormalities not only in relation to socio-perceptual functions of the 
amygdala but also in relation to orbitofrontal-amygdala interactions that may be involved in 
socio-emotional behavioural self-regulation. Although speculative at present, this framework 
not only complements Schultz's (2005) account, but also promises to address some of the 
heterogeneity of the symptom severity associated with ASD. More specifically, Bachevalier 
and Loveland (2006) suggest that the maturation of the amygdalo-orbitofrontal system may 
be compromised at different stages in development and either be associated with more 
widespread mediotemporal-frontal dysfunctions or not. Since the developmental time course 
of the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex differ (e.g. Happaney, Zelazo & Stuss, 2004; Nikolic 
& Kostovic, 1986), variations in the timing of the neuropathological onset in ASD would 
probably alter the nature and severity of the orbitofrontal-amygdala system's dysfunction and 
thus alter the symptom severity characterising the developing child. Abnormalities early in life 
may affect the amygdala disproportionately and result in the kind of developmental cascade 
described by Schultz (2005). Later emerging abnormalities may primarily affect the 
orbitofrontal cortex (with indirect effects on the amygdala) and result in socio-emotional 
difficulties that are less of a perceptual and more of a behavioural self-regulation nature. If 
abnormalities extend to other mediotemporal - frontal systems, such as the hippocampal -
dorsolateral prefrontal circuit, ASD may be associated with more severe intellectual difficulties 
than when this system is spared (Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006). Although these suggestions 
await empirical testing, they pose interesting questions for future studies to address. 
The Mentalising account 
The socio-perceptual account of Schultz (2005) and the framework put forward by 
Bachevalier & Loveland (2006) offer well founded explanations for the socio-emotional 
abnormalities of the disorder in terms of neurodevelopmental processes. Whilst such neural 
accounts are perfectly acceptable, they reveal little about the cognitive and psychological 
processes that would allow a characterisation of ASD in terms of the mental experiences of 
those diagnosed with the disorder. This is the level of explanation that developmental 
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psychologists seek, and it is this level that remains the source of much controversy. 
According to advocates of the 'mentaJising' account of ASD (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith, 
2001; Frith, 2003), the emotional disturbances associated with the disorder are a reflection of 
an underlying impairment in the capacity to understand other people's minds. In direct 
opposition to this view, Hobson (1993, 2002) argues that the autistic limitations in various 
cognitive faculties, including the ability to 'mentaJise', are the consequence of an infant failing 
to develop affectively patterned relations with others. I will outline this latter view in more 
detail in the next section. First, I will summarise the former. 
Mentalising refers to the ability to understand, describe and explain behaviour in 
terms of mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions, etc ... ) and it is well established that 
individuals with ASD experience difficulties in this domainS. Such individuals often fail to 
understand that someone's actions are motivated by their beliefs about reality rather than the 
actual state of affairs (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Baron-Cohen, et aI., 1985; Happe, 1995; 
Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989; Surian 
& Leslie, 1999), for example, and they infrequently refer to mental states in order to describe 
social phenomena (Serra, et al., 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 1992) or the function of the brain 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b). Individuals with ASD also have trouble comprehending that acts of 
deception can alter somebody's behaviour, and that somebody's behaviour may not 
necessarily reflect a person's inner thoughts (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe & Tidswell, 1991; 
Sodian & Frith, 1992). When asked to sort pictures in order to form coherent stories, 
individuals with ASD perform worse on narratives that revolve around the thoughts and 
believes of story characters whilst they have little difficulty with stories concerning physical 
causality (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986). They also find it hard to recognize stories in 
which a character commits a faux pas (Baron-Cohen, Q'Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 
1999), and they frequently have trouble appreCiating that the literal meaning of language is 
qualified by the intentions of the speaker and the listener (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). Finally, individuals with ASD perform poorly on a test battery in which mental 
SAlthough the term 'Theory of Mind' is often employed to describe this ability, I will avoid this terminology throughout 
this thesis in order to avoid the implication that mental states are necessarily understood through a process of 
theorising. Although this view is endorsed by so~e. (e.g. Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1999; 
Perner, 1991) it is not the only way of conceptualiSing the ability to understand behaviour in terms of mental states 
(e.g. Gordon, 1996; Hobson, 1991b; 1993; 2002). 
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states need to be inferred from video-clips of emotionally charged interactions (Golan, Baron-
Cohen, Hill & Golan, 2006; Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008), sound recordings of speech 
segments (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006) or photographed eye-regions of a face (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Jolliffe, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Ring, Wheelwright, Bullmore, Brammer, Simmons et aI., 1999, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). In short, individuals with ASD exhibit difficulties 
across a variety of experimental paradigms in which behaviours need to be understood, 
described or predicted in terms of unobservable mental phenomena (see Baron-Cohen, 
2001; Bowler, 2007 and Frith, 2003 for more detailed reviews of this literature). 
When evidence of a mentalising difficulty in ASD first emerged during the 1980s, it 
stimulated one of the most wide-ranging and long-lasting debates in the history of 
developmental psychology. Motivated by philosophical questions regarding the nature of the 
'Mind' and the 'Self and what it means to entertain mental representations of the world, 
different opinions have emerged about what it means to be able to mentalise, why and from 
what the ability has evolved, how mentalising can best be measured, when the ability 
emerges during childhood, what role language and culture might play in its development and 
why self awareness might be important for the ability to mature. It is far beyond the scope of 
the current review to delve into this extensive literature (see Baron-Cohen, 1995; Bowler, 
2007; Heyes, 1998; Hobson, 1993; Hobson, 2002; Perner, 1991; Scholl & Leslie, 1999; 
Tirassa, Bosco & Colle, 2006; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003 for relevant 
discussions). Fortunately, a detailed discussion is not necessary in order to show that the 
affective disturbances associated with ASD can be plausibly explained in terms of a 
mentalising impairment. All one needs to be content with is a conceptualisation of mentalising 
that presupposes that the processes involved in this ability are a prerequisite for the kinds of 
socio-emotional capacities that are characteristically disrupted in ASD and this is precisely 
the assumption underlying the 'Mindreading' model proposed by Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005). 
According to Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005), the ability to mentalise reflects the operation 
of a Mindreading System that consists of six neurocognitive mechanisms - The Intentionality 
Detector (ID), Eye Direction Detector (EDD), Emotion Detector (TED), Shared Attention 
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Mechanism (SAM), Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) and The Empathising System 
(TESS). In typical development, the ID, EDD and TED components are the first to be 
functionally mature (between birth and 9 months of age) and allow infants to understand 
simple mental states by building dyadic representations of certain Agent-Object relations. 
More specifically, the ID represents self-propelled movements as goal-directed and volitional, 
EDD ascribes perceptual capacities to entities with eyes, and TED represents certain acts in 
terms of affective states such as anger and happiness. Thus, during the first 9 months of life, 
infants acquire an increasingly sophisticated understanding of how agents (including 
themselves) can relate to objects (including other agents) in their environment through 
unobservable mental processes such as 'wanting' something (ID) 'seeing' something (EDD) 
or being 'angry' about something (TED). According to Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) these 
mechanisms are, in principle, functionally intact in ASD although their development may be 
delayed. Support for this suggestion stems .from studies, which indicate 1) that individuals 
with ASD ascribe volitional mental states to agents (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Bowler & 
Thommen, 2000), 2) that they are able to detect what someone is looking at (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1989c) or when someone is looking at them (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-
Smith, Grant & Walker, 1995)6 and 3) that they sometimes do not seem to have any difficulty 
with the perception of non-mentalistic emotional expressions such as anger, fear or 
happiness (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Spitz & Cross, 1993; Castelli, 2005, Prior et aI., 1990( 
The next mechanism to mature in typical development (between 9 and 18 months) is 
SAM, which uses the dyadic representations from ID, EDD and TED to build more complex 
triadic representations of Self-Agent-Object relations. These triadic representations allow 
young children to understand that the object of their own mental scrutiny may also be the 
object of another agent's mental scrutiny and since SAM provides a link between the ID, EDD 
and TED mechanisms, children also come to understand that the eyes (EDD) are particularly 
6Some studies suggest that individuals with ASD may experience some difficulties in deteding gaze diredion (e.g. 
Senju, Yaguchi, Tojo & Hasegawa, 2003). Such findings may refled a developmental delay in the maturation of EDD 
to which some experimental paradigms may be more sensitive. The prinCipal argument here is that the fundional 
integrity of ID, EDD and TED are relatively preserved (relative to the fundion of the other mechanisms of the 
Mindreading System which are severely compromised). 
71t is worth noting that the evidence for this last claim is rather scarce (see Table 1.1) 
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informative about an agent's desires (ID) and affective states (TED)8. Thus, the 
computational capacities of SAM equip the young child with a host of new behavioural skills 
such as gaze monitoring, protodeclarative pointing and social referencing that allow for a 
much richer interaction with others. The deficient emergence of these so called jOint attention 
behaviours in ASD (see Bruinsma, Koegel & Koegel, 2004 for a review) is what prompts 
Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) to suggest that the functioning of SAM is severely compromised in 
this disorder and that this has detrimental consequences for the subsequent maturation of the 
last two components of the Mindreading System - ToMM and TESS. 
In order to understand what ToMM is needed for, it is useful to consider the 
limitations of SAM. According to the Mindreading System, SAM mediates an understanding of 
triadic relations that are limited to those that are perceptually anchored and thus rigidly fixed 
in reality. That is, SAM is unable to represent so called epistemic mental states (e.g. beliefs, 
pretence, imaginations, dreams, etc ... ) that can either stand in true or false relationship to the 
actual state of the world (e.g. one can believe, pretend or imagine that it is raining even if it is 
not). These mental state concepts can only be represented by ToMM, which is thought to 
gradually mature between 18 and 48 months of age. Following a theoretical framework 
developed by Leslie (1987), Baron-Cohen (1995) suggests that the function of ToMM is to 
compute the full range of epistemic mental states (believing, pretending, dreaming, etc ... ) by 
enabling representations of the world to be decoupled from reality. Without going into undue 
detail, the process of decoupling (see Leslie, 1987 for a detailed description) involves copying 
'true' representations of objects into a working memory type store where they can be 
manipulated without the constraints of reality. This decoupling process provides the 
necessary context for children to understand that mental (or any other) representations can 
either reflect the world truthfully (e.g. he thinks it is raining when it is actually raining) or 
falsely (e.g. he thinks it is raining when it is actually sunny). The first evidence that young 
children comprehend this characteristic of mental phenomena is when they start to 
understand (and engage in) acts of pretence and symbolic play (e.g. use a banana as if it 
were a telephone) around 18 months of age (Leslie, 1987, see also Perner, 1991). Since the 
8This proposed link forms the basis of mentalising tasks in which individuals are asked to infer mental states and 
certain emotions form photographed eye-regions of a face (e.g. Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999). 
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operation of ToMM crucially depends on the input from SAM and because SAM is functionally 
impaired in ASD, Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) suggests that virtually all aspects of ToMM 
should be compromised in this condition. Indeed, pretend and symbolic play are severely 
delayed or abnormal in children with ASD (see Jarrold, 2003 for a review of this literature) 
and as outlined above, there is an impressive amount of evidence to suggest that individuals 
with ASD have difficulties in understanding a wide range of epistemic mental states. 
The final component of Baron-Cohen's (2005) Mindreading System is TESS, which 
enables children not only to describe and understand behaviour in terms of mental states but 
also to respond to such states with appropriate affect. In other words, TESS allows children to 
react to another's mental states with empathy and according to Baron-Cohen this ability does 
not mature until the age of about 14 months during typical development (see also Perner, 
1991). Similar to SAM and ToMM, TESS accomplishes its function by computing triadic 
relations, this time of a rather special kind that Baron-Cohen (2005) calls E-Representations 
(Le. Empathising Representations). Formally expressed, these representations take the form 
of Self Affective State-Other Affective State-Object relations, with the critical constraint that the affective 
state of the self must be appropriate to and triggered by the affective state of the other 
(Baron-Cohen, 2005). Again, the computational capacities of TESS (which are not specified) 
rely on the input from SAM and again this means that the behaviours supported by TESS 
should be severely compromised in ASD. In support of this suggestion, individuals with ASD 
seem to have particular difficulties understanding the concept of empathy (e.g. Dziobek et al., 
2008; Yirmiya, et al., 1992) and there is evidence indicating that they struggle with the idea 
that beliefs can cause emotions even though they have no trouble comprehending that 
physical events can do so (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen, et al., 1993; Dennis, et al., 
2000). In addition, studies such as the one by Sigman and colleagues (Sigman et al., 1992) 
outlined earlier, demonstrate that individuals with ASD do not react empathically to the 
distress of others. Finally, there is also evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD have 
difficulties understanding particularly those kinds of emotions that rely on a greater degree of 
mentalising. Pride and embarrassment, for example, arise when one realises that one's 
behaviour is the focus of someone else's mental scrutiny and children with ASD have 
difficulties explaining these emotions even when they can describe Simpler emotions such as 
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happiness or sadness (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Capps, et al., 1992 but see Hillier & 
Allinson, 2002). In short, the patterning of affective disturbances associated with ASD, 
together with their severe difficulties on tasks that require an understanding of other people's 
minds, is consistent with the suggestion that deficiencies in a Mindreading System are 
responsible for much of the socio-emotional atypicalities characterising the disorder. 
Before leaving the topic of Mindreading, it is worth pointing out that this framework is 
compatible with the socio-perceptual account offered by Schultz (2005). As outlined earlier, 
Schultz (2005) suggests that the amygdala is essential for directing an infant's attention 
toward social stimuli (particularly the face), allowing the socio-perceptual brain network (e.g. 
the Fusiform Gyrus) to functionally specialise for the modulation of socio-emotional 
behaviours. According to this view, the socio-emotional deficiencies associated with ASD are 
the result of an early emerging amygdala abnormality and the resulting disruption of a socio-
perceptual brain network that normally modulates socio-emotional behaviours. Baron-Cohen 
(1995,2005), also suggests that the amygdala plays an important role in directing attention to 
social stimuli (particularly the eye region of a face; i.e. EDD) but unlike Schultz, he attempts 
to specify the developmental consequences of such attention in cognitive rather than neural 
terms. More specifically, he argues that attention to the eyes plays an important role in the 
maturation of a Mindreading System that mediates the understanding of how behaviour is 
guided by mental representations of the world. The socio-emotional abnormalities 
characterising ASD are therefore considered to reflect a disruption in the computational 
mechanisms subserving the ability to understand other people's minds. 
ASD as a disorder of affectivelv patterned interpersonal relations 
Whilst few authors would deny that socially oriented attention is important (and even 
necessary) for the development of affectively patterned interpersonal skills, not everyone is 
content with the idea that such attention promotes the maturation of interpersonal life by 
facilitating the development of computational mechanisms such as a Mindreading System. 
Hobson (1993, 2002) has a rather different opinion and argues that abilities such as 
'mentalising' actually result from, rather than promote, reciprocal social development. 
39 
Hobson's (1993, 2002) approach is based on the assumption that much of an infant's 
cognitive development is anchored in an innate disposition to psychologically and emotionally 
relate to other individuals. He agrees that socially oriented attention constitutes an important 
facet of this disposition, but for Hobson the attention to and perception of other people is not 
the driving force in development. What matters the most is an infants' emotional engagement 
with and re/atedness to others, which provides her with the means to learn about the world 
(and the people within it) through the attitudes and emotional orientations of others. On the 
basis of this view, the clinically defining socio-emotional abnormalities of ASD are therefore 
seen as the result of a failure to establish affective interpersonal relations with others. 
In line with Hobson's theory is the observation that infants, soon after birth, do not 
simply observe and attend to other individuals. They also actively react to and engage with 
them. As mentioned earlier, it is now well established that infants exhibit a strong preference 
to attend to social stimuli (see Walker-Andrews, 1997 for a review) from birth. Neonates, for 
instance, preferentially look at faces and face-like stimuli rather than non-face stimuli (e.g. 
Cassia, Simion & Umilta, 2001; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & Morton, 1991; Turati, Simion, 
Milani & Umilta, 2002; Valenza, Simion, Cassia & Umilta, 1996) and the human auditory 
system is so finely attuned to the perception of human speech (Ramus, Hauser, Miller, Morris 
& Mehler, 2000; Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004) that even before birth the foetus 
distinguishes between the mother's voice and that of a stranger (Kisilevsky, Hains, Lee, Xie, 
Huang, Ye, et al., 2003). Young infants, however, are not merely passive perceivers of their 
social surroundings. They are equipped with a variegated behavioural repertoire that allows 
them to actively control and synchronise with the behaviours of others. For instance, 
neonates have been found to synchronise their general motility levels with the patterning of 
adult speech (e.g. Condon, 1979; Kato, Takahashi, Sawada, Kobayashi, Watanabe & Ishii, 
1983). This, so-called 'entrainment' is thought to facilitate a primitive, yet coordinated, 
interchange between the infant and her caretakers (Kato et ai, 1983). In addition, it is now 
well established that infants, only a few days old, will imitate a range of facial and gestural 
behaviours (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1989, 1997; Meltzoff, 2007), including certain 
expressions of emotions such as happiness, sadness and surprise (Field, Woodson, 
Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). This last finding is particularly important because it shows that, 
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even during this very early stage in development, infants are equipped with the basic motoric 
competences to engage in emotionally charged interactions. In fact, careful analyses of 
imitative behaviours have shown that neonates are emotionally expressive even when they 
are imitating non-emotional expressions such as mouth opening (Kugiumutzakis, Kokkinaki, 
Makrodimitraki & Vitalaki, 2005) and even outside the context of imitation, neonates are 
emotionally surprisingly expressive. Soon after birth, neonates spontaneously smile, even 
when asleep (see Messinger & Fogel, 2007 for a review), and three day old neonates 
express disgust in response to smelling unpleasant odours (see Soussignan & Schaal, 2005 
for a review). Regardless of whether one considers these neonatal emotional expressions as 
intentional or reflexive, the fact that they are present from birth and that they are recognised 
as emotionally meaningful by adults means that infants are born with the necessary 
competences to send emotional signals to others and hence influence their behaviour. 
The synchronised and emotionally expressive behavioural repertoire of neonates 
described above constitutes the earliest form of interpersonal engagement between an infant 
and her social environment (see also Trevarthen's concept of 'primary intersubjectivity'; e.g. 
Trevarthen, 1979). Although the synchronicity at this young age is not easy to detect, from 
the age of about 6 to 8 weeks, the reciprocal intent and communicative value of infant 
behaviour is no longer so elusive. At this age, infants start to use gaze patterns, social smiles 
(Le. smiles directed at others) and vocalisations to modulate face-ta-face interactions with 
others (e.g. Lavelli & Fogel, 2002; Messinger & Fogel, 2007; Trevarthen, 1979; Tronick, Als & 
Adamson, 1979) and over the course of the next few months these reciprocal social 
behaviours become increasingly well integrated, timed and co-ordinated. Most important for 
the current discussion is that infants from about 6 - 8 weeks become significantly distressed 
when the flow (Le. the timing and synchronicity) of reciprocal social behaviour is disrupted. 
During the still-face paradigm, for instance, an infant's previously energetic and positive 
engagement with an adult becomes sober and negative when the adult ceases to react and 
simply maintains a blank expression (see Adamson & Frick, 2003 for a review of the still-face 
paradigm). Similarly, when the contingency between the infant's behaviour and that of a 
social partner is temporally distorted (through the use of delayed video-feedback), infants 
become visibly disconcerted (e.g. Soussignan, Nadel, Canet & Gerardin, 2006; Striano, 
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Henning & Stahl, 2005; Striano & Bertin, 2005). What these observations show, is that the 
increasingly sophisticated interchanges between an infant and her caretaker continue to be 
intensely emotional (see Nadel & Muir, 2005 for a collection of reviews). For Hobson (1993, 
2002), this is the crucial point to emphasise because this emotional dimension leads to a 
transformation of an infant's understanding of other people. Initially (i.e. during the first 9 
months or so) infants primarily understand other people as the kind of 'thing' that affords 
synchronous and co-ordinated interaction. What they do not yet understand, however, is that 
other people engage with and relate to the world in much the same way as they themselves 
do. The first step toward such understanding is the mutual experience provided by the 
emotional dimension of interpersonal engagement, which enables both interactive partners to 
'feel' within themselves what they observe in the expressions of the other. From the point of 
view of the infant, this experience affords her direct access to the emotional directedness of 
others, both toward herself and toward other objects in the world. There is an obvious 
problem, with this state of affairs. If the infant experiences the subjective orientations of 
others within herself, how can she distinguish between her own subjective experiences of the 
world and that of others? According to Hobson (1993, 2002), the answer lies within the 
infant's increasingly sophisticated interpersonal skills. By being able to take control of 
reciprocal social interactions and manipulate the behaviours of others, infants start to direct 
the subjective orientations of others toward different aspects of their own (the infant's) 
behaviour. One moment the adult directs his attention to the infant's smile, the next he tickles 
a moving limb, and after that he places a finger in the infant's opening hand. And when the 
adult fails to play along, all the infant needs to do is deploy an arsenal of smiles, coos, cries 
and gaze-patterns in order to re-engage him. What the infant learns through these 
experiences, is that the subjective orientations of others are 'directable' and that they are 
'directable' toward things that the infant herself is engaged with. In other words, the 9 month 
old infant is beginning to understand that her own orientations toward the world are 
independent of the orientations of other people and this means that there is something 
special about times when both direct their orientations to the same objects. This transition in 
the infant's understanding marks the emergence of joint attentional skills. 
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In discussing the Mindreading account offered by Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005), we 
have already seen that the age of 9 months marks an important developmental milestone in 
relation to ASD. According to Baron-Cohen, this is the time at which the Shared Attention 
Mechanism (SAM) typically comes online. A developmental failure of SAM is regarded as the 
onset of the behavioural manifestations of ASD and the evidence for jOint attention, 
mentalising and empathizing impairments are taken as supportive evidence for this account. 
Hobson (2002) also regards the 9 month developmental milestone as important in relation to 
ASD but for rather different reasons. For Hobson (2002) the developmental trajectory of ASD 
does not start with a failure of some mechanism to develop at 9 months. Instead he suggests 
that the disorder has been developing since birth. He argues that the infant with ASD never 
experiences the kind of emotional connectedness with others that forms the foundation of 
understanding other people as people. Thus, by 9 months, the child has not had the 
necessary experiences with others to understand that the subjective orientations of others 
can be brought in line with the child's own. It is for this reason that individuals with ASD fail to 
develop the rich joint-attentional skills that characterise typically developing children and not 
because some computational mechanism fails to come online. Another point on which 
Hobson (1993, 2002) and Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) disagree, is how a failure in the 
development of joint attention around the age of 9 months compromises the subsequent 
development of reciprocal social behaviour in such a way as to give rise to the clinical 
manifestations of ASD. As described in the previous section, Baron-Cohen suggests that 
impairments in joint attention (i.e. SAM) compromise the maturation of ToMM and TESS, 
which mediate an understanding of behaviour in terms of mental states and empathy. As a 
result of this developmental knock-on effect, individuals with ASD are limited in their 
imaginative and symbolic play activities (see Jarrold, 2003 for a review), their understanding 
of behaviour in terms of mental states and emotions (see Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2001) and 
their empathic reactions to the distress of others (e.g. Sigman et aI., 1992; Yirmiya, et aI., 
1992). Hobson (1993, 2002) agrees that these manifestations of ASD are linked to the 
impairments in the development of joint attentional skills, but not in terms of a computational 
processing chain. Hobson suggests that an infant's failure to share the attentional focus with 
another individual prevents her from learning about the world through the experiences of 
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others. Recall, that the studies by Sigman and colleagues outlined earlier (e.g. Sigman et al., 
1992; Sigman, 1998) showed that children with ASD do not only fail to attend to adults 
displaying distress but that they also fail to alter their behaviour in relation to the object 
eliciting this reaction in the adult. In this context Hobson emphasises that infants do not 
simply observe or attend to what another person is attending to but that they are relating to 
that person's emotional orientation toward the world. Through this related ness, the child is 
being moved to different psychological standpoints in relation to objects in the world and, 
according to Hobson (1993, 2002), this movement in psychological space facilitates the 
development of imaginative abilities and a deeper understanding of other people's mental 
lives. In parallel, this joint engagement with others enables a child to learn about the 
emotional saliency of objects and events in the world. The clinical manifestations of ASD, 
therefore, are seen as the continuing failure of interpersonal engagement rather than a 
developmental failure of a cold and calculating cognitive machinery 
Summary 
I hope that the preceding overview has demonstrated three things. First, that it is well 
established that individuals with ASD are severely limited in multiple aspects of emotional 
communication. Second, that explanations of these limitations at the neural level converge on 
the suggestion that abnormalities of the amygdala are most likely involved. And finally, that 
explanations at the psychological level continue to differ as to whether ASD is fundamentally 
a disorder of emotional development (e.g. Hobson, 2002) or of socio-cognitive development 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2005). Within the scope of the current thesis it has not been possible to 
outline all the evidence that is relevant to this last debate in detail. A thorough consideration 
of the similarities and differences between children with ASD, congenitally blind children, and 
children who are emotionally deprived during infancy (e.g. Romanian orphans), for instance, 
would have been informative in relation to Hobson's (2002) account, whilst a more focused 
discussion of the evidence pertaining to the amygdala's involvement in social cognition may 
have helped to further furnish the arguments of Baron-Cohen (2005). The prinCipal aim, 
however, was not to provide an in-depth discussion of a debate that has prevailed in the 
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study of ASD for almost three decades but to convince the reader that this debate continues 
to be unresolved. In this context the important point to make is that the currently available 
evidence, even if it stems from various sources, can be accommodated within both Baron-
Cohen's (2005) and Hobson's (2002) account. 
One of the main difficulties in distinguishing between the validity of the frameworks 
proposed by Hobson (1993, 2005) and Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005), is the fact that, like all 
theories, they are open to refinement. Hobson's account, for instance, does not specify what 
it means to be engaged with another emotionally. The concept is defined only loosely by the 
behavioural patterns that take place between an infant and her caregiver. As such, the 
definition of interpersonal engagement can be refined on the basis of new observations 
regarding interpersonal behavioural patterns. In the case of Baron-Cohen's account, the 
theoretical malleability arises from the modular structure of the Mindreading System. Between 
1995 and 2005, this system has changed from a 3-component computational mechanism to a 
5-component one (TED and TESS were added) and as a result the system can now better 
account for the emotional disturbances that characterise ASD. It is important to note that 
these observations are not meant as criticisms of the respective theories. Redefining theories 
in light of new evidence is what scientific progress is all about. Sometimes newly 
accumulated data require a drastic change in the formulation of theories, such as when 
Copernicus placed the sun rather than the earth at the centre of our solar system. More often 
than not, however, theories are not entirely wrong and instead capture something important 
about the way things really are. They just do not always capture that 'something' in quite the 
right way, requiring a small adjustment to the definitions and terms of the theory. In 
psychology, as in every other science, it is this process of theoretical refinement that results 
in ever more detailed explanations of the phenomenon of interest. The unfortunate state of 
affairs regarding the debate surrounding the emotional disturbances evident in ASD, is that 
two competing theories offer equally valid explanations for the same empirical phenomena 
whilst being equally accommodating of new findings. The question is, how can we resolve 
this theoretical deadlock? 
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A closer look at what emotions are 
After having discussed the emotional disturbances associated with ASD over dozens 
of pages, it may seem strange to ask what emotions actually are. Yet, if we want to determine 
whether abnormalities in emotional development play a central role in the development of 
ASD, we need to specify what we mean when we say that something is 'emotional'. Neither 
Hobson (1993, 2002) nor Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005) consider this issue in any great detail, 
and they do not need to, for their theories are about explaining the socio-emotional difficulties 
associated with ASD and not the emotional difficulties per se. Both authors focus their 
considerations on how emotional behaviours influence reciprocal social development and 
how development in this domain relates to other areas of cognition. Hobson (1993, 2002), for 
instance, identifies the mutual experience that emotional episodes provide for an infant and 
her caregiver as a key factor in social development and he maintains that cognitive capacities 
mature within this affectively patterned social context. Baron-Cohen (1995, 2005), by 
contrast, emphasises that emotions need to be understood as mental phenomena in order for 
one to make sense of the emotional nuances of reciprocal social behaviour, and a pre-
condition for this level of understanding is the development of certain neurocognitive 
mechanisms. What both of these authors overlook, is the fact that emotions are not merely a 
social phenomenon. Emotions play an important role in our lives regardless of whether we 
are alone or in the company of others; they influence our attention, modulate our learning, 
and alter our perceptions of the world. Thus, if there is something severely amiss in terms of 
how emotional processes develop in ASD, we would expect the consequences to be evident 
regardless of whether emotions are studied within the context of social behaviour or not. 
Looking back on the evidence discussed so far, it becomes immediately apparent that we 
know virtually nothing about how emotional processes operate outside the context of social 
cognition in ASD and this gap in the literature is what the following experimental chapters will 
try to fill. Chapter 2 will present the findings from three experiments that explore the influence 
of emotional factors on learning and memory in ASD. Chapter 3 will consider the influence of 
emotional factors on perceptual processes, and Chapter 4 will examine fear conditioning. 
Since four of the five experiments presented in these chapters have either been published, or 
are currently under review (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 
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under review a, Gaigg & Bowler, under review b), they will be presented as stand-alone 
articles and as such, contain detailed descriptions of the literature most pertinent to them. In 
order to avoid repetition, therefore, the current chapter will conclude with some general 
considerations about the nature of emotions and the formulation of the principal hypothesis 
that motivates the subsequent studies. 
Arousal. Cognition and the subjective experience of Feelings 
Emotions have been at the centre of fierce debates for more than a century and so it 
is just as well that, for the current purposes, it suffices to focus on issues that all authors 
agree on. First, however, it is necessary to start with the rather dull task of commenting on 
some terminological distinctions since these continue to be the source of many debates. The 
first point to make, in this context, is that the current thesis uses the terms emotion and affect 
in a theoretically neutral sense to describe behaviours, processes and experiences alike. This 
decision reflects the fact that these terms are used commonly in this manner in day-to-day 
conversations and so ascribing specific meanings to them would inevitably lead to confusion. 
Other words, however, are used with more deliberation. The word 'feeling' and its derivatives, 
for instance, is reserved to describe the subjective experience people describe when they are 
asked to report on their current emotional state. It reflects a person's conscious awareness of 
experiencing an emotion. It is worth noting, about the word 'feeling', that it is commonly also 
used to describe the subjective experience of phYSical sensations such as temperature (e.g. I 
feel cold) and homeostatic imbalances (e.g. I feel thirsty, I feel dizzy). There is a thin line 
between these two uses of the word and it is not a coincidence that descriptions of physical 
sensations often figure in reports of emotional states (e.g. hot with rage, shaking with fear). 
What distinguishes the two will become apparent shortly. Another term with a specified 
meaning is 'arousal', which denotes the automatic alterations in bodily states that take place 
during an emotional episode. Arousal is the product of the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
branches of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and as such reflects the state of a 
multifaceted homeostatic system. An important feature of arousal is that it manifests in 
various ways such as changes in heart-rate, respiratory function, blood pressure, body 
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temperature, vasoconstriction, pupil-dilation, muscle tension and gland secretions. The final 
word worth a brief comment is 'cognition', which describes the information processing 
capacities of our brain (i.e. cognitive neuroscience) and mind (i.e. cognitive psychology). 
Traditionally, emotions were not considered under the rubric of 'cognition', and during the 
height of the cognitive revolution the two words almost acquired the status of antonyms (see 
Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996 for further discussion). Whilst this contrast between emotion 
and cognition has started to fade in recent years, for the purposes of the current thesis it is 
useful to keep the two apart. Thus, whenever the word 'cognition' is used here, it refers to 
inherently non-emotional processes including learning, memory, attention, perception, 
decision-making, problem-solving and mental imagery. On a final note, it is worth noting that 
the following discussion is informed by the considerations of several prominent authors in the 
field of emotions (e.g. Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Cannon, 1927; Damasio, 
1994, 1999, 2003; Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; James, 1890; Lane, 2006; Lane & Nadel, 
2000; Lazarus, 1984; LeDoux, 1996, 2002; Levenson, 1992; Reisenzein, 1983; Russell, 
2003; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Zajonc, 1984) as well as by my own thinking on the topic. 
For this reason, and because the experimental chapters of this thesis will provide a fully 
referenced introduction to specific aspects of emotional processing, the subsequent summary 
will contain few references. 
The first point of agreement in the study of emotions, is the idea that every emotion is 
elicited. It should only take a moment's consideration to agree with the fact that emotions do 
not simply arise out of nowhere (nothing does!). They are the result of some kind of stimulus 
or event that can either be a real object such as a snake or the sight of a loved one, or a 
figment of the imagination such as the thought of failing an exam or the memory of a recent 
argument. As William James (1890) put it, 'One may get angrier in thinking over one's insult 
than at the moment of receiving it; and we melt more over a mother who is dead than we ever 
did when she was living' (p.443). It is not worth dwelling on this issue for too long because the 
current thesis is not specifically concerned with examining the kinds of objects or events that 
elicit emotions in individuals with ASD (though some of the findings reported later are relevant 
to this issue). It is worth noting, however, that we still know very little about this topic. With the 
exception of a few studies that I will consider in due course, the only stimulus we know not to 
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elicit typical emotional responses in individuals with ASD is a person - especially one that 
expresses an emotion. Outside the social domain, however, we know next to nothing about 
what individuals with ASD consider to be emotional or not. 
The point with which the current thesis is most directly concerned is the question of 
how certain objects or events come to elicit emotions and how these objects come to be 
considered as 'emotional' as a result. The answer to these questions is fraught with 
controversy, partly because different authors employ different terminologies in slightly 
different ways, partly because it depends on the object or event of interest and partly because 
different types of emotions require different formulations of an answer. Despite many 
unresolved issues, however, authors have come to several points of consensus. One of these 
is the notion that emotions are the result of the interaction between arousal and cognition. It is 
useful to remember that the term 'emotion' in the current thesis is used in a theoretically 
neutral way and that 'cognition' refers to inherently non-emotional processes. This use of 
terminology has the advantage that every form of behaviour and cognition can be described 
as either emotional or non-emotional. Since this is no doubt confusing (and logically dubious), 
it is worth considering an example. Imagine you are walking down a dark alley when, all of a 
sudden, you hear footsteps quickening behind you. Your cognitive system immediately 
homes in on the noise. Your attention is focused, your senses heightened and your memory 
system lays down a trace of the whole event. Simultaneously, your arousal system starts to 
prepare you for action by increasing your heart rate, diverting blood-flow to your muscles and 
increasing adrenalin secretion. Regardless of whether you are an organism capable of self-
conscious thought or not, you will quicken your pace in order to avoid potential danger. Now, 
the quickening of your pace in this scenario, is an emotional behaviour because it is a direct 
consequence to the interaction between the cognitive processing of the sound of quickening 
footsteps in the dark alley and the arousal elicited by that sound. Equally, the memory you 
formed during the episode is an emotional memory, because it too resulted from the 
interaction between arousal and cognition (in this case memory). Thus every behaviour and 
every form of cognition can take on an emotional quality despite the fact that there is nothing 
inherently emotional about such behaviours or cognitions. 
49 
The foregoing arguments directly inform the next point on which most authors agree, 
which is the idea that feelings are the result of a rather special kind of interaction between 
cognition and arousal. More specifically, feelings only arise when the interaction between 
cognition and arousal is evaluated or appraisecf. Once again, it is useful to illustrate the point 
with an example and so I invite you back into the dark alley. In the scenario above, you would 
most likely have experienced the feeling of fear because, in the context of your arousal 
response you would have evaluated the quickening footsteps behind you as threatening to 
your well being. Imagine again, however, that you hear the quickening of footsteps behind 
you, only this time you know that they belong to your partner, who had stopped to tie his 
shoelace and is now trying to catch up. In this case your autonomic system is unlikely to 
respond with alarm and you are unlikely to start feeling afraid. Even if your arousal system is 
activated with an initial startle response or is in a similar state to that described above at the 
moment you hear the footsteps quickening - maybe because you ran to catch the last bus 
before being forced to walk home - you would not necessarily start to feel afraid. The point 
here is that cognition and arousal are not sufficient to elicit a feeling. Feelings only arise when 
arousal is evaluated in relation to the stimulus that gave rise to it. Incidentally, this analysis 
helps clarify the relationship between the two uses of the word 'feeling' noted earlier. Recall 
that 'feelings' can either describe one's conscious awareness of experiencing an emotion, or 
one's awareness of experiencing a physical sensation. Since emotions are, in part, the result 
of arousal and because many aspects of arousal (e.g. heart rate, breathing rate, etc ... ) can 
come under the scrutiny of conscious awareness, it makes sense that emotional feelings 
should sometimes be associated with descriptions of physical sensations. What distinguishes 
the two, is that emotional feelings necessarily involve an evaluation of the physiological 
sensation in relation to the stimulus that elicited it. Physical feelings on the other hand are 
primarily conscious perceptions of physical sensations that need not necessarily be 
evaluated. 
An important question raised by the foregoing analysis, is what the nature of the 
evaluative process is that gives rise to feelings. Although this topic remains the matter of 
9Th is evaluative process is often described as a cognitive process. so it is easy to see where some of the 
terminological confusion stems from. 
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debate, it is widely acknowledged that feelings are intricately linked to the concepts of self 
awareness and consciousness (e.g. Damasio, 2003; Lane, 2006; LeDoux, 2002). More 
specifically, ideas converge on the suggestion that the interaction between arousal and 
cognition shapes interpretations of environmental stimuli and events in terms of their 
significance to the ·Self. This view has important implications for developmental theory since 
it is widely believed that neonatal infants do not yet possess the kind of 'Self concept that lies 
at the centre of the evaluative processes necessary for feelings (e.g. Neisser, 1988). Infants 
do possess a functioning autonomic nervous system, however, and they have a series of 
functioning cognitive processes at their disposal that allow them to represent the sensory 
properties of their surroundings. Thus, the building blocks for the emergence of feelings are 
present very early in life, making it likely that the interactions between arousal and cognition 
that are necessary for the emergence of feelings also play a role in the development of self-
awareness more generally (see Damasio, 2003; LeDoux, 2002). I believe that these 
arguments hold the key to understanding the developmental trajectory of ASD in its broadest 
sense and I will return to this argument in more detail in the final chapter. For now let me 
return to the final point of agreement in the study of emotions. 
An immense amount of evidence has accumulated over the past two decades that 
leaves little doubt that the amygdala plays an important role in mediating the interaction 
between arousal and cognition that gives rise to emotional behaviours and experiences (e.g. 
Davis & Whalen, 2001; Lane & Nadel, 2000; LeDoux, 1995, 1996; Phelps, 2006; Zald, 2003). 
Once again, this evidence will be set out in detail in the following chapters and so I will only 
note two general pOints here. First, the amygdala is in an ideal position to moderate the 
interaction between arousal and cognition. Situated in the anterior portion of the medial 
temporal lobes (immediately anterior to the hippocampus and adjacent to inferior horn of the 
lateral ventricle), the amygdala receives sensory information from all modalities, both directly 
from the thalamus (with the exception of olfactory information which is relayed to the 
amygdala directly from the olfactory bulbs) and indirectly from cortical areas. Efferent 
pathways project back to virtually all cortical areas thus allowing the amygdala to modulate 
sensory representations of information. Efferent pathways also project to many sub-cortical 
areas such as brain-stem nuclei and the hypothalamus, which are in control of regulating the 
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homeostatic balance of the autonomic nervous system. In other words, the amygdala sits at 
the junction between arousal and cognition (see Aggleton, 2000 for a collection of detailed 
discussions regarding the amygdala). The second point worth a brief comment about the 
amygdala relates to its involvement in the processes underlying feelings. Here, interactions 
between the amygdala, the cingulate cortex and frontal areas of the cortex (particularly the 
orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal areas) are thought to be important (e.g. Damasio, 
2003; Lane, 2006). Interestingly, prefrontal areas of the cortex mature much later in life than 
the amygdala (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Happaney et aI., 2004). Thus, in 
neurodevelopmental terms, it seems plausible to suggest that young infants are unlikely to 
experience the kind of feelings an adult would normally associate with emotional experiences. 
Yet such infants are already equipped with the neural hardware that mediates arousal. 
Back to the beginnings 
Looking back on the evidence relating to the emotional disturbances that characterise 
ASD, it becomes apparent that research in this area is restricted, almost exclusively, to the 
study of the cognitive and behavioural components of emotional experiences within the social 
domain. This limited range of research makes it impossible to determine whether the 
emotional processing difficulties arise from abnormalities in social-cognition, cognitive 
aspects of emotion, arousal responses to emotional stimuli or the interaction between these 
domains. There is, however, one area of research that I have deliberately ignored until now 
and that is the study of autonomic arousal in ASD. The decision to delay mention of this 
evidence is motivated by the fact that it seemed necessary to operationalise the concept of 
emotions before discussing evidence of arousal in ASD. More importantly, however, this 
evidence directly informs the principal hypothesis of the current thesis and it seemed natural 
to conclude the introduction with the formulation of this hypothesis. 
It is difficult to summarise the evidence pertaining to arousal responses in ASD in 
brief, because the studies that have looked at this issue vary widely in scope and 
methodology and are not always directly concerned with the study of emotion. Table 1.2 
includes a brief description of each of the relevant studies to date that have appeared in the 
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literature since ASO was first officially recognised as a distinct disorder in 1980 (Barry & 
James, 1988; Ben Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett, Goldberg, McLeod & Hoehn-Saric, 2003; Ben 
Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett, Goldberg, Landa, Faran, et aI., 2006; Bernier, Oawson, 
Panagiotides & Webb, 2005; Blair, 1999; BOlte & Poustka, 2003; Corona et aI., 1998; 
Hirstein, Iversen & Ramachandran, 2001; Hubert, Wicker, Monfardini & Oeruelle, 2008; 
James & Barry, 1984; Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Queller & Stout, 2006; Kylli::iinen & 
Hietanen 2006; Palkovitz & Wiesenfeld, 1980; Salmond, de Haan, Friston, Gadian & Vargha-
Khadem, 2003; Sigman, Oissanayake, Corona & Espinosa, 2003; Stevens & Gruzelier, 1984; 
van Engeland, 1984; van Engeland, Roelofs, Verbaten & Slangen, 1991; Willemsen-
Swinkels, Bakemans-Kranenburg, Buitelaar, van IJzendoorn & van Engeland, 2000). Table 
1.2 provides a brief description of the participant groups, sample sizes and matching criteria 
for each of the studies (CA = chronological age; MA = Mental Age) and sets out a brief 
description of the stimuli or experimental paradigm employed and what the autonomic and 
behavioural dependent variables (OVs) were (SCR = Skin Conductance Response; HR = 
Heart Rate; BP = Blood Pressure; RR = Respiratory Pause; EMG = Electromyogram). Most 
importantly, however, Table 1.2 summarises the overall outcome of the results. Column 'Mag' 
indicates whether the magnitude of the autonomic responses of participants with ASO were 
elevated (f). similar (=) or attenuated (!) in relation to the comparison groups, or whether 
subgroups of individuals with ASO needed to be classified in this manner (= j). Column 'Oift' 
indicates whether the autonomic responses of individuals with ASO differentiated between 
different types of stimuli to the same extent (=) or less W than the comparison groups or 
whether such response differentiation occurred only to some but not all classes of stimuli (= 
i). Column 'Hab' sets out whether partiCipants with ASO habituated to the repeated 
presentation of stimuli to the same extent as the comparison groups (=) or whether they 
habituated at a slower rate (!) (habituation is indexed by a decrease in response magnitude 
as a function of repeated exposure to the same stimulus). And finally, column 'Behav' shows 
how ASO participants fared on the behavioural response measures that were obtained in 
some studies, with the symbol '~' indicating group differences and the symbol '=' indicating 
that groups performed similarly. 
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Table 1.2 
Summary of studies of psychophysiological arousabifity in ASD 
Participant Autonomic Behavioural Results 
Reference Groups N Matching Stimuli I Paradigm DVs DVs Mag. Diff. Hab. Behav. 
Palkovitz & Wiesenfeld ASD; Typical 10; 10 CA tone vs. speech HR; SCR NA i = NA NA (1980) 
Stevens & Gruzelier (1984) ASD; Typical; Dev. 20;20;20 CA; MA tones of different amplitude Delay SCR NA = = ~ NA 
James & Barry (1984) ASD; Typical; Dev. 40;40;40 CA; MA tone vs. white squares HR; SCR; RP NA i NA ~ NA Delay 
van Engeland (1984) ASD; Typical; Dev. 35;45;20;38 CA tone SCR NA i NA = NA Delay; Psychiatric 
Barry & James (1988) ASD; Typical; Dev. 32; 32;32 CA; MA tones of different amplitude vs. HR; SCR; RP NA = i = ~ NA Delay images of different complexity 
van Engeland et a!. (1991) ASD; Typical; 20;20;40 CA; MA images of different complexity vs. SCR Target detection ~ NA = NA Psychiatric Target detection paradigm 
Corona et a!. (1998) ASD; Dev. Delay 22;22 CA; MA simulated distress of adult HR NA ~ NA NA 
Blair (1999) ASD; Typical; Dev. 20;20;20 CA; MA Distress, Threat & Neutral SCR NA = = ~ NA NA Delay photographs 
Willemsen-Swinkels et al ASD; Typical; Dev. 32; 19; 19; CA; MA separation vs. reunion HR Attachment style = = i NA j: (2000) Delay 
Hirstein et al. (2001) ASD; Typical 37;25 Not reported Eye-contact with mother vs. papercup SCR NA ~ ~ NA NA 
video of crying vs. playing infant; Looks at stimulus & Sigman et al. (2003) ASD; Dev. Delay 22; 22 CA; MA interaction with mother; separation HR 
attitude = = ~ NA j: 
vs. reunion 
Salmond et a!. (2003) ASD; Typical 14; 18 CA startle response modulation by EMG Subjective ratings = = NA = emotional pictures 
Ben Shalom et a!. (2003) ASD; Typical 10; 10 CA Pleasant, Unpleasant, & Neutral SCR Subjective ratings = = NA j: photographs 
Lt) 
Lt) 
Table 1.2 Continued 
Participant Autonomic Behavioural Results 
Reference Groups N Matching Stimuli I Paradigm DVs DVs Mag. Diff. Hab. Behav. 
Bemier et al. (2005) ASO; Typical 14; 14 CA; MA; Fear conditioning paradigm EMG HA = HA HA HA Anxiety 
Kylliainen & Hietanen (2006) ASO; Typical 12; 12 CA; MA direct vs. averted gaze SCR Gaze direction = = i HA = detection 
Ben Shalom et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 10; 10 CA Pleasant, Unpleasant, & Neutral SCR Subjective ratings = = HA t: photographs 
Johnson et al. (2006) ASO; Typical 15; 14 CA; MA Iowa Gambeling Task GRS Card Selections L HA HA t: 
BOlte et al. (2008) ASO; Typical 10; 10 CA; MA Fear, anger, disgust, happiness & HR; BP Subjective ratings = = L t: sadness eliciting photographs 
Hubert et al. (2008) ASO; Typical 16; 16 CA Angry vs. Happy Faces; Moving SCR Identification L L HA = object 
Note: CA (Chronological Age), MA (Mental Age), BP (Blood Pressure), EMG (Electromyogram), HR (Heart Rate), RP(Respiratory Pause), SCR (Skin Conductance Response). 
A first glance at the last four columns of Table 1.2 suggests that the observations of 
the respective studies are rather inconsistent. A closer look, however, reveals some patterns 
in this inconsistency. More specifically, studies involving simple auditory or visual stimuli tend 
to show that individuals with ASD respond to such stimuli with heightened physiological 
responses and reduced habituation but that they nevertheless differentiate between different 
stimuli to the same extent as comparison groups. By contrast, studies involving more 
complex and emotionally meaningful stimuli tend to show that individuals with ASD exhibit 
either typical or reduced response magnitudes but less differentiation between stimuli. Finally, 
studies that fail to observe group differences in terms of how individuals with and without ASD 
respond autonomically to emotionally meaningful stimuli, nevertheless indicate that 
individuals with ASD subjectively experience such stimuli differently from typical individuals 
(i.e. ratings distinguish groups). Only two studies do not conform to this pattern (Bernier et al., 
2005; Salmond et al., 2003) and both of these employed conditioning paradigms that will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
The evidence summarised in Table 1.2 above suggests two things. First, that 
stimulus parameters atypically modulate autonomic arousal responses in individuals with 
ASD and second, that autonomic arousal responses abnormally relate to the cognitive 
representation of stimulus parameters in individuals with ASD. The latter set of findings, has 
led Ben-Shalom and colleagues (e.g. Ben Shalom, 2000; Ben Shalom et al., 2003; Ben 
Shalom et al., 2006) to suggest that ASD is characterised by impairments in feelings but not 
arousal. Whilst I agree in principle with this suggestion, I believe that it misses the point 
somewhat, mainly because this idea amounts to a description rather than an explanation of a 
set of observations. As suggested in the previous section, it is unlikely that neonates have the 
cognitive capacities necessary to experience feelings because such subjective experiences 
require relatively mature conceptualisations of the 'Self. Since such a self concept seems to 
be acquired throughout early development because of the interaction between arousal and 
basic forms of cognition, an impairment in feelings in adults, must reflect abnormalities in how 
arousal and cognition interacted earlier in life. I will return to issues relating to the 'Self in 
more detail later. The principal hypotheSiS I put forward for now, is that the developmental 
trajectory of individuals with ASD is the result of abnormalities in the interaction between 
56 
stimulus induced arousal and cognition and that the neural correlate of this abnormality is a 
disruption in the connectivity between the amygdala and areas of the brain that mediate 
aspects of cognition. I will deal with the developmental aspect of this hypothesis in the final 
chapter of this thesis. The aim of the experimental work presented below is to test one of the 
main predictions of this hypothesis, namely that cognition and arousal abnormally modulate 
one another in ASD. 
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CHAPTER 2: MEMORY FOR EMOTIONALLY SIGNIFICANT STIMULI 
Overview 
The present chapter will set out three experiments designed to assess the 
modulatory effect of stimulus induced arousal on memory. Experiment 1 asks whether ASD 
and typical participants differ in how their memory for emotionally arousing and non-arousing 
words is affected by the division of attention during a study phase. Experiment 2 employs a 
free recall paradigm in order to determine whether individuals with ASD, like typical 
individuals, retain emotionally arousing words better over time than comparable neutral 
stimuli. And experiment 3 sets out to determine to what extent it is possible to induce false 
memories of emotionally charged words in individuals with and without ASD. In typically 
developed individuals, these experimental manipulations help to illustrate that memories of 
emotionally arousing stimuli not only differ in quantity from those of non-arousing stimuli but 
that such memories are also retained in qualitatively distinct ways (see Reisberg & Hertel, 
2004 for a collection of reviews). Thus, these manipulations provide a sensitive measure of 
the specific modulatory influence of arousal on memory and of the hypothesis that such 
modulatory mechanisms may operate abnormally in ASD. Since the influence of arousal on 
memory is widely known to necessitate the functional integrity of the amygdala (e.g. Hamann, 
2001; La Bar, 2007; McGaugh, 2000; Phelps, 2004), the experiments should also provide 
insight into the possible neural underpinnings of emotional processing abnormalities in ASD. 
As mentioned earlier, several experiments of the current thesis (including 
experiments 2 and 3 of the current chapter) have either been published or are currently under 
review. Therefore they are presented in the form in which they were submitted for publication, 
with the exception of minor editorial amendments in order to preserve the format of the thesis 
(e.g. Abstracts and reference sections have been removed and some terminologies have 
been standardised). Since it is in the nature of such publications to treat only the most 
pertinent evidence to the topic under discuSSion, the respective introductions to the individual 
experiments provide little background information on general issues such as how the concept 
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of memory is currently operationalised and what is known about its integrity in ASD. In order 
to overcome this shortcoming and discuss some general methodological issues, the current 
chapter will commence with a brief introduction of these more general issues. 
Memory in ASD 
Memories are the result of learning, which is evident when an organism's behaviour 
is altered by past experience. Whilst this rather crude description is relatively simple, the 
underlying processes are complex and multifaceted. First it is important to note that not all 
memories are alike. Remembering how to ride a bicycle is fundamentally different from 
knowing what the capital of the UK is, which in turn differs in important ways from recalling 
one's last visit to the dentist. In addition, some memories only last a brief moment and seem 
to vanish without a trace, whilst others last a lifetime and cannot be undone even if one tries 
to forget. The way in which we acquire new memories also varies considerably. Some 
memories are formed through effortful and conscious attempts to learn (e.g. studying for an 
exam) whilst others are acquired without much effort or awareness (e.g. recognising your 
friend's voice). Similarly, the context in which we try to retrieve memories has important 
consequences for our chances of success in doing so. We might on one occasion struggle to 
think of the name of a colleague who we met at a recent conference, yet upon our next 
meeting the same name may materialise on the tip of our tongue without much effort. 
Differences such as these have led to the suggestion that memory is not a unified 
phenomenon but rather the result of the operation of separable memory systems and 
processes that interact in systematic ways with the properties of what we try to remember 
and the context in which we try to do so. 
As far as memory systems are concerned, one of the first distinctions was proposed 
by James (1890), who noted that certain memories only last as long as they occupy 
conscious awareness, whilst others endure even after we have stopped to think about their 
content. The former is known as primary, short-term (STM) or working memory (WM), whilst 
the latter is referred to as secondary or long-term memory (L TM). As with many of James's 
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(1890) insights, his considerations on memory turned out to be justified and the study of 
amnesic patients has provided ample evidence to suggest that the ability to form long-lasting 
memories is dissociated from the capacity to retain information over a short period of time 
(Scoville & Milner, 1957; Wickelgren, 1968). Amnesic patients have also stimulated other 
sub-divisions of memory systems including the differentiation between procedural or impliCit 
and declarative or explicit memory (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968). 
The procedural I implicit memory system allows us to learn new skills, procedures or units of 
information without the awareness of such learning taking place. Amnesic patients exhibit this 
ability and have been found to improve in their performance on tasks such as tracking a 
moving target, reading mirror-reversed words or identifying degraded images that they were 
shown on previous occasions (e.g. Cohen & Squire, 1980; Corkin, 1968; Graf, Squire & 
Mandler, 1984; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968). The declarative I explicit memory system, on 
the other hand, endows us with the awareness that we have learned something new and this 
ability is virtually absent in amnesia (e.g. Cohen & Squire, 1980). Thus, even though such 
individuals improve their performance on various tasks, they will deny ever having taken part 
in learning trials. The final commonly cited distinction is one proposed by Tulving (e.g. 
Tulving, 1985), who suggests that the declarative or explicit memory system is further sub-
divided into a semantic and an episodic one. The former is responsible for the acquisition of 
factual knowledge about the world such as the boiling point of water or the name of a UK 
prime minister. Tulving (2002) calls these memories 'timeless facts', because they are 
associated with a sense of awareness (what he calls 'noetic' awareness) that does not 
recreate the spatial-temporal context, which places the 'self at the centre of the remembered 
experience. This latter kind of awareness, what Tulving (1985, 2002) calls 'autonoetic' 
awareness, is what makes episodic memories special and it is this self awareness in memory 
that led Tulving (2002) to liken episodic memories to mental time-travel (see Gardiner, 2001 
for a review of evidence pertaining to the distinction between semantic and episodic 
memory). 
In addition to distinguishing among various memory systems, cognitive scientists also 
differentiate among various memory processes, the most important of which are encoding, 
consolidation, forgetting and retrieval processes. Crudely put, encoding processes are 
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responsible for transforming sensory information into memory representations, whilst retrieval 
processes are involved in recovering these representations for the purposes of guiding 
behaviour. Consolidation and forgetting, on the other hand, alter the quality or strength of 
memory representations, with consolidation resulting in longer-lasting and more robust 
memories whilst forgetting weakens or decays them (see Roediger, Gallo & Geraci, 2002; 
Wixted, 2004; Wixted, 2005 for relevant reviews). Although the way in which these processes 
work and how they interact with one another is rather complex, several properties of their 
operation are relatively well established. For instance, it is widely accepted that encoding 
processes operate at different levels such that different properties of a stimulus are encoded 
through separate processing channels (e.g. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975; 
Roediger, et aI., 2002). In itself this is not surprising given that early stages of sensory 
processing operate to a large degree independently from one another. Interestingly, however, 
the extent of encoding at different levels can be manipulated by instructing participants to pay 
particular attention to a certain stimulus property (e.g. meaning of a word, spelling of a word, 
etc.) and such 'orienting tasks' alter the ease with which partiCipants can later retrieve the 
stimulus. More specifically, orienting tasks that direct a participant's attention toward 
conceptual properties of a stimulus (e.g. its meaning or conceptual relations to other stimuli) 
generally result in better performance on a subsequent memory test than orienting tasks that 
direct attention toward more perceptually anchored properties of the stimulus such as its 
graphemic composition (e.g. Bower, Clark, Lesgold & Winzenz, 1968; Craik & Tulving, 1975; 
Hunt & Seta, 1984). Another well established phenomenon is the observation that the 
retrieval success of a particular memory depends not only on how it is encoded but also on 
how suitable the encoded information is for a particular retrieval context (e.g. Morris, 
Bransford & Franks, 1977; Nairne, 2002; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). For instance, if one 
learns a list of words by thinking about rhymes of these words, the presentation of such 
rhymes during a memory test will make it easier to retrieve the studied words than the 
presentation of semantically related words (e.g. Morris et aI., 1977). Similarly, if one learns a 
set of stimuli in a particular location it is usually easier to retrieve these stimuli in the same 
location rather than another (e.g. Godden & Baddeley, 1975). Other interactions between 
memory processes are evidenced by interference effects whereby the encoding of a set of 
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stimuli hinders the consolidation (or retrieval) of a similar set of stimuli encoded subsequently 
(e.g. Gershberg & Shimamura, 1995). 
The foregoing description, despite by no means complete, paints a rather complex 
picture of what memory entails. It is important to note, however, that the various distinctions 
between memory systems and processes outlined above are not mutually exclusive. Nor are 
they necessarily compatible with one another. They reflect the views of different authors and 
represent attempts to operationalise the concept of memory in order to account for, and 
scientifically study, its phenomenology. In relation to ASD, this theoretical heterogeneity is 
very useful because it provides a rich heuristic for studying how such individuals form lasting 
impressions of their interactions with their environment, which in turn offers insights into their 
inner mental experiences (see Bowler & Gaigg, 2008). It is within this context that the study of 
memory in ASD has enjoyed a long and prosperous history, a history that has recently been 
celebrated with the publication of an edited book dedicated to this topic alone (Boucher & 
Bowler, 2008). The purpose of the current discussion is not to provide a summary of the 
extensive literature in this field but rather to highlight certain aspects of memory functioning in 
ASD that raise important methodological issues for the experiments presented below. As 
already mentioned, the principal aim of the following three experiments is to determine 
whether stimulus-induced arousal modulates memory processes in ASD in the same way as 
in typical individuals. The methodological challenge that presents itself in this context is two-
fold. First, it is important to devise experimental paradigms that assess the specific effects of 
stimulus induced arousal on memory. In other words, any quantitative or qualitative difference 
in memory for emotionally arousing compared to non-arousing stimuli must reflect the 
modulatory influence of arousal on memory and not of other factors. Although this is not an 
easy task, scientists interested in the influence of arousal on memory have devised rather 
clever experimental paradigms to achieve this goal and these paradigms serve as the basis 
for the experiments presented below. The more problematic methodological concern, 
however, is to ensure that the experimental paradigm assesses how arousal modulates those 
kinds of memory functions that operate similarly in ASD and typically developed individuals. If 
not, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that differences (or even similarities) in how arousal 
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modulates memory in ASD and typically developed individuals are the result of group 
differences in the operation of generic memory processes or systems. 
The main difficulty in satisfying the latter of the two aforementioned criteria, is the fact 
that it is very difficult to know whether conceptualisations of memory in typically developed 
individuals are suitable for describing the phenomenology of memory in ASD (see Mottron, 
Dawson & Soulieres, 2008 for a more detailed consideration of this issue). In order to 
demonstrate this problem more concretely and illustrate its relevance to the subsequent 
experimental studies, consider the well established finding that typically developed individuals 
remember semantically and conceptually more coherent information better than information 
that is less meaningful10. Regardless of how such meaning is manipulated or how the 
relevant information is presented, and regardless of the conditions under which individuals 
learn or try to retrieve the information, meaning almost always facilitates memory (e.g. see 
Gardiner, 1976 for a collection of relevant reviews and also Morris et aI., 1977). In relation to 
studying the effects of arousal on memory, this raises the possibility that arousing stimuli are 
remembered differently from non-arousing ones simply because they differ with respect to 
their meaning (e.g. Talmi, Luk, MacGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). 
One way to control for this possibility is to try to match arousing and non-arousing stimuli in 
terms of their meaningfulness, which is not always easy since 'meaningfulness' is a rather 
vague concept. In ASD, however, the issue becomes even more complicated because 
meaning, loosely defined, influences memory differently in this population. 
Investigations of free recall performance, where individuals are simply asked to 
reproduce what they can remember from a previously presented set of stimuli, often show 
that individuals from across the autism spectrum do not benefit from meaning as much as 
non-autistic comparison groups. For instance, numerous studies have assessed free recall 
performance for word sequences that are either arranged randomly or according to the 
syntactic and conceptual rules of language, and found that whereas children without ASD 
recalled the latter sequences better than the former, children with ASD did not (e.g. Hermelin 
10 The term meaning here is used loosely to describe the meaning of the information per se as well as it's 
meaningfulness within the context of the task (see Morris et al., 1977 for a more detailed discussion of the concept of 
'meaning' in the context of memory) 
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& O'Connor, 1967; Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970; O'Connor & Hermelin, 1967). Similarly, when 
memory for a set of semantically interrelated words is compared to that for a set of unrelated 
words, individuals from across the autism spectrum exhibit a much lower recall advantage for 
the semantically related words than comparison participants (e.g. Bowler, Matthews & 
Gardiner, 1997; Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & Saavalainen, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 1991). In 
addition, individuals with ASD tend to cluster (Le. recall in sequence) semantically interrelated 
words less during their recall attempts (e.g. Gaigg, Gardiner & Bowler, 2008; Minshew & 
Goldstein, 1993) and even when no obvious relations exist among to-be-remembered stimuli 
individuals with ASD tend to cluster stimuli differently from non-autistic individuals (Bowler, 
Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008a). If such observations were conSistent, one could conclude that 
meaning does not influence memory in ASD and therefore attempt to design an experimental 
paradigm that assesses the influence of arousal on memory whilst placing few demands on 
the processing of meaning. Unfortunately, however, things are not that simple. First, not all 
studies indicate that free recall performance in ASD is atypically modulated by semantic 
interrelations amongst stimuli, particularly when pictorial rather than verbal material is used 
(e.g. L6pez & Leekam, 2003; Ameli, Courchesne, Lincoln, Kaufman & Grillon, 1988). More 
importantly, studies that employ recognition or cued recall measures of memory generally fail 
to demonstrate abnormalities in how semantic relations amongst stimuli influence memory in 
ASD (e.g. Boucher & Warrington, 1979; Bowler, Gaigg & Gardiner, 2008b). Individuals with 
ASD have also been found to benefit as much as typical participants from orienting tasks that 
direct attention to semantic aspects of information (Bowler, et al., 1997; Gaigg et al., 2008; 
Mottron, Morasse & Belleville, 2001; Toichi & Kamio, 2002) and such individuals have been 
found to be subject to semantically induced memory illusions (Bowler et aI., 2000; Beversdorf, 
Smith, Crucian, Anderson, Keillor, Barrett, et al., 2000), which are false memories of a non-
presented word that participants frequently report after having studied a number of words that 
are highly associated with this illusory item (e.g. bed, pillow, night, dream ... for sleep). In 
short, a vague concept such as 'meaning' seems of little use in trying to specify the memory 
difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD. 
One might wonder why the above analysis poses a problem in relation to studying 
the effects of arousal on memory in ASD. If there is any doubt as to how meaning influences 
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memory, then controlling for it experimentally is surely a good option. Of course this is true 
but recognising that meaning influences memory differently in ASD without actually explaining 
the patterning of memory functioning in this condition highlights the fact that controlling for 
meaning alone is not necessarily sufficient to rule out the possibility that generic memory 
difficulties result in abnormalities in how arousal influences memory in ASD. In order to try 
and specify the kind of memory processes that pose difficulties for individuals with ASD, it is 
useful to take a closer look at what the different tasks outlined above require of the 
participant. Such an analysis has led my colleagues and I (Bowler & Gaigg, 2008; Bowler, 
Gaigg & Und, in press; Gaigg, et aI., 2008) to suggest that individuals with ASD experience 
difficulties in processing relational information whilst their ability to process item-specific 
information is preserved and possibly even enhanced. Relational processing, refers to the 
processing of a stimulus in relation to its context, which can include other stimuli, the time of 
day or the location in which the stimulus is encountered. Item-specific processing, on the 
other hand describes the processing of information specific to the stimulus such as its 
physical, semantic or conceptual properties. This distinction has been used to describe 
several phenomena in the typical memory literature (e.g. Anderson & Bower, 1972; Hunt & 
McDaniel, 1993) and the patterning of memory functioning in ASD is consistent with the idea 
that such individuals process information more in an item-specific rather than a relational 
fashion (see Bowler, et al., in press for a detailed discussion of the relevant evidence). For 
instance, tasks on which meaning influences memory relatively typically in ASD (Le. cued 
recall, recognition, levels of processing & memory illusions) rely more heavily on item-specific 
rather than relational processing whereas the opposite is true for tasks that pose some 
difficulty for individuals with ASD. The distinction between item-specific and relational 
processing also accommodates the fact that individuals with ASD experience difficulties on 
tasks assessing episodic memory (e.g. Bowler, Gardiner & Gaigg, 2007; Bowler, Gardiner & 
Grice, 2000; Und & Bowler, 2008; Toichi, 2008), which require that information is processed 
in relation to temporal and contextual information that define a particular episode. Of course 
there is a certain danger of circularity in this argument whereby any task that poses difficulties 
for individuals with ASD may be said to involve relational processing. Nevertheless, direct 
tests of the hypothesis have so far yielded affirmative results. Thus, when individuals with 
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ASD are simply asked to learn a list of words that consists of varying numbers of items from 
different categories, their performance is not only overall worse than that of a comparison 
group, but they experience disproportionate difficulties recalling words that are not obviously 
related to one another whereas their recall of words that are more obviously related to one 
another is less affected (Gaigg et aI., 2008). This pattern of results is in line with the 
suggestion that individuals with ASD experience disproportionate difficulties in relational as 
compared to item-specific processing (see Hunt & Seta, 1984). 
Based on the view presented above, the following three experiments were designed 
in order to minimize demands on relational processing by either employing recognition test 
procedures or item-specific encoding instructions. In addition, three very different 
experimental paradigms were employed in order to ensure that findings would not be 
confounded by specific task demands. An attempt was also made to control for the possible 
influence of semantic properties on memory, which not only minimized the chance of 
confounding between group comparisons but also helped to dissociate the specific influence 
of arousal on memory. In relation to this last point, the experimental paradigms also 
employed within-group manipulations that would influence memory for arousing and non-
arousing material differentially, thereby lending further support to the notion that arousing 
stimuli are remembered in qualitatively distinct ways. 
Experiment 1: The effect of dividing attention on memory for emotionally 
arousing and non-arousing words in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Introduction 
Although it is now well established that abnormalities in socio-emotional conduct 
constitute a clinically significant manifestation of ASD, only very few studies have to date 
assessed the emotional competencies of such individuals outside the broader context of 
social cognition. This is somewhat surprising given the long standing debate about the 
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developmental significance of socio-emotional disturbances in this disorder (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Hobson, 2002; Loveland, 2005) and the related question of what role 
abnormalities of the amygdala play in the pathology underlying ASD (e.g. Bachevalier & 
Loveland, 2006; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Schultz, 2005). Studying emotional processes 
outside the context of social cognition could provide valuable insights into both of these 
issues because it would help clarify to what extent emotional abnormalities are specific to the 
social domain and because the role of the amygdala in certain non-social emotional 
processes is well understood. 
In the memory literature, one of the most consistent observations is the finding that 
emotionally significant stimuli and events (as long as they do not elicit severe distress) are 
better remembered and for longer retained than comparable neutral ones (see Reisberg & 
Hertel, 2004; Uttl, Ohta & Siegenthaler, 2006 for a collection of reviews). The extensive 
research of this phenomenon suggests that two properties of emotional information are 
responsible for making it more memorable. The emotional valence of a stimulus and the 
degree of arousal it elicits. Valence refers to whether a stimulus is perceived as positive or 
negative and this dimension is thought to facilitate memory through relatively generic 
processes such as promoting deeper and more elaborate levels of processing (e.g. 
Buchanan, Etzel, Adolphs & Tranel, 2006; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Maratos, Allan & Rugg, 
2000; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). The arousal response elicited by certain emotional stimuli 
refers to changes in autonomic functioning that can either be directly observed (e.g. 
monitoring heart rate) or inferred from subjective ratings and an extensive body of evidence 
indicates that this dimension enhances memory through a relatively specialized neural 
circuitry that centres around the amygdala (e.g. Buchanan & Lovallo, 2001; Buchanan et aI., 
2006; Hamann, 2001; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; McGaugh, 2002; Pare, Collins & Pelletier, 
2002; Phelps, 2004). Given the widely held belief that abnormalities of the amygdala play an 
important role in the neuropathology underlying ASD (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006), it 
is easy to see how studies of the influence of arousal on memory could prove fruitful for our 
understanding of the disorder. 
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To date, only two studies have investigated memory for emotionally significant stimuli 
in ASD. In the earliest of these, Beversdorf and colleagues (Beversdorf, Anderson, Manning, 
Anderson, Dordgren, Felopulos, et aI., 1998) asked a group of adults with and without a 
diagnosis of ASD to try to remember a series of emotionally charged and neutral statements 
(e.g. 'He talks about death' vs. 'He is talking with his roommate') for a subsequent free recall 
test. The results of this test showed that only the comparison group recalled the emotionally 
charged statements significantly better than the neutral ones, despite the fact that groups did 
not differ in terms of their memory for sentences and paragraphs that varied in terms of their 
syntactic and conceptual coherence or mentalistic content. A more recent study by South and 
colleagues (South, Ozonoff, Suchy, Kesner, McMahon & Lainhart, 2008) failed to support 
these observations. These authors presented participants with a list of words containing 
emotionally charged and neutral items and found that both ASD and typical partiCipants 
recognised significantly more of the emotional words on a subsequent 'Yes/No' recognition 
test. 
It is important to note that neither of the experimental paradigms used in the studies 
described above was designed to dissociate the relative effects of valence and arousal on 
memory. Thus, it is difficult to know to what extent the observations should be interpreted in 
relation to the kinds of processes that are engaged when emotional stimuli elicit arousal, and 
in how far the findings may best be described with reference to the more generic memory 
processes that underlie the influence of valence on memory. Based on current evidence and 
the particular methodologies employed by Beversdorf et al. (1998) and South et al. (2008), it 
seems that the discrepant findings can be explained purely in terms of the operation of 
relatively generic memory processes. More specifically, Beversdorf et al. (1998) employed a 
free recall paradigm, and it is generally accepted that such test procedures pose more 
difficulty for individuals with ASD than the kind of recognition test employed by South et al. 
(2008) (see Bowler & Gaigg, 2008 for a more detailed discussion on free recall and 
recognition performance in ASD). More importa~tly, a recent study by Bowler, et al. (2008b) 
showed that individuals with ASD benefit from semantic relations amongst to-be-remembered 
words and incidentally encoded context words only on a test of recognition whereas typical 
partiCipants benefit from such relations on tests of recognition and free recall. This suggests 
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that certain properties of stimuli that normally enhance memory by promoting elaborated 
processing only do so in ASD when test procedures offer some retrieval support. Within this 
Task Support framework (e.g. Bowler, Gardiner & Berthollier, 2004), the difference in findings 
between Beversdorf et al. (1998) and South et al. (2008) can be accommodated without 
invoking either the amygdala or any other emotion specific process. 
The foregoing analysis shows that it is important to employ experimental paradigms 
that assess the specific influence of arousal on memory in order to determine whether 
abnormalities in emotional processes (and associated amygdala functions) generalize to this 
domain of cognition in ASD. An experiment by Kensinger and Corking (2004) offers such a 
paradigm. These authors showed that the influence of valence and arousal on memory can 
be dissociated by manipulating partiCipants' attentional resources whilst they are trying to 
remember a set of words. In their experiment partiCipants studied words varying in emotional 
arousal and emotional valence either during a fUll-attention condition or a divided-attention 
condition. During the former, participants simply tried to remember the words but during the 
divided-attention condition participants were also required to monitor a sequence of tones 
and press a button whenever they heard a change in pitch. During subsequent recognition 
tests, participants' performance for emotionally arousing words was consistently above 80%, 
regardless of whether an easy, difficult or no concurrent tone-monitoring task needed to be 
performed during study. Performance for valenced and neutral words on the other hand 
declined as the concurrent task during study increased in difficulty. This pattern confirmed 
that valenced and neutral words are encoded through qualitatively similar processes, whilst 
arousing words are encoded through qualitatively distinct and relatively automatic processes. 
That the latter processes involved the amygdala was supported by functional imaging data, 
which showed that the encoding of valenced words was associated with activity in a 
prefrontal cortex-hippocampal network whilst the encoding of arousing words was associated 
with activity in an amygdala-hippocampal network (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). 
The current experiment employs a paradigm similar to the one used by Kensinger 
and Corkin (2004) in order to test the hypothesis that arousal modulates memory abnormally 
in ASD. Based on the finding that manipulations of dividing attention moderate recognition 
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performance similarly in ASD and typical participants (Bowler, et al., 2007), it was predicted 
that overall recognition levels would be comparable between ASD and typical participants. 
However, based on the hypothesis that the influence of arousal on memory operates 
atypically in ASD, it was expected that dividing attention at study would not differentially effect 
subsequent recognition performance for arousing, valenced and neutral words in this 
disorder. If these predictions are borne out, it would lend support to the suggestion that 
emotional processing abnormalities extend to domains outside the broader context of social-
cognition in ASD. 
Method 
Parlicipants 
Sixteen ASD (13 male, 3 female) and sixteen typical individuals (12 male, 4 female) 
were recruited for the current experiment and paid standard University fees for their 
participation. ASD participants were diagnosed according to conventional criteria and a 
review of available medical records and/or assessment with the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS, Lord et al., 1989) confirmed that all met current diagnostic 
criteria for an Autism Spectrum Disorder (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). Developmental histories of sufficient detail to show that a diagnosis was made 
according to the DSM criteria were available for 7 of the 16 ASD participants. For the 
remaining 9 participants, ADOS scores confirmed that all met relevant cut-off points 
consistent with an ASD diagnosis (these participants had also provided brief statements of 
their diagnosis). Typical individuals were recruited from the local community through 
newspaper advertisements and individually matched to ASD participants to within 7 points of 
Verbal IQ (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale_llluK, The Psychological Corporation, 2000). 
Groups were also matched in terms of chronological age, Performance IQ and Full-scale IQ 
(see Table 2.1). Brief interviews with all participants ensured that none had any medical 
history of psychiatric conditions other than ASD and all participants reported being free of 
medication. The experimental procedures described below were approved by the University's 
ethical committee and adhered to the guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of Age and IQ characteristics for the ASD and Comparison Group 
ASD (n = 16) Comparison (n = 16) 
Measure M SD M SD 
Age (years) 34.2 14.1 32.1 11.2 
VIQ- 106.2 15.4 105.5 15.1 
PIQb 106.7 16.6 104.8 13.2 
FlOc 106.8 16.6 105.4 14.8 
• Verbal IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_llluK) 
b Performance IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
C Full-Scale IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
Materials and Design 
The stimuli for the current experiment included a set of 36 emotionally arousing 
words (hereafter 'arousing'), 36 emotionally valenced but non-arousing words (hereafter 
'valenced'), and 36 categorically related words. The latter were chosen from the Hampton 
and Gardiner (1983) category norms and included the most typical members of the 'Clothing' 
category. Typical category members were chosen in order to maximise the semantic 
cohesiveness of this group of words and thereby rule out the possibility that any memory 
advantage for arousing over non-arousing words would be the result of the former being 
semantically highly interrelated. The arousing and valenced words were selected from two 
sources. 12 words were selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW, 
Bradley & Lang, 1999), which provide normative data for ratings of emotional arousal and 
valence for over 1000 words. Since this data set includes few taboo, offensive or sexually 
explicit words that one would expect to be amongst the most arousing, however, the majority 
of emotional words were selected from a pool of 130 words for which normative data were 
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gathered separately. During this normative study 49 undergraduate students (35 female, 14 
male) rated each of 130 words that included a set of profanities, sexually explicit words and 
taboo words on four dimensions - familiarity, imageability, emotional valence and emotional 
arousal - using 9 point rating scales. High familiarity scores indicated that the meaning of a 
word was immediately obvious whilst low scores indicated that some thought was required to 
bring the meaning of the word to mind. Similarly, high scores on the imageability dimension 
were used when a word immediately brought a picture to mind whereas low scores were 
used when some effort was required to picture what a word described. The emotional valence 
dimension was rated according to whether a word was positive or negative in meaning, with 
low scores reflecting the former and high scores the latter. Finally, high ratings on the 
emotional arousal dimension were used to indicate that a word elicited a physical emotional 
reaction whilst low scores were used when this was not the case. It was made clear to 
students in this rating task that the emotional valence and emotional arousal dimensions were 
not necessarily related to one another and that the emotional arousal dimension should 
reflect the actual physical responses experienced when reading the word rather than the 
physical responses that might be elicited by the object or event described. 
Since the principal aim of the current study was to assess the specific effects of 
emotional arousal on memory, the arousing and valenced words selected for the current 
experiment were closely matched in terms of letter length (arousing M = 5.22, SO = 1.67; 
valenced M = 5.39, SO = 1.25; t = 0.48, df = 70, ns) ratings of familiarity (arousing M = 7.58, 
SO = 0.41; valenced M = 7.76, SO = 0.59; t = 1.48, df = 70, ns), imageability (arousing M = 
6.21, SO = 0.87; valenced M = 6.00, SO = 1.70; t = .68, df= 70, ns) and valence (arousing M 
= 5.95, SO = 1.38; valenced M = 5.73, SO = 1.93; t = .55, df= 70, ns)l1. For valence, it was 
also ensured that the number of positive (n = 8) and negative words (n = 16) in the arousing 
and valenced category was equal. Obviously ratings of arousal differentiated the two types of 
words (arousing M = 5.46, SO = 0.49; valenced M = 5.07, SO = 0.76; t = 2.56, df= 70, P < 
.05) although it is important to note that the close matching procedure meant that there was 
11 It should be noted that familiarity ratings and imageability ratings were not available on 9-point scales for the words 
taken from the ANEW data set. Relevant rati~gs for these words were therefore estimated on the basis of the norms 
provided by the University of Western Australia MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart. 1981). 
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considerable overlap on this dimension (range for arousing words 4.58 - 6.47; range for 
valenced words 3.32 - 6.50). 
The final set of words was split into 3 sub-sets including 12 arousing, 12 valenced 
and 12 categorically related words each. Sets A and B always served as the 'Target' words 
that participants would be required to learn during the full-attention and divided-attention 
conditions, whilst half of the words of set C (6 or each type) was used as 'Lures' during each 
of the two recognition tests. By not counterbalancing Targets and Lures it was possible to 
select Target words that were maximally distinct in terms of arousal whilst remaining closely 
matched in terms of all other dimensions. During the study phase, words were presented in 
Bold, 48 point, Times New Roman font in the centre of a Sony Laptop monitor. The rate of 
presentation was set at 2700 ms per word with no inter-stimulus interval. The order of words 
within each set was randomised with the constraint that no more than two words of the same 
type would occur in sequence. During the divided attention condition, a sequence of high-
frequency (1575 Hz) and low-frequency (788 Hz) ping tones was continuously played through 
speakers at a rate of approximately 1 tone per second. The sequence was constructed to 
produce 13 changes in pitch at random intervals throughout word presentation. Word sets A 
and B were counterbalanced across the fUll-attention and divided attention conditions and the 
order of these conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, during each of the 
recognition tests all Targets from the studied set and half of the 'Lures' from set C were 
presented in the same format as during study but remained on the screen until participants 
gave their responses. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room and fully briefed before the start 
of the experiment. They were told that they would be asked to try to remember two sets of 
words and that their memory for each set would be tested through a recognition test in which 
they had to decide whether they had seen certain words before or not. Participants were 
further informed that they would be studying one set of words without any distraction but that 
they would be studying the other set whilst trying to monitor a sequence of sounds for 
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changes in pitch. Finally, participants were warned that some of the words they would be 
studying would be rude, offensive and sexually explicit and that they should not take part in 
the study if they preferred not to be exposed to such materials. 
After participants gave their consent, they were familiarised with the divided-attention 
procedure. First, they were presented with several tone sequences and asked to press the 
space-bar every time they heard the tone change. After this initial induction procedure, 
participants were required to monitor another tone sequence for pitch changes whilst reading 
a series of 16 common words (e.g. house, window, cat) aloud. Since all participants 
performed near ceiling on these practice trials, no further training was needed. The two 
experimental tasks followed the practice trials with half of the participants starting with the 
divided-attention condition whilst the other half commenced with the full-attention condition. A 
recognition test immediately followed each encoding phase and the two encoding conditions 
were separated by approximately 1 hour during which partiCipants were either taken for lunch 
or asked to take part in an unrelated experiment. 
Results 
Performance on the divided attention task was near ceiling for both groups, with ASD 
partiCipants responding accurately on 94% of trials and typical comparison individuals on 
96% (t = 0.80, df = 30, ns). The results from the recognition tests are set out in Table 2.2, 
which provides average proportions of 'yes' responses to Targets and Lures as a function of 
participant group (ASD vs. Typical), encoding condition (full vs. divided attention) and word 
type (arousing vs. valenced vs. category member). Also set out in Table 2.2 are corrected 
recognition rates (Le. Target 'yes' minus Lure 'yes' proportions), which provide an estimate of 
recognition memory that is uncontaminated by partiCipant's response biases (Le. their 
tendency to respond 'yes'). A 2 (Group) x 2 (Encoding Condition) x 3 (Word Type) mixed 
ANOVA of corrected recognition rates revealed main effects for Encoding Condition (F(1,30) 
= 10.34, P < .01) and Word Type (F(2,29) = 17.22, P < .001) but no other main effects or 
interactions (all Fs < .65). Thus, although performance during the divided-attention condition 
(M = .66, SD = .15) was worse than during the full-attention condition (M = .76, SD = .15) and 
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despite the fact that arousing words (M = .82, SO = .13) were better remembered than the 
valenced (M = .64, SO = .19; t = 5.51, df = 31, P < .001) and categorically related words (M = 
.67, SO = .16; t = 5.01, df = 31, P < .001), the current findings failed to replicate Kensinger 
and Corkin's (2004) observation that memory for arousing words is relatively immune to the 
effects of dividing attention at study. 
Table 2.2 
Average recognition proportions for the ASO and Comparison Group as a function of 
Encoding Condition and Word Type (values in parenthesis reflect standard deviations) 
ASD (n = 16) Comparison (n = 16) 
Target Lure Corrected Target Lure Corrected 
Full attention 
Arousing 0.88 (0.14) 0.03 (0.09) 0.85 (0.15) 0.88 (0.14) 0.01 (0.04) 0.87 (0.14) 
Valenced 0.73 (0.20) 0.07 (0.12) 0.66 (0.19) 0.74 (0.21) 0.06 (0.10) 0.68 (0.23) 
Category 0.82 (0.18) 0.06 (0.12) 0.76 (0.22) 0.79 (0.21) 0.06 (0.10) 0.72 (0.21) 
Divided attention 
Arousing 0.82 (0.17) 0.04 (0.11) 0.78 (0.17) 0.86 (0.19) 0.09 (0.10) 0.77 (0.18) 
Valenced 0.71 (0.24) 0.09 (0.17) 0.61 (0.24) 0.69 (0.24) 0.10 (0.15) 0.59 (0.25) 
Category 0.71 (0.23) 0.07 (0.12) 0.64 (0.21) 0.72 (0.22) 0.13 (0.16) 0.60 (0.17) 
One possible reason for the current failure to replicate the findings by Kensinger and 
Corkin (2004) in full is the fact that the experimental materials used here were not only 
matched in terms of valence but also in terms of other stimulus dimensions known to 
influence memory (i.e. familiarity, imageability and semantic relatedness). In order to 
determine whether these stringent matching criteria may have contributed to the difference in 
findings, the data were re-analysed after re-Classifying arousing and valenced words 
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according to ratings of arousal alone. That is, memory for the 24 most arousing words was 
compared to that for the 24 least arousing words regardless of how these words were 
matched according to the other stimulus dimensions (in fact high-arousal and low-arousal 
words only differed in terms of imageability, with the former being rated as more imageable 
than the latter). According to this re-classification, 10 previously valenced words were now 
included as high-arousal words. A 2 (Group) x 2 (Encoding Condition) x 3 (Word Type) mixed 
ANOVA of the resulting corrected recognition rates, however, again only yielded main effects 
for Word Type (F(2,29) = 7.44, P < .01) and Encoding Condition (F(1,30) = 9.50, P < .01) but 
no other main effects or interaction (Fs < 0.57). Average corrected recognition rates during 
the full-attention condition were 0.80 (SO = 0.18) for high-arousal words and 0.72 (SO = 0.17) 
for low-arousal words whilst during the divided-attention condition the respective values were 
0.73 (SO = 0.17) and 0.65 (SO = 0.23). Recognition rates for categorically related words were 
not influenced by the re-classification of the emotional words (Le. see Table 2.2 for values). 
Somewhat surprisingly, a nearly identical pattern of results also emerged when emotional 
words were re-classified according to the valence dimension alone (Le. most negative vs. 
least negative; the latter were also rated as significantly more familiar). This re-classification 
resulted in 12 originally valenced and 12 originally arousing words being included in the most 
and least negative categories each. Again statistical analyses revealed main effects for Word 
Type (F(2,20) = 13.56, P < .001) and Encoding Condition (F(1,30) = 10.55, P < .01) but no 
other main effects or interactions (Fs < 0.30). Average recognition rates for this re-
classification of words were 0.80 (SO = 0.17) for the most and 0.73 (SO = 0.17) for the least 
negative words during the fUll-attention condition and 0.75 (SO = 0.16) and 0.63 (SO = 0.22) 
respectively for the divided-attention condition. Thus, regardless of whether emotional words 
were classified according to arousal ratings or valence ratings, the most extreme words on 
either of these dimensions were remembered better than all other words. No evidence was 
uncovered, however, to suggest that arousal modulates memory through qualitatively distinct 
processes in the current paradigm. 
Before turning to a discussion of the current findings, it is important to point out that 
the failure to replicate Kensinger and Corkin's (2004) observations in full was somewhat 
surprising because overall recognition levels and the main effects of Word Type and 
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Encoding Condition in the current study were comparable to those observed by these 
authors. Recognition rates in the Kensinger and Corkin (2004) study varied between 60% and 
88% across the various experimental conditions, which is nearly identical to the values 
observed here (see Table 2.2). In addition, inspection of individual data ruled out the 
possibility that a minority of individuals in the current sample performed in an unusual way 
that may have obscured the expected interaction effect. Most importantly, however, a pilot 
study of 7 undergraduate students had yielded this interaction between Word Type and 
Encoding Condition (F(2,5) = 4.54, P = .07; effect size r = .69), making it extremely unlikely 
that the materials and procedures employed in the present study were not sensitive to the 
effects observed by Kensinger & Corkin (2004). 
Discussion 
The purpose of the present experiment was to assess the specific effect of arousal 
on memory in individuals with ASD, in order to gain insight into the nature of emotional 
processing difficulties evident in this condition. For this purpose an experimental paradigm 
used by Kensinger and Corkin (2004) was employed, which, in the original publication, 
showed that arousing words are not only better remembered than non-arousing ones but that 
the acquisition of such memories is also relatively unaffected by dividing participant's 
attention at study. The demonstration of such differences at both the quantitative and 
qualitative level, together with extensive neuroscientific evidence, lends strong support to the 
idea that memories of arousing stimuli are mediated by distinct cognitive and neural 
mechanisms (e.g. Hamann, 2001; McGaugh, 2002). 
Although the current experiment confirmed that arousing words are better 
remembered than non-arousing words, it failed to replicate the finding that the formation of 
such memories is relatively immune to the effects of dividing attention at study. Moreover, 
memory was found to be superior for emotional words regardless of whether such words 
were classified according to their ratings of arousal or their ratings of valence. Thus, the 
present findings yielded no evidence to suggest that arousal modulates memory through 
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emotion specific cognitive or neural mechanisms, making it difficult to formulate conclusions 
regarding the functional integrity of such mechanisms in ASD. 
Despite the failure to replicate the findings by Kensinger and Corkin (2004) in full, the 
current observations nevertheless provide a useful extension to previous research regarding 
memory for emotionally significant stimuli in ASD. More specifically, the current findings 
replicate the observations by South et al. (2008) who found that individuals with ASD exhibit a 
relatively typical recognition memory advantage for emotionally significant compared to 
neutral words. In addition, the present results show that this memory advantage prevails 
when emotional and neutral words are closely matched on other (non-emotional) dimensions 
known to influence memory. In particular, the current findings rule out the possibility that 
individuals with ASD may remember emotionally significant words better than neutral words 
simply because the former are semantically more interrelated. Thus, similar to typical 
individuals, those with a diagnosis of ASD seem to exhibit a relatively specific memory 
enhancement for emotionally significant information. Whether this memory enhancement 
reflects the operation of qualitatively similar processes in both groups, and whether these 
processes are emotion-specific and mediated by the amygdala, however, remains uncertain. 
Experiment 2: Free recall and forgetting of emotionally arousing words 
in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that individuals with ASD exhibit a rather typical 
recognition advantage for emotionally significant words but failed to confirm that this 
recognition advantage was the result of the operation of amygdala mediated memory 
modulation processes. One possibility for the failure of Experiment 1 to replicate the findings 
by Kensinger and Corkin (2004) in full, is that participants in that experiment did not actually 
experience arousing words as truly arousing. That is, participants may not have had 
differential physiological reactions to the arousing compared to non-arousing words. The 
present study addresses this question by drawing on an experimental paradigm that allows 
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for the direct assessment of physiological responses to words differing in subjective ratings of 
arousal. Assessing such physiological responses places certain constraints on the 
experimental paradigm because they take place over a period of several seconds. Thus, the 
presentation of stimuli has to be rather slow, which gives participants ample opportunity to 
process the to-be-remembered stimuli in a variety of ways. In relation to the principal aim of 
the current experiments, this increases the possibility that differences in performance 
between ASD and typical participants may arise because the two groups engage in different 
encoding processes. In order to overcome this difficulty, the following experiment employed 
an incidental memory paradigm (Le. participants were not instructed to try to remember the 
Words) in which participants were simply asked to rate each word in terms of how aroused 
they felt by it. Such rating instructions have the additional advantage of encouraging item-
specific rather than relational encoding processes, which, as noted earlier, seem to operate 
typically in ASD. This experiment has been published in Neuropsychologia (Gaigg & Bowler, 
2008) and it should be noted that the study by South et al. (2008) appeared in the literature 
after the present study was accepted for publication. As a result, the study by South et al. 
(2008) was acknowledged in a note added during the revision process rather than in the 
introduction of the manuscript. 
l!:J.troduction 
Since the first descriptions of individuals with ASD, it has been noted that marked 
abnormalities in affective behaviours constitute a prominent feature of their behavioural 
manifestations. These include the limited sharing of affect (Kasari, et aI., 1990; Yirmiya, et aI., 
1992), restricted and inflexible use of context appropriate emotional expressions (Dawson, et 
al., 1990; Kasari, et al., 1993; Macdonald, et al., 1989; Sigman, et al., 1992; Yirmiya, et al., 
1989) and difficulties in the perception and recognition of emotional expressions in others 
(Hobson, 1986a,b; Hobson, et al., 1988a,b; Hobson, 1991; Weeks & Hobson, 1987; but see 
Castelli, 2005 for contrasting findings). Although these atypicalities constitute a diagnostically 
relevant feature of ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organisation, 
. 1992), their causes remain the matter of debate. Some authors maintain that disordered 
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emotional behaviours may be a secondary manifestation of impairments in other social 
capacities such as face-processing (Schultz, 2005) or 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) understanding 
(Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen, et al., 1999), whilst others argue that aberrant 
emotional behaviours reflect primary impairments in emotional processes (Hobson, 1989; 
Kanner, 1943; Mundy & Sigman, 1989). In order to gain further insights into this debate, it is 
important to determine whether emotional processing difficulties in ASD extend to domains 
outside the broader context of social cognition. 
In typically developed individuals, it is well established that emotionally charged 
events are remembered better than neutral ones (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry & Lang, 1992; 
Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Kensinger & Corkin; 2003) but only one 
study has to date investigated this phenomenon in individuals with ASD. In one of four 
experiments, Beversdorf and colleagues (Beversdorf, et al., 1998) asked participants to try to 
remember a series of emotionally charged and neutral statements (e.g. 'He talks about death' 
vs. 'He is talking with his roommate') that were auditorily presented in a blocked fashion. 
Following each block, participants were asked to free recall as many statements as possible. 
Results showed that whilst typically develo'ped participants recalled significantly more 
emotionally charged than neutral statements, those with ASD recalled both types of 
statements to a similar extent. Since the other 3 experiments of this publication demonstrated 
that individuals with ASD, like typical participants, exhibited enhanced memory for sentences 
and paragraphs that were syntactically and conceptually more coherent, the authors 
concluded that ASD seems to be characterised by a relatively specific memory decrement for 
emotionally charged stimuli. 
Studies such as the one set out above provide valuable insights into the nature of 
emotional 'processing abnormalities in ASD by indicating that the emotional significance of 
environmental stimuli atypically modulates cognitive processes outside the broader context of 
Social cognition. As such the findings by Beversdorf et al. (1998) augment recently 
accumulating evidence showing that the aberrant emotional processes manifest in ASD do 
indeed extend to domains outside the broader context of social cognition. Studies of 
classically conditioned fear responses for example, indicate that individuals with ASD acquire 
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fear to a previously neutral stimulus similar to typical individuals when this stimulus is 
consistently and repeatedly paired with a noxious stimulus (Bernier, et al., 2005). However 
when the association between the neutral stimulus and the noxious stimulus is less 
consistent, such as in differential fear conditioning paradigms, fear acquisition in ASD is 
attenuated in comparison to typical individuals (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007). This pattern suggests 
that whilst relatively basic emotional response mechanisms function relatively typically in 
ASD, they are not normally modulated by the contingencies that determine the emotional 
significance of stimuli. Studies assessing the psychophysiological reactivity of individuals with 
ASD have yielded a similar pattern of observations. Such studies show that although 
individuals with ASD generally exhibit heightened autonomic responses to emotionally 
significant stimuli (e.g. Ben-Shalom, et al., 2003; Salmond, et al., 2003), such responses are 
often abnormally modulated by specific stimulus parameters such as the direction of gaze in 
facial stimuli (Joseph, Ehrman, McNally & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 
2006) or the type of emotional content displayed (Blair, 1999; Hillier, Carpenter, Smith, 
Berntson, & Beversdorf, 2006). In addition, even when autonomic responses are comparable 
across typical and ASD participants, the accompanying subjectively experienced 'feelings' 
participants report tend to differentiate these groups (Ben-Shalom, et al., 2003). Based on 
this literature, we have recently suggested that ASD may be characterised by ab~ormalities in 
how psychophysiological and cognitive emotional processes are integrated and how they 
modulate one another (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007). Memory paradigms provide a useful 
behavioural tool to test this suggestion because stimulus induced psychophysiological 
arousal has been shown to modulate memory processes reliably (e.g. Cahill & McGaugh, 
1998; Corteen, 1968; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Maltzman, Kantor 
& Langdon, 1966). 
In addition to shedding further light on the nature of emotional atypicalities in ASD at 
the behavioural level, studies of memory for emotionally significant stimuli may also provide 
important insights into the neuropathological basis underlying them. As Beversdorf et al. 
(1998) point out, their finding of atypical memory for emotional stimuli is in line with the view 
that abnormalities of the limbic system, in particular the amygdala, may play an important role 
in the neuropathology underlying ASD. Although several other lines of inquiry support this 
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view (e.g. Bachevalier, 2000; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Nacewicz, Dalton, Johnstone et al., 
2006), the evidence remains inconclusive and the extent and nature of a proposed amygdala 
abnormality unspecified (e.g. Amaral, Bauman, Mills & Shumann; 2003; Sweeten, Posey, 
Shekhar & McDougle, 2002). Based on the behavioural evidence outli~ed above, it appears 
that relatively basic amygdala functions such as those necessary for mediating automatic 
behavioural and autonomic responses to innately emotive stimuli are relatively preserved in 
ASD. Ashwin, et al. (2006) have recently reached a similar conclusion following their 
observation that individuals with ASD like typical individuals exhibit a 'pop-out' effect (Le. 
faster detection) when searching for an angry face amongst neutral or happy face distracters. 
What appears. to be impaired in ASD is how such basic emotional response processes 
modulate and are modulated by 'higher' level cognitive and perceptual processes. Together 
with accumulating evidence suggesting that the neuropathology underlying ASD may be 
characterised by relatively widespread abnormalities in connectivity between disparate brain 
areas (e.g. Brock, Brown, Boucher & Rippon, 2002; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana & 
Minshew, 2007; Rippon, Brock, Brown & Boucher, 2007) this pattern of findings has led 
several authors to suggest that the amygdala may be functionally disconnected from areas 
sub-serving other cognitive and perceptual processes (Ashwin, et al., 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 
2007; McAlonan, Cheung, Cheung, Suckling, Lam, Tai, et al., 2005). Memory paradigms 
provide a useful behavioural tool in this context because it is well established that interactions 
between the amygdala and hippocampus play a central role in the modulation of memory as 
a function of the physiological arousal elicited by emotionally significant stimuli (see Cahill & 
McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, 2001; McGaugh, 2000; Phelps, 2004 for reviews). 
In order to test the prediction that memory is atypically modulated by stimulus 
induced autonomic arousal in ASD, the current study extends the findings by Beversdorf et 
al., (1998) in two ways. First, by directly measuring participants' Skin Conductance 
Responses (SCR) and asking them to rate each stimulus on 'arousal', we confirmed whether 
or not our experimental stimuli did indeed vary on this dimension. In addition to assessing the 
impact of arousal on memory more directly, this also allowed us to address the possibility that 
emotional memory deficits in ASD may arise because of abnormalities in how such 
individuals perceive or physiologically respond to emotionally charged stimuli. As indicated by 
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the evidence outlined above, this possibility is viable since individuals with ASD do not seem 
to exhibit typical levels of physiological arousal in response to all emotionally significant 
stimuli (e.g. Blair 1999) and even when they do, such responses may not alter their 
perceptions of the stimuli accordingly (e.g. Ben-Shalom, et aI., 2003). Second, we assessed 
participants' memory at three time-points (immediately after encoding and following 1 hour 
and 24 hour delays) in order to establish forgetting rates for emotionally arousing and non-
arousing stimuli. Studies employing such forgetting paradigms consistently show that 
memories of emotionally arousing stimuli are more resistant to forgetting than non-arousing 
stimuli (e.g. LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Walker & Tarte, 1963). Aided by 
extensive neuroscientific evidence (e.g., Adolphs, Denburg & Tranel, 2001; Hamann, 2001; 
Phelps, 2006; Phelps, LaBar, Anderson, Q'Connor, Fulbright & Spencer, 1998) this 
behavioural dissociation of the effects of arousal on memory is widely thought to reflect 
memory modulation processes that are mediated by the amygdala and should therefore yield 
further insights into the functional integrity of the amygdala in ASD. Because no study has to 
date addressed the possibility that the attenuated forgetting rate for emotionally arousing 
stimuli may in part be the result of the greater semantic relatedness amongst arousing 
compared to non-arousing stimuli, we included a set of categorically related items in our 
experimental materials in order to control for this possibility. This experimental control was 
equally important in terms of addressing the possibility that a memory decrement for 
emotionally arousing stimuli in ASD may arise simply because such individuals tend to make 
less use of semantic relations between items to facilitate free recall (e.g. Bowler, et aI., 1997; 
Hermelin & Q'Connor, 1967; Smith, Gardiner & Bowler, 2007; Tager-Flusberg, 1991; But see 
L6pez & Leekam, 2003 for contrary evidence). 
Method 
&rticipanfs 
Eighteen participants with a diagnosis of ASD (15 male; 3 female) and 18 typically 
developed adults (14 male; 4 female) participated in the current experiment. All participants in 
the clinical group had been diagnosed according to conventional criteria and a review of 
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available medical records or assessment with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord, et al., 1989) confirmed that all met DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) criteria for an autism spectrum disorder. Brief interviews ensured that none of the 
participants suffered from any mental or neurological disorder other than ASD and all 
participants were free of medication. ASD and typical participants were individually matched 
to within 7 points of verbal IQ as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
IIluK; The Psychological Corporation, 2000) and groups did not differ on performance IQ, full-
Scale IQ or age (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 
Summary of Age and IQ characteristics for the ASD and Comparison Group 
ASD (n = 18) Comparison (n = 18) 
Measure M SD M SD 
Age (years) 33.0 13.1 30.4 10.0 
VIQs 107.8 15.5 107.4 14.7 
PIQb 107.8 16.8 105.1 12.5 
FIQc 108.6 16.8 104.6 12.4 
a Verbal IQ (WAIS_RuK or WAIS_lIl uK) 
b Performance IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_llluK) 
C Full-Scale IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
Materials & Design 
The experimental materials consisted of 16 emotionally arousing, 16 semantically 
related neutral and 16 semantically unrelated neutral words. The arousing words included 
profanities, sexually explicit and taboo words and were between 3 and 10 letters in length. 
Written frequency norms (Kucera & Francis, 1967) were available for 8 of these items and 
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ranged from 1 per million (e.g. Puke) to 84 per million (e.g. Sex) (M = 15.25, SO = 28.08). 
The semantically related words consisted of 16 items of fruit taken from the Battig and 
Montague (1969) category norms and were matched to the arousing words on letter length 
(range 4-10) and written frequency (M = 10.88, SO = 17.47). Similarly, the 16 unrelated 
. neutral words were selected to match the arousing and semantically related words in terms of 
letter length (range 3-10) and written frequency (M = 16.31, SO = 9.24) and none of the these 
Words was semantically or conceptually related to any other words in this study. 
Words were presented in pseudorandom order in 46 point Arial font in the centre of a 
15" laptop monitor with the constraint that no more than two words of the same type (Le. 
arousing, related neutral, unrelated neutral) would occur in succession. An additional 4 filler 
words, 2 at the beginning and 2 at the end of the list, were included to counteract primacy 
and recency effects on memory. Words were presented for 5 seconds each and were 
immediately followed by on-screen instructions asking participants to rate the word on a 4 
POint 'arousal' scale (1 = not at all arousing; 4 = very arousing). Once the participants had 
indicated their rating by typing the appropriate number on the keyboard, a fixation cross 
appeared in the centre of the screen and remained there until the experimenter triggered the 
presentation of the next item via a wireless mouse. Throughout the experiment participants 
SCRs were recorded via two surface electrodes attached to the medial phalanges of the first 
and third digit of the participants' non-dominant hand and a new stimulus word was presented 
only when there was no sign of galvanic activity for at least 2 seconds. SCR data acquisition 
Was controlled by ~owerLab hardware (ADlnstruments, 2004), which sampled electrodermal 
activity at 1 kHz and Chart 5 software (ADlnstruments, 2004) was used for the storing and 
assessment of the data. 
frocedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated laboratory and upon 
arrival, were informed that the current experiment was concerned with asseSSing individuals' 
emotional responses to neu~ral and emotionally charged words. More specifically, participants 
Were told that the purpose of the experiment was to determine the degree to which their 
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physiological responses to different words would relate to their subjective experience of 
arousal. We explained that for this purpose we would measure their SCR and ask them to 
rate each word in terms of how much they thought they physiologically reacted to these 
stimuli. It was clarified that their rating should reflect the degree to which they actually 'feW an 
emotional response to each word rather than base their ratings on the meaning of the words. 
No mention was made of any impending memory tests. 
Following the instructions, the SCR electrodes were attached and participants were 
asked to find a comfortable position in front of the screen and relax for a few minutes. Once 
SCR had reached baseline activity, the presentation of stimuli commenced. Immediately after 
the experiment and removal of all equipment, participants were given a surprise free recall 
test in which they were asked to write down as many words from the experiment as possible 
in any order. Following approximately 1 hour· which was filled by a lunch break or by non-
verbal tasks, free recall was again requested. For logistical reasons it was unfortunately not 
Possible to ask participants to return again the next day for the final free recall test. Instead, 
they were asked to take home a sealed envelope which they should not open until the 
following day. The envelope contained instructions to once again write down as many words 
as possible from the experiment of the previous day and to return responses via the envelope 
provided. 
Results 
For the analyses of participants' SCR, the largest deflection of galvanic activity during 
t~e 5 second stimulus presentation was calculated and square root transformed in order to 
normalise the distribution of the data. Average responses to the arousing, related neutral and 
unrelated neutral words are set out in Table 2.4, which also presents the participants' 
average arousal ratings for these stimuli. A 2 (Group) x 3 (Word Type) ANOVA of SCR 
confirmed that the emotive words elicited higher levels of physiological arousal than the other 
classes of stimuli (F(2,33) = 17.54, P < .001) and the absence of a main effect of Group 
(F(1,34) = 0.78, ns) and interaction (F(2,33) = 2.36, ns) suggests that both groups exhibited 
similar levels of autonomic activity across the different stimuli. An analysis of participants' 
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ratings equally revealed a significant main effect of Word Type (F(2,33) = 66.21, P < .001) but 
no main effect of Group (F(1,34) = 0.75, ns) or interaction (F(2,33) = 0.75, ns). Together, 
these results suggest that the manipulation of arousal was successful and that both groups 
similarly perceived and autonomically experienced the emotional significance of arousing 
Words. Interestingly, an assessment of correlations between autonomic activity and subjective 
ratings of arousal indicated that only for the comparison group this association was 
statistically reliable. These correlations were computed for each participant and whilst the 
average correlation coefficient (M = 0.29; SO = 0.20) across typical participants was 
significantly above chance (t = 6.11, df= 17, P < .001) the average across individuals with 
ASD (M = 0.10; SO = 0.23) was only marginally significant (t = 1.85, df = 17, P = .08)12. 
Table 2.4 
Average SCR and arousal ratings for ASO and Comparison Group as a function of Word 
Type 
ASD (n = 18) Comparison (n = 18) 
Word Type M SO M SO 
SCR (VIJS) 
Arousing 0.720 0.347 0.880 0.880 
Related Neutral 0.546 0.340 0.503 0.503 
Unrelated Neutral 0.574 0.378 0.559 0.559 
• Arousal Rating 
Arousing 2.49 0.76 2.49 2.49 
Related Neutral 1.64 0.64 1.49 1.49 
Unrelated Neutral 1.51 0.42 1.27 1.27 
12 
The difference between groups was also statistically reliable (t = 2.62, df= 34, P < .05) 
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Prior to assessing the free recall data we determined whether participants in the two 
groups completed the final free-recall test within similar timeframes. All but two typical and 
one ASD participant returned their final free recall responses and since the exclusion of these 
participants did not significantly alter the results reported below, their final free recall score 
was substituted with the respective group averages. Inspection of postmarks indicated that 
typical participants posted their responses on average 2 days after the experiment (SO = 
1.26; Range = 1-5) and ASD participants 3 days after the experiment (SO = 2.27; Range = 1-
9). Since this difference was statistically not reliable (t = 1.29, df = 31, ns) and response delay 
did not correlate with free recall for either group (r < 0.25, ns) it is unlikely that the results 
reported below are confounded by group differences in study-test delays. For simplicity we 
will refer to the last free recall test as a 24 hour+ delay test to indicate that for all participants 
at least 1 day had elapsed before they returned their responses. 
Figures 2.1 a and 2.1 b illustrate the average proportions of arousing, related neutral 
and unrelated neutral words recalled by the ASD and Comparison group as a function of time 
of recall. A 2 (Group) x 3 (Word Type) x 3 (Time) mixed ANOVA of these data revealed main 
effects for Word Type (F(2,33) = 155.84, P < .001) and Time (F(2,33) = 8.78, P < .01, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). As the figures suggest, the main effect of Word Type was 
due to the arousing (M = 0.44; SO = 0.15) and semantically related words (M = 0.41; SO = 
0.16) being recalled significantly more frequently than the neutral words (M = 0.15; SO = 
0.14) whilst the main effect of Time was mainly due to a Significant drop in recall between the 
1 hour (M = 0.34; SO = 0.14) and 24 hour+ (M = 0.30; SO = 0.15) delay (t = 3.36, df = 35, P < 
.01). Although no other main effects or interactions were statistically significant, the three-way 
interaction was (F(4,31) = 2.28, P = .08). Post-hoc analysis indicated that the Comparison 
group exhibited the expected pattern of results, forgetting the unrelated neutral (t = 2.46, df = 
17, P < .05) and related neutral (t = 3.66, df = 17, P < .005) words whilst their recall of 
arousing words (t = 0.98, df = 17, ns) did not decrease Significantly over time. For the ASD 
group on the other hand, only the forgetting rate of arousing words over the 24 hour+ period 
(t = 2.57, df = 17, P < .05) was significant. 
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Figure 2.1 
Average recall performance for the ASO and Comparison Group as a function of Word Type 
and Time of Recall (Error Bars represent Standard Errors) 
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The results above indicate that although individuals with ASD remember emotionally 
charged and semantically related items better than neutral unrelated items, they forget these 
Words more quickly than typical participants. In order to establish to what extent these results 
are attributable to abnormalities in how physiological arousal modulates memory, we re-
analysed recall performance as a function of actual levels of physiological arousal rather than 
as a function of the conceptual classification of words. For this purpose, words were re-
classified as either 'High Arousal' (16 words eliciting highest SCRs), 'Medium Arousal' (16 
Words eliciting moderate SCRs) or 'Low Arousal' (16 words eliciting the lowest SCRs) on the 
basis of each participant's SCRs. Figure 2.2a and 2.2b illustrate the relevant recall data for 
this classification of words and again show a markedly atypical pattern of forgetting in the 
clinical group. A 2 (Group) x 3 (Level of Arousal) x 3 (Time) ANOVA of these data revealed 
main effects for Level of Arousal (F(2,33) = 18.75, P < .001) and Time (F(2,33) = 5.81, P < 
.01) and a Significant three-way interaction between the factors (F(4,31) = 4.38, P < .01). The 
main effect of Level of Arousal represents the fact that the high arousal words (M = 0.40; SO 
::: 0.15) were recalled significantly better than the medium arousal (M = 0.31; SO = 0.17) and 
low arousal words (M = 0.28; SO = 0.15), whilst the main effect of Time was again mainly due 
to a Significant drop in recall performance between the 1 hour (M = 0.34; SO = 0.14) and 24 
hour+ (M = 0.30; SO = 0.15) delay period. As Figure 2.2 suggests, the three-way interaction 
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was due to the ASD participants exhibiting a recall advantage for highly arousing words only 
on the immediate test of memory (F(2, 16) = 8.78, P < .01) but not following a 1hour (F(2, 16) = 
1.35, ns) or 24 hour+ delay (F(2,16) = 1.82, ns). Typical participants on the other hand 
exhibited a highly reliable recall advantage for high arousal words across all time delays 
(Immediate: F(2,33) = 9.27, P < .01; 1 hour: F(2,33) = 16.16, P < .001; 24 hour+ F(2,33) = 
18.68, p <.001). 
Figure 2.2 
Average recall performance for the ASD and Comparison Group as a function of Level of 
Arousal and Time of Recall (Error Bars represent Standard Errors) 
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Previously, Beversdorf and colleagues (Beversdorf et aI., 1998) have observed a 
relatively specific memory decrement for emotionally charged stimuli in individuals with ASD 
and concluded that such a decrement may be the result of abnormalities of the amygdala. 
Current views regarding the role of the amygdala in memory postulate that this limbic 
structure modulates hippocampally based memory consolidation processes when stimuli elicit 
Physiological arousal (e.g. Phelps, 2006). As a result of this modulation, memory for arousing 
Over non-arousing stimuli is quantitatively enhanced and also more resistant to forgetting over 
time. Particularly the attenuated forgetting rate of emotionally arousing items is thought to 
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reflect amygdala mediated memory modulation processes, whilst the enhancement of 
memory over short periods of time can in part be accounted for by the semantic 
interrelatedness of emotionally charged stimuli (Talami, et al., 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 
2004). The current study was aimed at trying to provide further insights into the functional 
integrity of amygdala mediated memory modulation processes in ASD by assessing 
participants' SCR and subjective experience of arousal in response to a series of emotionally 
charged and neutral words and subsequently assessing memory for these stimuli at 3 points 
in time. 
Our results may be summarised as follows. Individuals with ASD, like typical 
individuals, exhibited significantly increased SCR to emotionally charged compared to neutral 
Words. Similarly, both groups rated the emotive words as more arousing than the non-
emotive ones. Interestingly, the correlation between SCRs and subjective ratings was 
significantly higher for the comparison than the clinical' group for whom this relationship was 
only marginally above chance. In terms of the participants' recall performance, both groups 
exhibited enhanced recall for emotive and semantically related compared to semantically 
unrelated neutral words. However, whilst the results from the comparison group replicated 
previous findings of reduced rates of forgetting of arousing words (e.g. LaBar & Phelps, 
1998), the ASD group exhibited the opposite pattern by forgetting emotionally arousing but 
not non-arousing words. Further analysis of the recall data as a function of each participant's 
SCR confirmed this group difference, again demonstrating significantly attenuated forgetting 
rates of arousing words in the typical but not the ASD group. This analysis furthermore 
showed that whilst typical participants maintained a highly reliable recall advantage for 
Physiologically arousing items over time, this recall advantage was only present on a test of 
immediate memory in ASD participants. Already following 1 hour, the clinical group's recall no 
longer varied as a function of whether the words had elicited high, medium or low levels of 
arousal during encoding, strongly suggesting atypicalities in how physiological· arousal 
mOdulates consolidation processes in this group. 
The degree to which neurological processes can be inferred from behavioural data 
depends on the extent to which the observed behaviour is associated with specific neural 
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processes. In this respect our observations from the comparison group yield important new 
evidence regarding the specificity with which physiological arousal modulates memory. 
Although it is well established that emotionally charged stimuli are better remembered than 
neutral stimuli, there remains some debate regarding the extent to which this memory 
enhancement may be an artefact of the semantic interrelatedness of emotionally arousing 
stimuli (e.g. Buchanan, et al., 2006; Maratos, et al., 2000; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). Our 
current findings contribute to this debate by demonstrating that incidentally encoded 
emotionally significant words, despite being better remembered than unrelated neutral words, 
are not remembered better than semantically related ones on an immediate test of free recall. 
Importantly, however, our assessment of forgetting rates showed that only emotive words 
were resistant to forgetting whilst neutral words were forgotten at a similar rate regardless of 
whether they were semantically interrelated or not. This suggests that although quantitatively 
memory for emotional words may be similar to that of semantically related non-emotional 
Words over short periods of time, such stimuli are consolidated in a qualitatively different 
manner. This qualitative difference is further highlighted by the fact that when memory is 
Considered in relation to actual levels of physiological arousal rather than a conceptual 
classification of stimuli, arousing stimuli are not only resistant to forgetting but remembered 
better than non-arousing stimuli even on immediate tests of memory. Together with the 
extensive neuroscientific evidence implicating the amygdala in the modulation of memory due 
to arousal (e.g. Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, 2001; Phelps, 2004), our results suggest· 
that, in particular, forgetting rates of emotionally arousing stimuli provide a relatively reliable 
behavioural marker of amygdala mediated memory modulation processes. 
If one accepts our interpretation above, our results from the ASD group provide 
important new insights into the functional integrity of the amygdala in this condition. Our 
observation of relatively typical autonomic responses to emotionally charged words in ASD 
SUggests that the basic process by which the amygdala modulates autonomic arousal in 
response to verbal stimuli is functionally intact. The markedly abnormal forgetting rate of 
emotionally arousing stimuli, on the other hand, suggests that the amygdala abnormally 
mOdulates hippocampally based consolidation processes as a function of arousal in ASD. As 
sUch our observations provide further behavioural evidence for our suggestion that the 
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amygdala may not be grossly impaired in ASD but that instead it abnormally modulates the 
functional activity in other areas of the brain because of poor connectivity to those areas 
(Ashwin, et al., 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 2007; McAlonan, et al., 2005). One may criticise these 
conclusions on the basis of our observation that individuals with ASD did exhibit enhanced 
memory for arousing words on a test of immediate free recall. As we argued above, however, 
the quantitative memory enhancement for arousing stimuli over short periods of time can be 
accounted for on the basis of such stimuli being semantically interrelated. In the current study 
individuals with ASD were able to draw on such semantic relationships to facilitate free recall 
as indicated by their superior recall of semantically related compared to semantically 
unrelated neutral words. Thus, although individuals with ASD exhibited a quantitative memory 
enhancement for arousing stimuli, these memories were not consolidated in the qualitatively 
distinct way that characterises emotionally charged memories in typical participants. In 
addition, our assessment of correlations between subjective ratings of arousal and the 
magnitude of SCRs replicates an earlier study in showing that this correlation is significant for 
typical individuals only (see Hillier, et al., 2006 for a similar observation). Again, this may be 
interpreted as indicating that cognitive representations of the emotional significance of 
environmental stimuli, which are thought to be mediated by cortical areas such as the 
cingulate cortex and frontal areas (e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, "2006; Lane, Reiman, Axelrod, 
YUn, Holmes & Schwartz, 1998; Maddock, Garrett & Buonocore, 2003), are inadequately 
modulated by physiological responses to these stimuli. 
Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects our suggestion that abnormalities of 
amygdala connectivity may be causally related to our observations, our results provide 
interesting insights into memory processes in ASD. First, our results confirm the observations 
by Beversdorf et al. (1998) in demonstrating that emotionally significant stimuli are atypically 
remembered by individuals with ASD. Although our observation of a relatively preserved 
memory enhancement for emotionally charged words on an immediate test of memory may 
be viewed as inconsistent with the observations by Beversdorf et al. (1998), as we have 
noted above, the atypical forgetting rate of these stimuli strongly suggests that qualitatively 
these memories are abnormal in individuals with ASD. Our observations thus provide further 
evidence that emotional processing atypicalities in ASD extend to domains outside the 
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broader context of social cognition, favouring the view that such abnormalities constitute a 
relatively basic feature of the ASD phenotype (e.g. Hobson, 1989) rather than a secondary 
manifestation of atypical social capacities (e.g. Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Schultz, 2005). 
Second, our findings also support recently accumulating evidence, which suggests that under 
some circumstances individuals with ASD make similar use of semantic relationships 
amongst items to facilitate free recall as do typical individuals (Gaigg et al., 2008; L6pez & 
Leekam, 2003). The current findings confirm our recent findings which showed that when 
semantically related words are presented in a mixed list, recall performance in individuals 
with and without ASD is nearly identical when individuals encode words through an item-
Specific encoding task in which individuals are asked to rate each word on pleasantness 
(Gaigg et al., 2008). Thus our current findings provide further support for our suggestion that 
item-specific memory processes function in a relatively intact manner in ASQ. 
In summary, we have shown that individuals with ASD exhibit atypical forgetting rates 
of emotionally arousing words, which on the basis of current neuroscientific evidence 
provides further support for the suggestion of abnormal amygdala connectivity in this 
condition (Ashwin, et al., 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 2007; McAlonan, et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
the current findings replicate our recent observations of intact free recall performance 
fOllowing item-specific encoding (Gaigg et al., 2008), providing further support for the 
SUggestion that item-specific memory processes function typically in this disorder. Finally, the . 
present findings add to the recently accumulating evidence, which suggests that emotional 
processing atypicalities extend to dqmains outside the broader context of social cognition, 
making it increaSingly unlikely that the emotional difficulties characterising autistic social 
behaviour are the sole result of abnormal socio-cognitive development. Instead it seems 
more plausible that emotional processing atypicalities form a primary feature of the ASD 
Phenotype. 
During the process of revising this manuscript for re-submission, we came across the 
recent publication by South, et al. (2008), who reported the results of four behavioural 
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experiments that are relevant to amygdala function. In one of these experiments the authors 
asked individuals with ASD and typical individuals to study a list of words containing 
emotionally charged and neutral words for a subsequent recognition memory task. The 
results showed that both groups of participants exhibited a memory enhancement for 
emotionally charged over neutral words. These observations are not inconsistent with our 
observations since we also noted that individuals with ASD recalled emotionally charged 
words better than neutral (unrelated) words on an immediate test of memory. What our 
results add to this observation is the suggestion that in ASD such emotional memories are 
not consolidated in the qualitatively distinct manner that characterises consolidation in typical 
individuals, thus implicating functional abnormalities in how the amygdala modulates such 
consolidation processes. It is worth noting that the other three experiments of the South et al. 
(2008) publication also revealed no indication of behavioural abnormalities leading these 
authors to suggest that amygdala dysfunction may be specific to social situations in ASD. Our 
current and previous findings (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007) suggest otherwise and further research 
is clearly needed in order to elucidate precisely what amygdala functions are and are not 
compromised in ASD. 
Experiment 3: Illusory memories of emotionallv charged words in 
Autism Spectrum Disorder: Further evidence for atypical emotion 
processing outside the social domain 
Experiment 2 above provides strong evidence for the suggestion that stimulus 
induced arousal atypically modulates memory in individuals with ASD. Although it remains 
possible that over relatively short periods of time such modulatory processes operate 
relatively normally in this condition, it seems clear from the foregoing observations, that 
individuals with ASD do not retain emotionally significant stimuli in distinct ways over time. If 
this is the case, one would expect such individuals to accumulate atypical representations of 
emotional stimuli (at least words) over the course of their lives. The present experiment puts 
this hypothesis to the test through the use of a memory illusion paradigm. This experiment 
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has been accepted for publication by the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
(Gaigg & Bowler, in press a). 
Introduction 
Research over the past four decades has firmly established that individuals from 
across the autism spectrum are severely compromised in I various aspects of affectively 
patterned communication (e.g., Corona, et al., 1998; Hobson, et al., 1988a, Joseph & Tager-
Flusberg, 1997; Kasari, et al., 1990; Loveland, 2003; Moore, et al., 1997; Sigman, et al., 
1992). Although these atypicalities are widely accepted to constitute a diagnostically sensitive 
manifestation of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Lord, et al., 1989; Lord, et al., 1994; 
Magyar & Pandolfi, 2007; Robins, et al., 2001), their causes remain the matter of debate. 
Some authors maintain that the emotional disturbances associated with ASD are the result of 
abnormalities in the development of socio-cognitive capacities such as face processing or 
'Theory of Mind' understanding (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Frith, 
2003; Leslie & Frith, 1990; Schultz, 2005). Others, by contrast, suggest that abnormal 
affective development lies at the root of the interpersonal abnormalities characterising the 
disorder (e.g., Hobson, 2002; Loveland, 2005, Mundy & Sigman, 1989). The major difficulty in 
reSolving this debate rests with the fact that most of the relevant evidence for it stems from 
studies assessing how individuals with ASD understand and react to the emotional signals of 
others. As such, the evidence can be accommodated by both theoretical accounts. In order to 
advance our understanding of the role of affective disturbances in ASD, it is therefore 
important to broaden the focus of research and assess how the emotional significance of 
"stimuli impacts on processes that are not primarily of a social nature. Studies of memory are 
ideally suited for this purpose because the influence of emotional factors in this domain are 
Well established and understood (see Reisberg & Hertel, 2004 and Uttl, et al., 2006 for a 
Collection of extensive reviews). 
One of the most reliable findings in the typical memory literature is that emotionally 
significant information is better remembered than neutral information (Bradley; et al.,1992; 
Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Kensinger & Corkin; 2003). To date only 
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four studies have investigated this phenomenon in individuals with ASD. The first, was 
conducted by Beversdorf and colleagues (Beversdof, et al., 1998) who presented a group of 
10 ASD and 13 typically developed adults with an audiotape of 10 emotionally salient 
statements (e.g., Carl shot his gun at someone) and 10 emotionally neutral statements (e.g., 
Mike is talking on the phone). After each block of statements participants were asked to write 
down as many of them as possible. Results indicated that only typically developed adults, 
and not those with a diagnosis of ASD, recalled significantly more of the emotionally salient 
statements. In direct contrast to this finding, South and colleagues (South, et al., 2008) 
reported no differences in memory for emotional material between a group of 36 adults with a 
diagnosis of ASD and 38 typically developed adults. In their experiment, participants were 
asked to study a random sequence of emotionally salient and neutral words for a subsequent 
recognition memory test. This time both groups of participants were found to exhibit superior 
memory for the emotionally salient material. Whilst the findings from these two studies are 
clearly at odds, a study from our own laboratory (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008) may help to resolve 
this inconsistency. Similar to South et al. (2008) we also presented participants with a random 
sequence of emotionally charged and neutral words and also found no group differences in 
memory for the emotional material between ASD and typically developed adults on an 
immediate test of memory. When assessing participants' memory again after 1 hour and once 
more after 1 day, however, the memory advantage for emotional words increased for typical 
participants whilst it diminished for those with a diagnosis of ASD. Importantly, we had had 
included a set-of semantically related but neutral words (Le. names of fruit) in our materials, 
allowing us to defermine to what extent the memory superiority for emotional words may be 
aCcounted for in terms of the semantic similarity between them .. In this respect our results 
.showed that neither group of participants exhibited enhanced memory for emotionally 
charged over semantically related neutral words on the immediate free recall test. This 
emotion specific enhancement of memory only emerged on the 1 hour and 1 day delay tests 
and it only emerged for typical but not ASD participants. Together, this pattern of findings 
SUggests that individuals with ASD may exhibit a quantitative enhancement in memory for 
emotionally charged as compared to neutral information over short periods of time because of 
semantic aspects of the stimuli rather than their emotional quality per se. In the Beversdorf et 
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al. (1998) study, the blocked presentation and use of statements rather than single words, 
may not have rendered semantic aspects of the emotional material salient enough to facilitate 
such a 'semantic modulation' of memory in ASD, whereas in the South et al. (2008) study 
such semantic influences on memory may explain why these authors failed to observe 
differences between ASD and typical participants. The evidence from the verbal domain, 
therefore, suggests that the emotional quality of verbal information does not impact on 
memory in ASD in the same qualitatively distinct fashion as in typical individuals and this 
conclusion has recently received additional support from the non-verbal domain. More 
specifically, Deruelle, Hubert, Santos and Wicker (2008) found that, unlike typical individuals 
who exhibit a memory advantage for negative as compared to positive and neutral pictures, 
participants with ASD demonstrated no such memory advantage (if anything they tended to 
remember neutral images more than positive and negative ones). 
Considering the available evidence, one might expect that memories of emotional 
material in individuals with ASD are qualitatively no different (or only minimally so) from their 
memories of non-emotional information. Over a lifetime, this would mean that individuals with 
ASD would accumulate representations of emotional information that are qualitatively 
indistinct from representations of non-emotional information. One way to test this contention 
is through a memory illusion paradigm developed by Pesta, Murphy and Sanders (2001). In 
their experiment, participants were presented with a list of words comprising blocks of 
orthographically associated words (e.g., Book, Nook, Cook, Look,,,. Cape, Tape, Shape, 
Nape, ... ) that participants were instructed to try to remember for a subsequent recognition 
memory test. Unbeknownst to the participants, this recognition test included a number of 
~:vords that were orthographically very similar to the words that had been on the studied list, 
but which participants had not actually seen. Half of these so-called Target Lures were 
neutral (e.g., Hook) and half of them were emotionally charged (e.g., 'Rape'). Pesta et al. 
(2001) found that typical individuals were extremely unlikely to falsely identify the emotionally 
charged Target Lures as having been on the original study list whilst their false recognition 
rates of neutral Target Lures was far above chance. In other words, whilst the orthographic 
Similarity between the studied words and the Target Lures gave rise to illusory memories of 
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certain neutral words, the distinctive nature of the emotional words attenuated such illusory 
memories. 
In the current experiment we replicated one of Pesta et ai's. (2001) experiments in 
order to test the hypothesis that individuals with ASD would be as likely to succumb to illusory 
memories of emotionally charged as neutral words. In addition, we were interested in whether 
individuals with ASD would generally be as susceptible to the illusory memory phenomenon 
as typically developed individuals. To date, most studies investigating this phenomenon in 
ASD (Beversdorf, et al., 2000; Bowler, et al., 2000; Hillier, Campbell, Keillor, Phillips & 
Beversdorf, 2007) have employed a paradigm developed by Deese (1959) and Roediger and 
MCDermott (1995), in' which participants study groups of semantically rather than 
orthographically associated words (e.g., bed, dream, pillow,: .. ) before memory is tested for 
some of these words together with semantically associated Target Lures (e.g. sleep). Overall 
the evidence suggests that individuals with ASD are susceptible to such semantically induced 
memory illusions, even if they may sometimes be less susceptible to them than typical 
Comparison individuals (Beversdorf et al., 2000). Interestingly, Hillier et al. (2007) found that 
individuals with ASD were less susceptible to illusory memories of abstract visual patterns 
that were induced by asking participants to study sets of similar visual patterns, despite the 
fact that groups did not differ on a standard semantic memory illusion paradigm. This pattern 
of results is informative in relation to the 'Weak Central Coherence' (WCC) (e.g. Shah & Frith, 
1993) and 'Enhanced Perceptual Functioning' (EPF) accounts of ASD (Mottron & Burack, 
. 
2001); Mottron et al., 2006). The former suggests that individuals with ASD are impaired in 
processing globally constituted and conceptual meaning, which seems at odds with the 
.. ~inding that individuals with ASD are subject to semantically induced memory illusions. The 
EPF account, on the other hand, predicts superior perceptual processing in ASD and this 
account seems to be in line with the patterning of findings in the memory illusion literature. To 
date, no study has assessed memory illusions in ASD in the verbal domain that are induced 
by structural (Le. orthography) rather than semantic associations between words. Given the 
eVidence so far, one might expect individuals with ASD to be less susceptible to such 
illUSions. 
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty two individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (18 male, 4 female) and 22 typically 
. . 
developed individuals (17 male, 5 female) participated in the present experiment. Individuals 
with ASD were diagnosed by experienced clinicians and a review of available records and/or 
assessment with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, et al., 1989) 
confirmed that all met DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for Autism 
Spectrum Disorder. ADOS scores were only used as an exclusion criteria when participants 
provided a statement of their diagnosis that did not include information about their 
developmental history. The 10 individuals included in this study who were unable to provide 
such details all met relevant cut-offs for an ASD on the AD OS assessment. Two individuals 
Whose ADOS scores fell below the cut-off for an ASD were included in the present study 
because their medical records clearly suggested that such a diagnosis was appropriate 
(exclusion of these participants did not alter the results presented below significantly). Typical 
participants were recruited from the local community through newspaper advertisements, and 
brief interviews ensured that no participants in either group suffered any psychiatric or 
neurological disorder (other than ASD) or were taking any psychotropic medication. Typical 
and ASD participants were individually matched to within 7 points of verbal IQ (WAIS_llluK; 
The Psychological Corporation, 2000) and, as Table 2.5 indicates, groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of performance IQ (t = 1.41, df = 42, ns), full-scale IQ (t = 1.29, df = 42, 
ns) or age (t = 0.53, df = 42, ns). The experimental procedures outlined below adhere to the 
ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society and were approved by the 
"University's Senate Ethical Committee. 
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Table 2.5 
Summary of Age and IQ characteristics for the ASD and Comparison Group 
ASD (n = 22) Comparison (n = 22) 
Measure M SO M SO 
Age (years) 33.5 12.3 35.2 9.6 
VIQa 101.1 12.6 103.1 11.5 
PIQb 96.7 13.3 102.5 14.1 
·FIQc 98.7 12.6 103.7 13.1 
• Verbal IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
b Performance IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
C Full-Scale IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lll uK) 
Materials & Design 
The experimental materials used in the current study were taken directly from Pesta 
et ai's. (2001) second experiment and included 12 groups of 10 orthographically related 
Words, 12 Target Lures, and 3 so-called 'distinctiveness attenuators'. Of the 12 orthographic 
Word groups, six were designated as Set A and six as Set B. Within each of these sets, three 
groups of words .. included the orthographic neighbours of three neutral Target Lures (Hook, 
. Shave and Peach for Set A and Rink, Park and Digit for Set B), whilst the other three groups 
included the orthographic neighbours of three emotionally charged Target Lures (Rape, Bitch 
and Whore for Set A and Slut, Hell and Penis for Set B). As outlined by Pesta et al. (2001), 
the emotional and neutral Target Lures were matched on word frequency (Kutera & Francis, 
1967) and letter length, whilst the lists comprising the orthographic neighbours of each type of 
Target Lure were matched as closely as possible in terms of the number of strict orthographic 
neighbours of their respective Target Lure. The three 'distinctiveness attenuators' (Fuck, Piss 
& Asshole) were presented during the study phase of the experiment and served to satisfy 
the participants' expectations of seeing emotionally charged words during the experiment (for 
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ethical reasons participants were fully informed about the nature of the experimental 
materials}. 
During the study phase of the experiment, participants were presented with a 
sequence of 67 words, including the sixty words from the orthographic word groups of either 
Set A or Set B, the three 'distinctiveness attenuators', and four buffer words (2 at the 
beginning and 2 at the end of the list). The buffer words were included to counter primacy and 
recency effects. Words were presented visually on a lap-top monitor at a rate of one word 
every 3 seconds. Each word appeared in bold, Times New Roman font (size 60) in the centre 
of the screen, remained there for 2 seconds and was followed by a 1 second blank screen 
before the onset of the next word. Following Pesta and colleagues, the order of presentation 
fOllowed a pseudorandom blocked design, whereby sets of 5 words from a given orthographic 
Word group were presented in sequence, whilst the order of these blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. The order of words within each block was randomised. 
The three 'distinctiveness attenuators' were inserted in serial positions 13, 34 and 50. During 
the recognition test participants were presented with a random selection of 18 words that they 
had studied (3 from each orthographic word group), 18 words from the set that they had not 
studied (3 from each orthographic word group) and all 12 Target Lures. The order of 
presentation was random and the format of presentation was similar to that during the study 
phase with the exception that the words remained on the screen until participants gave their 
response. 
frocedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated laboratory. Prior to the 
eXperiment, participants were briefed about the nature of the experiment. They were told that 
they would be required to try to remember a list of words for a subsequent memory test and 
that some of the words in the experiment would be 'sexually charged, vulgar or offensive'. 
The illusory memory phenomenon was not mentioned at this stage. Once participants had 
given their consent to take part in the experiment, they were presented with the to-be-
remembered list of words. Immediately after the last word, participants were given 
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instructions about the impending recognition memory test. The instructions specified that 
participants would again see a list of words and that this list would include some of the words 
that they had just seen and some new words. Participants were instructed to indicate whether 
or not they had seen a particular word before and the experimenter noted these responses on 
an answer sheet. After the end of the recognition test procedure, participants were fully 
debriefed about the nature of the experiment and paid according to standard University fees. 
Results 
Prior to analysing the illusory recognition rates of Target Lures, we assessed 
participants' true and false recognition rates of the orthographic word group items. Following 
Pesta and colleagues (2001), we computed participants' 'Yes' responses to these items as a 
function of whether these were part of the studied or unstudied set and according to whether 
they comprised the orthographic neighbours of the emotional or neutral Target Lures. A 2 
(Group) x 2 (Studied vs. Unstudied) x 2 (Orthographic neighbour of emotional vs. neutral 
Target Lure) mixed ANOVA of these data, which are set out in Table 2.6, revealed a main 
I 
effect of Studied/Unstudied (F(1,42) = 328.84, P < .001; effect size r= 0.94) but no other main 
effects or interactions (F < 2.20; effect size r < 0.22). The main effect of Studied/Unstudied 
Simply confirms that true recognition rates exceeded false recognition rates. The important 
result, however, is that both groups performed similarly well in terms of their overall 
recognition rates and across words comprising the orthographic neighbours of the emotional 
and neutral Target Lures. Thus, any differences in illusory Target Lure recognition between 
groups or across emotional and neutral Target Lures are unlikely to be due to differences in 
terms of how well participants remembered the orthographic neighbours of these Target 
Lures. 
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Table 2.6. 
Proportion of 'Yes' responses to Studied and Un studied words and the Target Lures related to 
them as a function of Emotionality and Group (values in parenthesis reflect the SD) 
Word Type 
Orthographic word group 
Related to neutral Target Lure 
Related toemotional Target Lure 
Target Lures 
Neutral 
Emotional 
ASD (n = 22) 
Studied 
.63 (.27) 
.59 (.28) 
.39 (.32) 
.32 (.36) 
Unstudied 
.09(.14) 
.04 (.08) 
.11 (.19) 
.09 (.18) 
Typical (n = 22) 
Studied 
.66 (.19) 
.69 (.26) 
.30 (.31) 
.18 (.20) 
Unstudied 
.06 (.08) 
.03 (.05) 
.12(.19) 
.00 (.00) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: In relation to the Target Lures, the column labels 'Studied' and 'Unstudied' refer to the distinction between 
Target Lures that were either orthographically related to the Studied or Unstudied word groups. 
Table 2.6 also presents the illusory Target Lure recognition rates. A 2 (Group) x 2 
(Orthographic neighbour of Studied vs. Unstudied list items) by 2 (Emotional vs. Neutral) 
mixed ANOVA of these data revealed main effects for the Studied/Unstudied (F(1,42) = 
50.75, p < .001; effect size r = 0.74) and Emotional/Neutral (F(1,42) = 4.78, P < .05; effect 
. size r = 0.32) factors, confirming that Target Lures are more likely to be misremembered 
when they are orthographically similar rather than dissimilar to the studied words, and that 
emotionally charged Target Lures are less likely to be misremembered than neutral Target 
Lures. A closer inspection of Table 2.6, also indicates the expected lack of an emotional 
I 
modulation of illusory memories in the ASD group and planned within-group comparisons 
Confirmed this impression. For the typical group, main effects were observed for both, the 
Studied/Unstudied (F(1,21) = 23.08; P < .001; effect size r = 0.72) and Emotional/Neutral 
(F(1,21) = 9.27; p < .01; effect size r = 0.55) factors, whilst for the ASD group only the main 
effect of Studied/Unstudi~d was significant (F(1,21) = 27.97; p < .001; effect size r = 0.75) 
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whilst the Emotional/Neutral factor had virtually no effect in this group (F( 1,21) = 0.49; ns; 
effect size r = 0.15). 
Discussion 
The principal motivation for the current experiment was the observation that ASD 
individuals seem to retain emotionally significant information in a qualitatively rather indistinct 
fashion over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). On the basis of this observation, we suggested 
that individuals with ASD would be unlikely to have accumulated distinct representations of 
emotionally salient information throughout their lives, leading us to predict that they should 
not exhibit an emotional modulation of the illusory memory phenomenon. Before we discuss 
Our results in relation to this hypothesis, we will briefly address the more general question of 
Whether individuals with ASD are as susceptible to orthographically induced memory illusions 
as typically developed individuals. 
As outlined in the introduction, previous studies of memory illusions in ASD seem to 
Suggest that such individuals may be less susceptible than typical individuals to illusory 
memories that are induced through perceptually anchored associations between to-be-
remembered words whilst their susceptibility to conceptually induced memory illUSions is 
more in line with that of typical individuals (Beversdorf et al., 2000; Bowler et al., 2000, Hillier 
et al., 2007). On the basis of the EPF model (Mottron & Burack; Mottron et al., 2006) this 
Pattern may be" explained in terms of the superior perceptual processing abilities of 
. individuals with ASD, which may enhance their ability to discriminate amongst very similar 
~ Patterns of perceptual information. In a way, one might consider the present findings to pose 
a challenge to such an interpretation because we observed no differences between ASD and 
typical participants in terms of their susceptibility to orthographically induced memory 
illUSions. We hasten to add, however, that orthographic associations between words are not 
perceptually anchored in the same way as the similarities between the abstract visual 
Patterns used in the Hillier et al. (2007) study. In this context it would be of interest to devise 
an experiment in which memory illusions of verbal stimuli are induced through similarities 
amongst words in terms of font style or font colour, which would more closely resemble the 
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associations of the abstract visual patterns used by Hillier et al. (2007). It is clear that further 
studies will be needed in order to clarify what kinds of associations amongst stimuli determine 
the degree to which individuals with ASD are susceptible to illusory memories. All we can 
conclude for the moment is that studies of this phenomenon may be fruitful in informing 
theoretical frameworks such as the wee (e.g., Shah & Frith, 1993) and EPF accounts 
(Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert & Burack, 2006), which attempt 
to specify the perceptual and conceptual processing abilities of individuals with ASD. 
In relation to our principal hypothesis, our findings support. our prediction that 
individuals with ASD would be as likely to experience illusory memories of emotionally 
charged as neutral words. More specifically, whilst our findings from typical participants 
replicated the observations of Pesta et al. (2001), that the experience of illusory memories is 
attenuated for emotionally charged compared to neutral words, we observed no such 
attenuation for participants with ASD13• In the context of our recent observation that 
individuals with ASD do not retain emotionally significant words in a qualitatively distinct 
fashion over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008), we interpret the current findings as follows. 
Throughout development, individuals with ASD accumulate representations of emotionally 
significant information that are rather indistinct from their representations . of neutral 
information. More specifically, we argue that autonomic responses during emotionally 
charged situations in ASD are atypically integrated with the subjectively experienced 
perception of the situation, resulting in an alteration in how relevant information is 
consolidated into long-term memory. In support of this view, the atypical pattern of memory 
. for emotional material in ASD tends to be associated with abnormalities in how stimulus 
induced arousal influences the subjective perception of stimuli. In our previous ~emory study 
(Gaigg & Bowler, 2008), for instance, we found that the subjective ratings of emotionality of 
Words in ASD did not correlate with participants' autonomic responses to the words, whereas 
for typical participants this correlation was Significant. Several other studies have reported 
Similar findings in relation to picture stimuli rather than words (Ben Shalom, et al., 2003; 
13 
One may criticise our conclusions in this respect on the basis that we observed no Group x Emotion interaction in 
OUr analysis. It is important to note, however, that even if this interaction were significant, it would be irrelevant in 
relation to our predictions, since the main effect of Emotion may nevertheless be significant within each group (Le. 
the effect could simply be larger in the Typical group), which would suggest that both groups represented emotional 
Words to some extent as qualitatively distinct. Our planned within-group analyses, therefore, are the most appropriate 
statistical analyses in relation to our predictions. 
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Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Hillier, et al., 2006) and as the recent study by Deruelle et al. (2008) 
suggests, individuals with ASD remember emotionally significant pictures no better than 
emotionally neutral ones (unlike typical participants). 
Of course, there are other ways to interpret our observations. On the basis of the 
EPF framework (e.g., Mottron et al., 2006) for instance, one could argue that the enhanced 
perceptual abilities of individuals with ASD interfered with the processing of the emotional 
quality of words, thus rendering them relatively indistinct and equally susceptible to the 
illusory memory phenomenon as neutral words. Such an explanation, however, would have to 
presume that the emotional quality of a stimulus is processed at a higher-order conceptual 
level than whatever perceptual process interfered with it. We do not think that such an 
assumption is tenable since the emotional quality of a stimulus tends to be processed 
relatively rapidly and automatically at a pre-conceptual level (LeDoux, 1996). Even if it were 
the case, however, that an atypically well functioning perceptual system interfered with the 
processing of the emotional quality of information, it would not contradict our interpretation of 
the current findings. On the contrary, suc~ interference effects might explain why autonomic 
emotional responses are abnormally integrated into perceptual and cognitive processes in 
ASD. In other words, perceptual interference may explain why individuals with ASD do not 
accumulate truly emotional representations of environmental stimuli. 
Another way of interpreting the current observations would be to suggest that 
individuals with ASD did not exhibit an emotional modulation of illusory memories because of 
more general abnormalities in language development. In fact, since language is acquired in 
the broader context of social cognition, one might argue that the current findings are the 
result of atypical reciprocal social development, an argument that could lead back to the 
theoretical debate that motivated the present experiment in the first place. In this context, 
however, it is important to consider the present findings not in isolation but in relation to other 
findings in the field. First, invoking atypical language development as an explanation for the 
current observations would not specify why individuals with ASD should remember 
emotionally Significant words better than neutral ones over short periods of time (Gaigg & 
Bowler, 2008; South et aI., 2008) whilst at the 'same time not retaining such words in a 
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qualitatively distinct manner over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). Second, it is unclear how 
language development could compromise memory for emotional pictures (Deurelle et al., 
2008) and how it could alter the extent to which subjective ratings of such pictures are related 
to arousal responses elicited by them (e.g. Ben Shalom, et al., 2003; Hillier et al., 2006). 
Third, a language account would be stretched to explain the finding that individuals with ASD 
acquire classically conditioned fear responses atypically when stimulus contingencies are 
unpredictable (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007) but not when they are predictable (Bernier et al., 2005) 
and such an account would also not clarify why decision making behaviours in ASD should 
be atypically related to the level of arousal participants exhibit in response to their decision 
making choices (Johnson et al., 2006). Because of this line of evidence, we feel that an 
explanation of the emotional processing difficulties in ASD in terms of a purely social 
phenomenon seems no longer tenable. In our opinion this facet of the ASD phenotype is 
more appropriately explained with reference to emotional processes that operate outside as 
Well as within the social domain and in this respect we argue that a core atypicality in ASD 
lies in how physiological aspects of emotional experiences influence perception and 
cognition. 
Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects our current interpretation, the 
observation itself remains the same and suggests that individuals with ASD do not only 
process socially relevant emotional signals atypically but that they are also relatively 
insensitive to the emotional significance of stimuli that are not directly social in nature. As 
such, our findings contribute to a growing literature, which favours the view that emotional 
. disturbances constitute a relatively central feature of the ASD phenotype (e.g. Hobson, 2002) . 
.§...ummary 
The principal aim of the experiments set out in this chapter was to test the hypothesis 
that stimulus induced arousal modulates memory atypically in individuals with ASD. This 
hypothesis was motivated by evidence suggesting that abnormalities of the amygdala, which 
is known to play a vital role in modulating memory as a function of arousal, are involved in the 
neuropathology underlying ASD. Experiment 1 showed that individuals with ASD, like typical 
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individuals, exhibit a quantitative memory enhancement for emotionally significant words on a 
test of recognition. However, that study failed to replicate the finding by Kensinger & Corkin 
(2004) that memory for arousing stimuli is relatively immune to the effects of dividing attention 
at study. Since the involvement of the amygdala in memory can only be inferred when 
arousal specific effects on memory are observed, Experiment 1 therefore did not permit any 
conclusions regarding the functional integrity of amygdala mediated memory modulation 
processes in ASD. Experiment 2 provided relatively strong evidence for arousal specific 
effects on memory and so provided a much more sensitive measure of amygdala functioning. 
This study demonstrated that, at least in typical individuals, memories for arousing words are 
much more resistant to forgetting than those of non-arousing words even when the latter are 
semantically highly interrelated. ASD participants did not exhibit this differential rate of 
forgetting despite the fact that both groups rated the arousing words as more physiologically 
stimulating, exhibited similar levels of actual physiological arousal and even demonstrated 
similar levels of enhanced recall of arousing words on an immediate test of free recall. This 
specific pattern of abnormality is difficult to account for in terms of generic memory processes 
especially since the finding was replicated when memory was assessed in relation to the 
actual levels of physiological arousal elicited by the words. At the behavioural level, therefore, 
this finding provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that stimulus induced arousal 
modulates memory abnormally in ASD and at the neural level this pattern of observations is 
consistent with the suggestion that abnormalities of amygdala connectivity (especially 
amygdalo-hippocampal connections) may be functionally compromised in this condition. The 
third, and final, experiment took a somewhat different approach and employed a memory 
illusion paradigm in order to determine whether individuals with ASD, like typical individuals, 
would be less likely to experience illusory memories of emotionally charged words. The 
rationale for this experiment was that, in order to experience illusory memories of emotionally 
charged words less frequently, one must perceive them as distinct, which necessitates that 
one has acquired distinct representations of emotional over non-emotional words on previous 
occasions. Since Experiment 2 showed that individuals with ASD retain emotionally arousing 
words no differently from non-arousing words, it was hypothesised that such individuals 
would not have acquired very distinct representations of emotional words throughout their 
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lives. Thus, individuals with ASD were predicted to experience illusory memories of 
emotionally charged words to the same extent as of neutral words, which was precisely what 
Experiment 3 demonstrated. 
In summary, the experiments of this chapter lend support to the principal hypothesis 
of the current thesis, namely that ASD is characterised by abnormalities in the interaction 
between stimulus induced arousal and cognition. On the basis of neuroscientific evidence, 
this evidence is suggestive of abnormalities in the functional connectivity between the 
amygdala and the hippocampus. The evidence, so far, however, is restricted to the domain of 
memory, and even more specifically to the memory of visually presented words. Although this 
restriction allowed for the control of variables that might explain group differences in 
performance without reference to emotion-specific processes, it leaves open the possibility 
that the observed abnormalities are relatively specific do the domain of memory, or perhaps 
even specific to verbal stimuli. The following two chapters address this issue by first 
determining whether abnormalities in the influence of arousal on cognition extend to the 
domain of perception when visually presented words are used as stimuli (Chapter 3) and 
second by employing a fear conditioning paradigm that assesses the influence of arousal on 
learning at a purely non-verbal level (Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 3: PERCEPTION OF EMOTIONALLY SIGNIFICANT WORDS 
Overview 
The concept of perception, like that of memory, is very broad and it would lead too far 
afield to provide a detailed overview of this domain of cognition. Such an overview would also 
be a digression from the principal focus of the following experiment, which simply asks 
whether individuals with ASD, like typical individuals, are more accurate at detecting 
emotionally arousing compared to non-arousing words when these are embedded within a 
very rapid sequence of distracter words. The experiment that follows has been accepted for 
publication as a brief report by the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders (Gaigg & 
Bowler, in press b) and as such includes only a brief introduction and discussion. Before I 
present the submitted manuscript, it is useful to elaborate on the rationale for the study 
somewhat. 
The previous set of experiments indicated that individuals with ASD may not 
accumulate distinct representations of arousing words throughout their lives because arousal 
responses induced by the perception of such words abnormally modulate the formation of 
long lasting memories. Although every attempt was made to control for the possibility that 
generiC memory difficulties might result in the observed pattern of results, it is nevertheless 
possible that such memory difficulties contributed to the observations reported earlier. As 
noted at the outset of Chapter 2, it is difficult to know whether our operational definitions of 
memory processes and systems apply to the way in which memory functions in individuals 
with ASD. As a consequence, it is possible that the observations of the experiments reported 
above, rather than reflecting abnormalities in how arousal modulates memory in ASD, are the 
consequence of differences in how memory operates in this disorder. However, if it is indeed 
the case that individuals with ASD accumulate relatively indistinct representations of 
emotional words throughout their lives, one would expect to observe evidence of this in other 
domains of cognition. For instance, one would expect that perceptual processes in ASD are 
rather unaffected by the emotional significance of words. This hypothesiS is put to the test in 
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the present chapter, which sets out an experiment that employed an attentional paradigm in 
order to determine whether individuals with ASD, like typical individuals, are more accurate at 
identifying emotionally significant compared to neutral words embedded in a rapid sequence 
of distracters. As in the previous experiments, the current design attempted to control 
experimentally for the possibility that individuals with ASD may exhibit abnormal performance 
patterns as a result of generic perceptual and/or attentional difficulties rather than emotion-
specific processing difficulties. 
Experiment 4: Attenuated emotional suppression of the Attentional Blink 
in Autism Spectrum Disorder: Another non-social abnormality? 
Introduction 
Traditionally, investigations of the emotional competences of individuals with ASD 
have focused on the study of emotional behaviours within the context of social cognition. 
Behavioural abnormalities are well established in this domain (e.g. Hobson, 2002) and 
although the developmental significance of these remain the matter of debate (see Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Frith, 2003; Hobson, 2002; Leslie & Frith, 1990; Loveland, 2005 for relevant 
discussions), neuroscientific investigations converge on the idea that abnormalities of the 
amygdala are most likely responsible (e.g. Bachevalier, 2000; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; 
. Schultz, 2005). The amygdala, however, is not only involved in the mediation of socially 
relevant emotional behaviours and processes. It plays an important role in our emotional lives 
regardless of whether we are alone or in the company of others - modulating learning and 
memory (e.g. LeDoux, 1994; Hamann, 2001; McGaugh, 2000; Phelps, 2004), altering 
decisions (e.g. Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2003; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 
1996) and influencing perceptions of the world (e.g. Anderson & Phelps, 2001). In recent 
years, several researchers have started to use the extensive literature on amygdala function 
heuristically to study the integrity of emotional processes in ASD outside the context of social 
Cognition. 
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Studies of fear conditioning have shown that individuals with ASD only learn the 
association between a noxious stimulus and a neutral one when the contingencies between 
the two are relatively predictable (Bernier, et al., 2005) but not when they are more variable 
(Gaigg & Bowler, 2007). Individuals with ASD have also been found to retain emotionally 
significant information no differently from non-emotional information (Beversdorf, et al., 1998; 
Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, under review a; but see South, et al., 2008) and 
decision-making processes in such individuals seem to be atypically influenced by the 
motivational significance of the decision-making choices (Johnson, et al., 2006). In short, 
accumulating evidence suggests that emotional processing abnormalities in ASD extend to 
domains outside the broader context of social cognition. 
The current experiment was designed to extend the aforementioned literature to the 
domain of attention where the amygdala is also known to play a modulatory role as a function 
of the hedonic value of environmental stimuli (e.g. Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Armony & 
Dolan, 2001). To date most studies relevant to this domain in ASD (see Schultz, 2005 for a 
relevant review), have involved assessments of attention to socially relevant emotional 
signals, with some studies noting abnormalities (e.g. Corona, et al., 1998; Kasari, et al., 1993) 
Whilst others do not (Ashwin, et al., 2006). Only two studies have attempted to extend this 
literature to 'the non-social domain, and here too the findings are inconsistent. South et al. 
(2008) found that typical and ASD participants exhibit similarly enhanced detection of fear-
relevant (e.g. snake) vs. fear-irrelevant (e.g. flower) stimuli in a visual search task, which 
supports the finding by Ashwin et al. (2006) that individuals with ASD demonstrate a typical 
anger-superiority effect in visual search paradigms employing socially relevant stimuli (Le . 
. , faster detection of angry vs. non-angry facial expressions). A recent study exploring a 
Phenomenon known as the 'Attentional Blink' (AB), on the other hand, showed that the 
emotional significance of words did not capture the attention of individuals with ASD to the 
same extent as for typical participants (Corden, Chilvers & Skuse, 2008), which is in line with 
Our observation that individuals with ASD do not seem to retain physiologically arousing 
Words in qualitatively distinct ways over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). The AB (Raymond, 
Shapiro & Arnell, 1992) describes a period of reduced awareness, elicited during tasks where 
PartiCipants are required to identify two target stimuli embedded among distracters in rapid 
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serial visual presentation (RSVP). Correct identification of the first target (T1) markedly 
attenuates identification of a second target (T2) occurring between 180-500 ms following T1. 
When T2 is emotionally charged, however, the AB phenomenon is attenuated (Keil & Ihssen, 
2004), and this attenuation is thought to be mediated by a neural system involving the 
amygdala (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). 
The experiment we report here can be thought of as a replication of Corden et al. 
(2008), even though the two studies were conceived independently of one another (Corden et 
ai's., 2008 findings only came to our attention after having prepared this manuscript). In fact, 
the two studies differ in important ways methodologically, thus strengthening the findings of 
each. Our rationale for the experiment is based on our previous finding that individuals with 
ASD do not seem to retain physiologically arousing words in qualitatively distinct ways over 
time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, under review). On the basis of this finding we 
hypothesised that such individuals would not accumulate distinct representations of emotional 
Words in long-term memory, making it unlikely that such words would capture their attention 
in an AB paradigm. 
Method 
E....articipanfs 
Twenty five individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (20 male, 5 female) and 25 typically 
developed individuals (20 male, 5 female) participated in the current study. Individuals with 
ASD were diagnosed by experienced clinicians and a review of available medical records 
and/or assessment with the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, et al., 
1989) confirmed that all met DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. Typical participants were recruited from the local community, and 
individually matched to within 7 points of verbal IQ (WAIS_lIluK; The Psychological 
Corporation, 2000) to ASD participants. Groups were also matched in terms of performance 
IQ, full-scale IQ and age. The relevant descriptive statistics for these group characteristics 
are set out in Table 3.1. The experimental procedures outlined below adhere to the ethical 
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guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society and were approved by the University's 
ethical committee. 
Table 3.1 
Summary of Age and IQ characteristics for the ASD and Comparison Group 
ASD (n = 25) 
Measure M SO 
Age (years) 38.4 13.6 
Vlaa 106.9 14.4 
Plab 104.8 17.0 
Flac 105.2 15.5 
• Verbal IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_llluK) 
b Performance IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lIIuK) 
C Full-Scale IQ (WAIS-RuK or WAIS_lll uK) 
Materials & Design 
Comparison (n = 25) 
M SO 
36.2 11.8 
106.3 13.8 
104.5 16.6 
105.8 15.1 
The stimuli included a pool of 590 distracter words and 120 target words. Distracter 
Words were 7 letters long and had a minimum written frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) of 
10 per million (average 60.2 per million). In order to ensure adequate masking during the 
RSVP stream, target words were only 3-5 letters long. Sixty of these were designated T1 and 
... included only emotionally neutral words. The remaining sixty were designated T2 and 
included 20 emotionally neutral words, 20 emotionally charged words (profanities, taboos, 
etc ... ) and 20 male first names. The latter were included to control for the possibility that 
semantic distinctiveness, rather than the emotional quality of words, facilitates T2 detection. 
In this context it is also worth noting that in previous studies ASD participants and typical 
Participants did not differ in terms of either their galvanic skin responses to emotionally 
Charged words or their subjective rating of arousal of such words (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg 
& Bowler, 2008). T1 words and T2 words were closely matched on letter length as were the 
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three sub-categories of T2 words. Neutral and emotional T2s were furthermore equated on 
ratings of familiarity, which we obtained in a separate normative study in which 49 
undergraduate students (35 female, 14 male) rated a set of 130 emotionally charged and 
neutral words on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all familiar; 9 = very familiar). The mean ratings 
for the neutral and emotional words included in the current experiment were B.OB (SO = .50) 
and 7.B4 (SO = 0.32) respectively. In order for the male first name T2s to be maximally 
distinct, we chose the ones most common in the UK. 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by E-Prime software (Psychology Software 
Tools, 1996-2002), which presented words in bold, 26-point, Arial font in the centre of a Sony 
Laptop 15" monitor at a rate of 10Hz (50 ms word durations + 50 ms blank intervals). 
Distracter words were always presented in blue ink, target words were always presented in 
red ink and the background colour of the screen was grey. Each trial started with a 1 second 
central fixation cross followed by the RSVP stream. Each of these streams consisted of 26 
distracter words and 2 red targets. The first target (T1) occurred randomly between serial 
Positions 5 and 20 whilst the second target (T2) occurred either one, three, or five distracter 
Words after T1 (hereafter Lag 2, Lag 4 and Lag 6 trials). The resulting SOAs (Stimulus Onset 
Asynchrony) between T1 and T2 were therefore 200 ms for Lag 2 trials, 400 ms for Lag 4 
trials and 600 ms for Lag 6 trials. Thus, Lag 2 and Lag 4 trials presented T2s within the AB 
period whilst on Lag 6 trials T2s occurred after this critical period. 
The experiment consisted of a total of 1BO trials including 60 trials for each of the 
three Lag conditions. Within Lag conditions, 20 trials each included either a neutral, 
emotionally charged or male first name T2. Target words were repeated three times during 
the experiment such that each of the T1 and T2 words appeared once in each of the Lag 
Conditions. Distracter words were repeated 7 -B times during the experiment. The order of 
presentation of the various trial types was random without constraints. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated laboratory and informed 
that they would be shown 180 very rapid word sequences that consisted mainly of blue words 
but also two red words that they should try and identify (written responses were requested). 
For ethical reasons, participants were forewarned about the sexually explicit and offensive 
nature of some of the words included in the study. To avoid a bias in favour of detecting 
emotionally charged words, participants were also told that they would see male first names. 
They were not told that the first red word was always neutral. Following the instructions, 
participants were asked for their consent and given a series of practice trials constructed from 
a separate pool of words (all neutral). Once they were confident that they had understood 
what was required of them, the experimenter started the experimental trials and left the room. 
Results 
Prior. to analysing T2 detection rates, we computed the proportion of correctly 
reported T1 words for each of the 9 experimental conditions (3 T2 word types x 3 lag 
conditions). As expected, detection rates for these targets were very high (M = .97, SO = .04). 
A 2 (Group) x 3 (T2 word type) x 3 (Lag) mixed ANOVA of T1 reports revealed a main effect 
of Lag (F(2,47) = 3.68, P < .05), with detection rates on Lag 6 trials (M = .97, SO = .04) being 
significantly higher than on Lag 2 trials (M = .96, SO = .04; t = 2.69, df = 49, P < .05). 
Detection rates 'on Lag 4 trials fell in between (M = .97, SO = .04). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant (Fs < 1.10). 
For the analysis of T2 detection rates, only trials on which T1 was correctly identified 
Were taken into account since only these trials reliably index the AB phenomenon (e.g. Keil & 
Ihssen, 2004). Figures 3.1a and 3.2b set out the proportions of correctly identified T2s as a 
fUnction of the experimental manipulations and participant group. A 2 (Group) x 3 (T2 word 
{ 
type) x 3 (Lag) mixed ANOVA of these data revealed the expected main effects of T2 word 
type (F(2,47) = 14.09, P < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) and Lag (F(2,47) = 82.12, P 
<: .001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), and a T2 word type x Lag interaction (F(4,45) = 
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13.48, P < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). The main effect of T2 word type confirms 
that detection rates of emotionally charged words (M = .85, SO = .17) were significantly 
higher than detection rates of male first names (M = .79, SO = .17; t = 3.55, df = 49, P < .01) 
and neutral words (M = .77, SO = .18; t = 4.11, df = 49, P < .001). In addition, the detection of 
male first names was superior to that of neutral T2s (t = 2.34, df = 49, P < .01). The main 
effect of Lag, replicates the AB phenomenon with detection rates during Lag 2 trials (M = .62, 
SO = .28) being significantly lower than during Lag 4 trials (M = .88, SO = .14; t = 9.50, df = 
49, P < .001), which in turn were lower than during Lag 6 trials (M = .92, SO = .10; t = 2.34, df 
= 49, P < .001). As indicated by Figures 3.1 a and 3.1 b, the interaction between T2 word type 
and Lag was partially due to the near ceiling performance during Lag 4 and Lag 6 trials, 
which compressed detection rates across word types in comparison to Lag 2 trials. There is, 
however, more to this interaction than is first apparent. More specifically, whilst male first 
names and neutral T2s were detected with similar frequency during Lag 2 (Male names M = 
.59, SO = .31; Neutral M = .56, SO = .32; t = 1.29, df = 49, ns) and Lag 4 trials (Male names 
M = .87, SO = .15; Neutral M = .86, SO = .17; t = 0.45, df = 49, ns), during Lag 6 trials male 
first names were detected more frequentry than neutral T2s (Male names M = .93; SO = .11; 
Neutral M = .90; SO = .12; t = 2.91, df= 49, P < .01). Thus, semantic distinctiveness seemed 
to facilitate T2 detection only after, but not during, the critical AB time-window. 
The data set out in Figures 3.1 a and 3.1 b suggests that the ASD group was less 
susceptible to the emotional modulation of the AB than the typical comparison group. 
Although the foregoing analysis yielded no interactions or main effects involving the group 
factor, as predicted, within group analyses showed that the effect of T2 word type on target 
... detection was only significant in the typical comparison group (F(2,23) = 21.69, P < .001, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) but not the ASD group (F(2,23) = 2.61, ns, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). Calculations of effect sizes indicated that the effect of T2 word type was 
more than twice the size in typical (r = .61) compared to ASD (r = .28) participants14. To put 
these effect sizes into perspective, the sizes of the main effects of Lag within each group 
Were.79 for the typical and. 75 for the ASD group. 
14 
These effect sizes are calculated on the basis of the Greenhouse Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 3.1 
Proportion of correctly reported t'd Target Words (T2s) as a function of Word Type, Lag and 
Participant Group (Error Bars represent Standard Errors) 
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In addition to the quantitative differences revealed by the within-group analyses, we 
also noted that the magnitude of the emotional modulation of the AB (Le. difference between 
emotional T2 detection and male first name T2 detection 15) in the ASD group was significantly 
correlated with VIQ (Lag 2: r= .53, p < .01; Lag 4: r= .37, p = .07), which was not the case 
for the comparison group (Lag 2: r = -.24, ns; Lag 4: r = -.19, ns). Fisher's z transformations 
showed that the differences in these correlations between groups were significant for Lag 2 (p 
<: .01) and marginally significant for Lag 4 (p = .052). Figures 3.2a and 3.2b depict the 
relevant scatter plots for these correlations (for illustrative purposes average difference 
scores across Lag 2 & Lag 4 trials are presented) and show that the association in the ASD 
group was not merely an artefact of individual variabil~ty (Fisher's transformations showed 
that correlations calculated on the basis of averages across Lags 2 & 4 (ASD r = .502, p < 
.05; Typical r = -.252, ns) significantly differed between groups (p < .01)). 
15 
It should be noted that difference scores between emotionally charged and neutral T2s yield the same pattern of 
results, which is not surprising given that semantic distinctiveness does not seem to facilitate T2 detection during the 
AB time-window. We present difference scores based on male first name T2s here as these more conservatively 
estimate the impact of emotion on the AB. 
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In addition to the quantitative differences revealed by the within-group analyses, we 
also noted that the magnitude of the emotional modulation of the AB (Le. difference between 
emotional T2 detection and male first name T2 detection 15) in the ASD group was significantly 
correlated with VIQ (Lag 2: r= .53, p < .01; Lag 4: r= .37, p = .07), which was not the case 
for the comparison group (Lag 2: r = -.24, ns; Lag 4: r = -.19, ns). Fisher's z transformations 
showed that the differences in these correlations between groups were significant for Lag 2 (p 
<: .01) and marginally significant for Lag 4 (p = .052). Figures 3.2a and 3.2b depict the 
relevant scatter plots for these correlations (for illustrative purposes average difference 
scores across Lag 2 & Lag 4 trials are presented) and show that the association in the ASD 
group was not merely an artefact of individual variabil~ty (Fisher's transformations showed 
that correlations calculated on the basis of averages across Lags 2 & 4 (ASD r = .502, p < 
.05; Typical r = -.252, ns) significantly differed between groups (p < .01)). 
15 
It should be noted that difference scores between emotionally charged and neutral T2s yield the same pattern of 
results, which is not surprising given that semantic distinctiveness does not seem to facilitate T2 detection during the 
AB time-window. We present difference scores based on male first name T2s here as these more conservatively 
estimate the impact of emotion on the AB. 
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Figure 3.2 
Scatter plots depicting the association between the magnitude of the emotional modulation of 
the Attentional Blink and VIQ for the ASD and Comparison Group 
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Qiscussion 
The current experiment adopted the Attentional Blink paradigm in order to determine 
Whether a group of individuals with ASD, like typically developed individuals, would exhibit 
enhanced attention to emotionally significant words. Based on our previous observation that 
individuals with ASD do not retain emotionally charged words in a qualitatively distinct 
manner over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, under review a), we predicted that 
the magnitude of the AB would not be modulated by the emotional significance of words in 
this group. Although our analyses revealed no between-group differences that would support 
this prediction, within-group analyses clearly indicated that the effect of emotion on T2 
detection was reduced (and actually not statistically reliable) in the ASD group. In addition, 
the emotional modulation of the AB in the ASD group was unusually associated with 
partiCipants' verbal IQ. Together, this pattern of results supports the recent observations by 
Corden et al. (2008) in showing that the emotional Significance of words does not capture the 
attention of individuals with ASD as readily as that of typical individuals. Importantly, the 
present and Corden et al. (2008) studies differed with respect to the use of control measures 
to rule out the possibility that general processing demands, rather than emotion-specific 
demands, were responsible for the atypical pattern of performance by individuals with ASD. 
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Corden et al. (2008) manipulated perceptual properties of T2s (Le. brightness) for this 
purpose whereas we manipulated the semantic properties of T2 words (Le. by including male 
first names). In both cases, these manipulations affected performance in ASD and typical 
participants similarly and in both cases performance of typical participants was affected much 
more by the emotional properties of T2 words. Since it is difficult to know how best to equate 
emotional and non-emotional words on distinctiveness, the two studies together present a 
strong case for the specificity with which emotion per se modulates early perceptual 
. processes in the AB paradigm. In turn, this strengthens the conclusion that the atypical 
pattern of performance observed in individuals with ASD represents abnormalities in emotion 
specific processes. 
The present findings did not only strengthen the observations by Corden et al. (2008) 
but also revealed an interesting and unusual association between VIO and the magnitude of 
the emotional modulation of the AB in the ASD group. Such associations between VIO and 
task performance parallel findings from socio-emotional tasks, such as those assessing the 
ability to identify emotion from facial or bodily expressions (e.g. Ozonoff, et al., 1990). This 
may suggest that difficulties in emotional processes within and outside the social domain in 
ASD are the result of a common developmental pathway. Corden et al. (2008) came to a 
Similar conclusion after noting that the attenuated emotional modulation of attention in the AB 
paradigm was associated with poorer performance on a facial fear recognition task. It will be 
important for future research to clarify how emotional processing difficulties within and outside 
the social domain relate to one another over the course of development, because such 
clarification would contribute valuable information to the long-standing debate as to whether 
... ASD is fundamentally a disorder of socio-cognitive or emotional development (e.g. Baron-
Cohen,1995; Hobson, 2002). It will also be important to extend the work on non-social 
emotional processing to lower functioning individuals from the autism spectrum in order to 
establish whether findings such as the current ones are representative of the broader 
Phenotype of the disorder. 
At the neural level of analysis, the present findings invite the inference that 
abnormalities in amygdala functioning may be responsible for the atypical pattern of 
121 
performance by individuals with ASD. Although several lines of evidence from both the typical 
and ASD literature (e.g. Anderson & Phelps, 2001; De Martino, Kalish, Rees & Dolan, 2008; 
Schultz, 2005) would support this suggestion, it is important to remember that the amygdala 
operates within complex neural systems. In the context of the AB paradigm, for instance, 
interactions between the amygdala, cingulate cortex and frontal cortical areas seem to be 
important (De Martino et al., 2008) and the abnormality in ASD may lie anywhere in this 
system (or perhaps even outside it). As Corden et al., (2008) point out, functional imaging 
studies will be an important next step in this context and our prediction for such studies would 
be that the functional connectivity between the amygdala and relevant cortical areas of the 
brain would be compromised in ASD (see Gaigg & Bowler, 2007; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008 for 
further discussion). Regardless of the nature of the neural correlat~, however, a hypothesised 
amygdala involvement seems to serve a useful heuristic purpose for furthering our 
Understanding of the cognitive characterisation of emotional processing difficulties in ASD. In 
this respect the current findings add to a growing literature that demonstrates atypicalities in 
this domain outside the broader context of social cognition~ 
.§ummary 
The memory experiments presented in Chapter 2 suggested that individuals with 
ASD retain emotionally significant words no differently from comparable neutral words and 
that, as a consequence, they do not seem to accumulate distinct representations of such 
Words in long-term memory. The findings of Experiment 4 lend support to this suggestion by 
showing that emotive words do not capture the attention of individuals with ASD any more 
than neutral words. This indicates that the abnormalities observed in Chapter 2 extend 
outside the memory domain, making it unlikely that generic memory difficulties in the ASD 
group were responsible for the pattern of the earlier observations. Instead, this condition 
seems to be characterised by rather specific abnormalities in how the emotional significance 
of words impacts on the cognitive processing of those words. The present experiment also 
sUpports the idea that abnormalities in amygdala function may be responsible for the 
abnormal way in which emotionally significant words are processed in ASD. Patients with 
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amygdala lesions have been shown not to exhibit enhanced detection rates for emotionally 
charged words in the kind of AB paradigm used here (Anderson & Phelps, 2001) and 
although arousal was not directly measured in the present experiment, the observations 
confirmed that the enhanced perception of emotionally significant words during the AB time-
window was not simply the result of such words being semantically distinct. Together with the 
independent observations by Corden et al. (2008), which only came to light during the 
reviewing process of the manuscript presented above, these observations support the notion 
that the emotional suppression of the AB is mediated by the amygdala and so the atypical 
pattern of performance seen in the ASD group is suggestive of abnormalities in this limbic 
structure. 
The foregoing claims are compromised by the fact that all experiments reported so 
far were concerned with the study of how the emotional significance of individual words 
influences cognition. Since abnormalities in language development constitute a clinically 
defining manifestation of ASD, one may argue that the findings so far simply reflect 
abnormalities in linguistic processing in this condition rather than more specific atypicalities in 
how stimulus induced arousal modulates cognition. Several aspects of the experimental 
designs employed so far make this unlikely. First, many ASD individuals who participated in 
the above experiments met diagnostic criteria for Asperger's syndrome, which is not thought 
to be associated with abnormalities in language development (Lord et aI., 1989). Second, 
participant groups were closely matched (on a person by person basis) on the basis of their 
performance on a standardised verbal ability test. Third, the performance of ASD participants 
differed from that of typical participants only with respect to emotionally significant words. 
Performance for non-emotional words was very similar between groups regardless of whether 
or not these stimuli were semantically distinct and I or interrelated. In other words, individuals 
with ASD seemed to process semantic aspects of words similarly to typical participants. Most 
importantly, however, individuals with ASD did not fail to process the emotional significance 
of words altogether. Like typical individuals they rated such words as emotionally significant 
and like typical participants they exhibited arousal responses to such words. Individuals with 
ASD even remembered emotionally significant words better than non-emotional words over 
short periods of time. The differences between ASD and typical participants, therefore, were 
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very specific. Individuals with ASD were unable to retain emotionally distinct representations 
of emotional words over time and they were relatively poor at providing subjective ratings of 
words that reflected the individual's actual physiological responses to them. It is difficult to 
imagine what kind of language difficulty could give rise to this particular pattern of 
observations. A more plausible account would invoke abnormalities in the kind of processes 
that are normally associated with amygdala functioning. 
Even if it is unlikely that generic language difficulties were responsible for the pattern 
of observations so far, the hypothesis that ASD is characterised by abnormalities in amygdala 
functioning that disrupt the acquisition of distinctly emotional representations of stimuli, needs 
to be validated for non-verbal stimuli. The next chapter will provide a very rigorous test of this 
hypothesis by drawing on a fear-conditioning paradigm, which is known to necessitate the 
functional integrity of the amygdala. 
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CHAPTER 4: LEARNING ABOUT THE EMOTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
NON-VERBAL STIMULI IN ASD 
The following experiment has been published in Neuropsychologia (Gaigg & Bowler, 
2007) and includes sufficient background information not to warrant a more general 
introduction. 
Experiment 5: Differential fear conditioning in Autism Spectrum 
Disorder: Implications for an amygdala theory of autism 
Introduction 
In the current paper we draw on the fear conditioning literature in order to provide 
further insights into emotional processes in ASD. Fear conditioning is a form of Pavlovian 
conditioning through which individuals learn the hedonic values of previously neutral stimuli 
via a process of association. In a typical fear conditioning study participants are presented 
with a simple visual or auditory stimulus alongside a painful or noxious stimulus such as a 
startling noise or mild electric shock (the unconditioned stimulus; UCS). Naturally, individuals 
will respond to such noxious stimuli with species-typical defence behaviours (the 
unconditioned response; UCR) such as increased autonomic activity, which in humans can 
readily be measured by monitoring skin conductance responses (SCR; Frederikson, Annas, 
Georgiades, Hursti & Tersman, 1993). After a few pairings of the neutral stimulus and the 
UCS, participants will start to exhibit such fear responses to the neutral stimulus alone (the 
stimulus has become a conditioned stimulus; CS), indicating that they have learned the 
aSsociation between the noxious and neutral stimuli. 
To date, only one investigation has examined fear conditioning in ASD. Bernier and 
Colleagues (Bernier, et al., 2005) employed a potentiated startle paradigm in order to assess 
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simple fear conditioning in a group of adolescents and adults with i ASD. The authors 
aversively conditioned participants to a red square by pairing its presentation with an aversive 
puff of air to the throat. Following several pairings of the red square and the puff of air, the 
authors assessed participants' eye-blink startle response to either a loud noise presented 
alone or accompanied by the red square. The results showed that as in typical participants, 
eye-blink startle responses in the ASD group were enhanced during the trials including the 
red square indicating that both groups had learned the aversive nature of the conditioned 
stimulus to similar extents. 
There are several reasons why such studies of fear conditioning are of value to our 
understanding of ASD. First, as Bernier and colleagues point out, such studies contribute to 
our understanding of the neuropathology underlying this spectrum of disorders. Extensive 
animal (see LeDoux, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000 for detailed reviews) and' human (Bechara, 
Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland & Damasio, 1995; BOchel, Morris, Dolan & Friston, 
1998; BOchel, Dolan, Armony & Friston, 1999; Cheng, Knight, Stein & Smith, 2003; Knight, 
Smith, Cheng & Stein, 2004; LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer & Phelps, 1995; La Bar, Gatenby, 
Gore, LeDoux & Phelps, 1998; Morris, Friston & Dolan, 1997, Morris, Friston & Dolan, 1998; 
Morris, 6hman & Dolan, 1997; Phelps, et al., 1998) research has demonstrated that the 
associative learning in fear conditioning paradigms is mediated by the amygdala, a limbic 
structure which has attracted increasing attention in relation to ASD in recent years. Although 
several lines of research have implicated the amygdala in the pathology underlying this 
disorder (e.g. Bachevallier, 1994; Bachevallier, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Baron-
Cohen, et al., 2000; Fotheringham, 1991; Howard, Cowell, Boucher, Broks, Mayes, Farrant, 
." et al., 2000; Sweeten, et al., 2002), the evidence is somewhat inconsistent and the extent 
and nature of the proposed amygdala pathology remain unclear (see Sweeten et al., 2002; 
Amaral, et al., 2003; Palmen, van Engeland, Hof & Schmitz, 2004 for recent reviews). Fear 
Conditioning paradigms are valuable in this respect because different forms of conditioned 
fear behaviour have been shown to rely on different amygdala nuclei or pathways. The 
acquisition of fear in simple conditioning paradigms such as the one employed by Bernier and 
Colleagues (2005), for example, is thought to be mediated primarily bya sub-cortical 
amygdala system involving direct sensory afferent projections from thalamic nuclei and 
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efferent connections to various brainstem and hypothalamic nuclei that mediate the 
behavioural and physiological fear responses (LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux, 2000). As Bernier and 
colleagues (2005) point out, their findings suggest that at least this sub-cortical system 
appears to be functionally relatively intact in ASD. Important for our current investigation are 
findings which suggest that fear acquisition in more complex differential fear conditioning 
paradigms, in which participants acquire fear to only one of several different stimuli (e.g. 
different colours), have been shown to rely on cortical modulation of the sub-cortical 
amygdala system (Jarrell, Gentile, Romanski, McCabe & Schneiderman 1987; Morris et al., 
1997). This cortical modulation is thought to be important for the regulation of fear responses 
according to the specific conditioning contingencies (Le. responding to the conditioned 
stimulus but not to the non-conditioned stimuli). Since several lines of evidence indicate that 
ASD may be characterised by poor connectivity between disparate brain regions (Belmonte, 
Alien, Beckel-Mitchener, Boulanger, Carper & Webb, 2004; Ben Shalom, 2000; Brock, et al., 
2002; Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2002; Just, Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 2004; Just, et 
al., 2007; McAlonan, et al., 2005; Rippon, et al., 2007), an investigation of differential fear 
conditioning in ASD may provide valuable behavioural insights into the functional integrity of 
cortico-amygdala connectivity in this population. 
In addition to providing further insights into the functional integrity of amygdala 
systems, studies of fear conditioning may also inform debates about the developmental role 
of emotional atypicalities in the clinical presentation of ASD. To date most investigations 
relevant to this· debate have focused on how individuals with ASD perceive and express 
emotions within the broader context of social behaviour. Although the evidence in this area is 
." relatively consistent in illustrating that ASD is characterised by difficulties in the recognition 
(Hobson, 1986a,b; Hobson, et al., 1988a,b; Hobson, 1991; Weeks & Hobson, 1987) and 
context appropriate expression of emotions (Dawson, et al., 1990; Kasari, et al., 1990; Kasari, 
et al., 1993; Sigman, et al., 1992; Yirmiya, et al., 1989; Yirmiya, et al., 1992), these findings 
can be accommodated within competing explanatory frameworks. In line with Kanner's (1943) 
original conclusion, some authors have argued that emotional atypicalities constitute a 
primary and possibly innate feature of the autistic phenotype. Hobson (1989) for example 
Suggests that individuals with ASD are characterised by difficulties in understanding the 
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hedonic value of their sensory-motor environment which results in an abnormal 
developmental progression of interpersonal relatedness (See Mundy & Sigman, 1989 for a 
similar suggestion). Others, however, argue that the emotional difficulties evident in ASD are 
secondary to impairments in more general socio-cognitive processes. Schultz (2005), for 
. example, argues that primary face processing atypicalities are responsible for the aberrant 
development of socio-emotional behaviours, whilst Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999, Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) have suggested that difficulties in Theory of 
Mind (ToM) understanding give rise to the abnormal social and emotional behaviours 
characterising the autism spectrum. These latter accounts are supported by evidence which 
suggests that individuals across the autism spectrum experience difficulties in processing 
faces (e.g. Gross, 2005; Joseph ~md Tanaka, 2003; Partland, Dawson, Webb, Panagiotides & 
Carver, 2004; Spezio, et al., 2007) and understanding mental states such as beliefs and 
desires of others (e.g. Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985; Happe, 1995; but see Bowler, Briskman, 
I 
Gurvidi & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). Fear conditioning paradigms may provide important new 
insights into this issue because they assess a relatively basic and automatic emotional 
process that does not necessitate intact 'socio-cognitive processes. In addition, because fear 
conditioning paradigms assess the processes by which individuals learn the hedonic value of 
sensory stimuli, such paradigms constitute a relatively direct test of Hobson's (1989) 
suggestion that ASD may be characterised by atypicalities in understanding the hedonic 
value of their sensory-motor environment. 
, FinallY,studies of fear conditioning in ASD will add to a small but growing number of 
studies that have investigated emotional processes' in this population at the 
,.. Psychophysiological rather than the behavioural level. Since it is widely accepted that 
Psychophysiological responses form an integral part of emotional experiences and 
behaviours (Cannon, 1929; James, 1884), the investigation of such responses in ASD is vital 
to understanding the nature of emotional atypicalities in this population. The limited evidence 
in this area to date suggests that like typical individuals, individuals with ASD exhibit changes 
in autonomic activity, such as increases in skin conductance responses (SCR) or changes in 
heart rate, when presented with emotionally salient pictures (Ben Shalom et al., 2003; Blair, 
1999; Hillier, et al., 2006; Salmond, et al., 2003), aversive auditory stimuli (Bernier, et al., 
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2005; Salmond et al., 2003) or emotive words (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). However, these 
physiological responses seem to be atypically modulated by specific stimulus properties in 
ASD. Blair. (1999) for example found that although children with ASD exhibited typically 
increased SCRs to distress cues (e.g. crying face) compared to neutral images, their 
. responses to threatening images (e.g. gun) were less consistently elevated than in the 
comparison group (see Hillier et al., 2006 for similar findings). Similarly, SCRs to faces in 
ASD have been found to be abnormally modulated by the direction of gaze (Joseph, et al., 
2005; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2006). As Ben Shalom (2000) suggests, this pattern of results 
would be in line with the suggestion that ASD is characterised by atypicalities in the 
connectivity between cortical areas responsible for the cognitive appraisal of emotional stimuli 
and the amygdala which mediates our physiological reactions to such stimuli. Such a view is 
also supported by the finding that unlike in typical individuals, SCRs do not seem to correlate 
with subjective ratings of emotionality in ASD (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Hillier et al., 2006). 
As this brief overview of the literature illustrates, there are several reasons why the 
study of fear conditioning is important for our understanding of ASD. In the current study we 
draw on a differential fear conditioning paradigm employed by Bechara and colleagues 
(Bechara et al., 1995) in order to test the hypothesis that individuals with ASD would exhibit a 
pattern of atypicality consistent with the suggestion that the amygdala is abnormally 
modulated by cortical areas. Thus, on the basis of the evidence suggesting that the sub-
cortical amygdala system is functionally intact in ASD (e.g. Bernier et al., 2005) we 
hypothesised that a group of ASD participants would exhibit typical patterns of physiological 
responses to aversive stimuli and that their autonomic activity would exhibit evidence of 
". learning the hedonic value of a previously neutral stimulus. However, based on the 
suggestion that the amygdala may not be modulated normally by cortical areas, we expected 
that participants with ASD would not exhibit a typical pattern of acquiring fear discriminatively 
to conditioned and non-conditioned stimuli. If our predictions are borne out this pattern of 
results would lend support to Hobson's (1989) suggestion that ASD may be characterised by 
difficulties in understanding (in this case learning about) the hedonic value of their sensory-
motor environment. 
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Method 
Participants 
Fifteen individuals with ASD (12 male, 3 female) and sixteen typical individuals (13 
male, 3 female) participated in this experiment. One female ASD and two male comparison 
participants were excluded from all analyses as they failed to exhibit detectable changes in 
skin conductance in response to the UCS (80dB - 100dB foghorn sound). Participants in the 
final sample (N = 14 per group) were matched on chronological age (ASD mean = 29.7 yrs., 
SD = 10.2; Comparison mean = 30.4 yrs., SD = 12.2) and WAIS_llluK (The Psychological 
Corporation, 2002) full scale IQ (ASD mean = 111, SD = 17.3; Comparison mean = 109, SD 
= 12.7). Individuals with ASD had all received their diagnosis according to conventional 
criteria (DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000; ICD-10, World Health 
Organisation, 1992) by experienced clinicians and none suffered any co-morbid anxiety 
disorders. The comparison group was recruited locally through newspaper advertisements. 
All individuals were free of medication and none of the participants exhibited discrepancies 
between verbal and non-verbal IQ of more than 15 points (i.e. 1.5 SDs), which could indicate 
neuropathology non-specific to ASD. The experimental procedures outlined below adhered to 
the ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society and were approved by the 
University's Senate Ethical Committee. All participants were. fully briefed before the 
experiment and all provided informed consent to participate in the study. 
Materials & Design 
The conditioning protocol was based on that employed by Bechara et al. (1995) and 
consisted of 12 habituation trials, 26 acquisition trials and 12 extinction trials. Four coloured 
slides (yellow, green, blue and red) presented for 2 seconds each on a Sony laptop 15" 
monitor served as stimuli. One of these colours was designated CS+ and was to be followed 
by the UCS (1sec foghorn between 85 and 100 dB) during the acquisition phase of the 
protocol. The remaining colours were designated CS- and were never paired with the UCS. 
The choice of colour for CS+ was counterbalanced across participants. During habituation 
130 
and acquisition, colours were presented at different frequencies in a fixed pseudorandom 
order (see Bechara et al., 1995 for details). The colour used as the CS+ stimulus occurred 5 
times during the habituation phase and 12 times during the acquisition phase and appeared 
on the same trials for all participants. The remaining trials consisted of the CS- colours. The 
rate of presentation was one colour approximately every 10-30 seconds, dependent on the 
participants' skin conductance responses (a new stimulus was presented only when there 
was no sign of galvanic activity for at least 2 seconds). During the acquisition phase CS+ was 
reinforced according to a variable ratio schedule. Thus, six of the 12 occurrences of CS+ 
were immediately followed by the UCS (CS+paired trials), whereas the other 6 presentations of 
CS+ were not (CS+unpaired trials). During extinction, CS+ was presented repeatedly without 
any further presentations of the UCS. The illustration in Figure 4.1 summarizes this protocol. 
Throughout the experiment, SCR was recorded vi'a two surface electrodes attached 
to the medial phalanges of the first and third digits of the non-dominant hand (assessed by 
asking participants). Data were recorded using PowerLab hardware (ADlnstruments, 2004), 
which sampled electrodermal activity at 1 kHz. Chart 5 software (ADlnstruments, 2004) was 
Used for the recording and assessment of the data. SCRs were computed according to 
standard criteria with the largest deflection during an 8 second window following the onset of 
a stimulus serving as a measure of autonomic response to that stimulus. All SCRs were 
square-root transformed prior to statistical analyses in order to normalise the distribution of 
the data. 
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Figure 4.1 
Experimental procedure for the differential fear conditioning paradigm 
ll-illITUATION Pll~SE (12 Tlials) 
ACQUISITION Pll~SE (26 Trials) 
~m CD Iml cFlml Iml ~Iml CJ ~ Iml ~ ,',' 
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EXTINCTION Pll~SE (n Trials) 
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EJocedure 
~ cs· (2 second duration) 
n CS· (2 second duration) 
§;I CS. (2 second duration) 
o CS+(2 second duration) 
~ UCS (I second duration) 
Intertrial interval between 10·30 seconds 
Participants were tested individually in a semi-soundproof air-conditioned room. They 
Were warned that the experiment would involve hearing some startling noises, which were 
demonstrated at an initially low volume through speakers. AI'I participants were then allowed 
--. to choose a volume level that they would find startling but in no way painful. Subsequent to 
the attachment of the electrodes, participants were asked to relax and find a comfortable 
seating position approximately 50 cm in front of the screen. They were asked to try and pay 
attention to the colours on the screen and to move as little as possible throughout the task in 
order to avoid movement artefacts. The experiment commenced following a few minutes 
during which SCRs were allowed to reach baseline activity. The experimenter was present 
throughout the whole of the procedure to control stimulus presentation and monitor SCRs. 
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Seating arrangements were such that the participant was seated at approximately 1.5 m from 
the experimenter with no equipment apart from the attached electrodes and the presentation 
laptop in line of sight. 
Following Bechara and colleagues (1995) participants' declarative memory for the 
experimental contingencies was probed around 5 minutes after the experimental procedure 
by asking them; 1) How many colours did you see? 2) What colours were they? 3) How many 
colours were followed by the loud noise? 4) What colour(s) was/were it/they? Correct 
responses to questions 1, 2 and 3 received a score of 0.5 whereas a correct response to 
question 4 received a score of 2.5, reflecting the fact that question 4 asks for the most 
important aspect of the experimental contingencies. 
Results 
Groups did not differ significantly in terms of the UCS intensities they chose (ASD 
group: M = 94dB, SO = 6; Comparison group: M = 97dB, SO = 3). Similarly, a 2 (group) x 6 
(trial) mixed ANOVA of SCRs elicited during the 6 CS+paired trials of acquisition revealed no 
main effects or interactions (All Fs < 1). Thus, the UCS was similarly effective for both groups 
in eliciting startle responses and neither group seemed to habituate to the UCS during the 
acquisition phase. An analysis of participants' declarative knowledge revealed 100% 
accuracy for the comparison group but 5 of the ASD pa(1icipants made errors in response to 
at least 1 of the questions. Thus the ASD group performed significantly worse in terms of 
noticing or remembering the experimental parameters (U = 63, Z = 2.41, P < .05). As we will 
.~ illustrate below, an assessment of individual data suggested that failing to remember the 
experimental contingencies was not directly related to autonomic fear acquisition, making it 
unlikely that the results described below are confounded by this group difference. 
In order to assess the conditioning data we adopted a similar method to that of LaBar 
and colleagues (1995). Thus for our first analysis we computed difference scores by 
subtracting the average response elicited during CS- trials from SCRs elicited by each of the 
CS+unpaired trials. The resulting difference scores thus indicate to what extent SCRs during 
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CS+unpaired trials exceeded the average response elicited by CS- presentations. Figure 4.2 
illustrates these difference scores for the relevant five habituation and six acquisition trials as 
a function of group. For the analysis of these data the first acquisition difference score was 
omitted since in differential conditioning paradigms the association between CS+ and the 
UCS only becomes fully apparent after the second pairing between these stimuli. A 2 (Group) 
x 2 (Phase) x 5 (Trial) mixed ANOVA revealed main effects for Phase (Habituation: M = -
.07~IJS, SO = .11; Acquisition: M = .27~IJS, SO = .15; F(1,26) = 50.11, P < .001) and group 
(ASD group: M = .03~IJS, SO = .13; Comparison group: M = .17~IJS, SO = .13; F(1,26) = 
8.00, P < .01), which were further characterised by a Phase x Group interaction (F(1,26) = 
6.90, P < .05). Post-hoc comparisons showed that this interaction was due to the fact that 
SCR difference scores were similar for both groups during habituation (ASD group: M = -
.08~IJS, SO = .15; Comparison group: M = -.06~IJS, SO =.15), whilst the ASD group 
exhibited significantly attenuated difference scores relative to the comparison group during 
the acquisition phase (ASD group: M = .14~IJ'S, SO = .21; Comparison group: M = .40~IJS, 
SO = .21; F(1,26) = 11.30, P < .01). Importantly, however, separate analyses of the groups! 
revealed main effects of experimental Phase for both the ASD (F(1, 13) = 13.27, P < .01) and 
the comparison group (F(1, 13) = 37.59, P < .001). Thus, although participants with ASD 
exhibited attenuated fear acquisition in comparison to typical participants, the data confirm 
Our prediction that individuals with ASD would show evidence of acquiring autonomic fear, 
responses to a previously neutral stimulus. 
The attenuation of difference scores in the ASD group during acquisition could have 
several sources. First, it is possible that ASD participants compared to typical participants 
'" exhibited either attenuated SCR responses to CS+unpaired stimuli or excessive responses to 
CS- stimuli during the acquisition phase of the protocol. Second, it is possible that only a 
Subgroup of ASD participants exhibited abnormalities to the effect of significantly reducing the 
groups' average in relation to the comparison group. 
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Figure 4.2 
Skin conductance difference scores (CS+unpaired - average CS-) during habituation and 
acquisition for the ASO and Comparison Group (Error Bars show Standard Errors) 
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In order to assess these possibilities we carried out two further analyses. First we 
assessed SCRs separately for CS+unpaired and CS- stimuli as a function of group and 
experimental phase. Figure 4.3a and 4.3b illustrate these data and suggest that the 
attenuated differential fear acquisition in the ASD group was largely the result of reduced 
SCRs to CS+unpaired stimuli during the acquisition phase of the experiment. A 2 (group) x 2 
(phase) x 5 (trial) mixed ANOVA of these data (again the first CS+unpaired trial of acquisition 
_. Was excluded) revealed a main effect of Phase (F(1,26) = 16.40, P < .001) confirming that 
CS+unpaired responses during acquisition (M = .66~IJS, SO = .31) were higher than during 
habituation (M = .35~IJS, SO = .17). Furthermore, the data were characterised by a significant 
interaction between Phase and Trial (F(4,23) = 4.92, P < .01) and a marginal interaction 
between Phase and Group (F(1,26) = 2.94, P = .098). Post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
interaction between Phase and Trial was due to a decrease in responses over trials during 
, . 
habituation (F(4,23) = 3.86, P < .05) but not during the acquisition phase. The marginal 
interaction between phase and group was due to the fact that for the ASD group the effect of 
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experimental phase was only marginally significant (Habituation: M = .35-vIJS, SO = .24; 
Acquisition: M = . 53-VIJS, SO = .44; F(1,13) = 3.36, P = .090) whereas for the comparison 
group this effect was highly reliable (Habituation: M = .35-vIJS, SO = .24; Acquisition: M = 
.79-vIJS, SO = .44; F(1,13) = 14.00, P < .01). As Figure 3b suggests, responses to CS- stimuli 
were not characterised by any main effects or interactions 16. 
Figure 4.3 
Skin conductance responses to CS+ (a) and CS- (b) presentations during habituation and 
acquisition for the ASO and Comparison Group (Error Bars indicate Standard Errors) 
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The analysis above suggests that the attenuated difference scores in the ASD group 
are mostly attributable to an attenuation of SCRs to CS+unpaired stimuli during the acquisition 
phase. However, the magnitude of the standard errors illustrated in Figure 4.3a, together with 
the marginally Significant effect of experimental phase of these data in the ASD group, would 
also be consistent with the possibility that abnormalities in fear acquisition were present in 
,,, only a subgroup of ASD participants. In order to explore this possibility further, we carried out 
a second analysis and computed indices of fear acquisition and discrimination for each 
participant. 
For the computation of these indices we considered the standard error of the mean 
habituation trials (hereafter SEh) to reflect the error of measurement of SCRs of each 
individual, since these responses reflect galvanic activity during a relatively relaxed period 
16 Note: For the analysis of these data, responses during the 14 CS- trials during acquisition were averaged across 
blocks of two consecutive trials. 
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and are therefore uncontaminated by the aversive stimulation that took place during 
acquisition 17. For the index of acquisition, we subtracted the average SCRs to CS+unpaired 
trials during habituation from those to CS+unpaired trials during acquisition and divided this 
difference by SEh. The resulting score thus represents the change in SCR to CS+unpaired trials 
between habituation and acquisition in units of the standard error of measurement, which has 
the advantage of removing inter-individual differences in baseline SCR variance from the 
data. For the index of discrimination, we subtracted the average SCRs to CS- trials during 
acquisition from the average SCRs to CS+unpaired trials during acquisition, again dividing the 
result by SEh. This index thus provides the magnitude by which responses to CS+unpaired trials 
during acquisition exceeded responses to CS- trials during acquisition. The data for these 
indices, together with the values for SEh are set out in Table 4.1. Based on the t-criterion one 
can consider an individual to have acquired fear if the acquisition index falls above 2. 
According to this criterion, 7 ASD and 9 typical participants exhibited reliable fear acquisition 
to the CS+ stimulus, with 1 additional ASD participant falling just short of the criterion. Closer 
inspection of these data furthermore suggest that with the exception of two typical 
participants who exhibited extremely. high acquisition indices, the distribution of acquisition 
scores is relatively similar for the two groups. In fact, neither the group averages (Z = 1.06, P 
= .291), nor the proportions of participants reaching the criterion value of 2 (>f = .58, df = 1, P 
= .352) are statistically significant. Thus, on the basis of the acquisition indices, and in line 
with the findings by Bernier and colleagues (2005), we obtained no reliable evidence to 
suggest that ASD participants differed from typical participants in terms of generally acquiring 
.. 
autonomic fear responses to a previously neutral stimulus. 
17 Note: In fact there was no significant difference in the standard error of measurement between the habituation and 
acquisition trials, indicating that the presentation of aversive stimuli did not seem to increase the error variance in 
rneasurements of SCR activity. 
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Table 4.1 
Indices of acquisition and discrimination for each participant in the ASD and Comparison 
Group. For clarity the data within each group have been arranged in descending magnitude of 
the acquisition index. 
ASD Group Comparison Group 
Acquisition Discrimination Acquisition Discrimination 
Participant SEh index index SEh index index 
- 1c 0.055 7.462a 5.150b 0.025 43.965a 31.686b 
2 0.165 6.8898 1.779 0.126 11.4688 4.656b 
3 0.062 5.7618 3.777b 0.082 7.2888 7.341 b 
4 0.070 4.7458 -0.619 0.073 5.5598 3.764b 
5c 0.043 3.506a 2.550b 0.083 4.4438 4.893b 
6 0.105 2.581a 1.558 0.083 4.0978 3.861 b 
7 0.112 2.4168 3.060b 0.125 3.0718 3.350b 
8 0.044 1.970 0.991 0.174 3.0298 2.404b 
9c 0.096 1.019 0.633 0.132 2.1408 2.012b 
10 0.083 -0.644 0.288 0.089 1.080 -0.085 
11 0.103 . -1.891 1.217 0.119 1.022 3.170b 
12c 0.035 -2.160 -1.756 0.100 0.237 2.608b 
13 0.098 -2.923 0.011 0.059 -0.279 1.821 
14c 0.042 -7.822 -1.218 0.103 -2.313 -0.114 
Median 0.076 2.193 1.104 0.095 3.050 3.260 
--- • Acquisition index scores that indicate reliable fear acquisition 
, 
b Discrimination index scores that indicate reliable differential fear responses 
C ASD participants who did not recall all aspects of the experimental contingencies 
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In contrast to this relatively typical level of fear acquisition, the data in table 4.1 
indicate that ASD participants compared to typical participants did not seem to acquire fear 
responses discriminately' to CS+ and CS- stimuli during the acquisition phase. Compared to 
11 of the typical participants who exhibited discrimination scores of at least 2, only 4 
participants in the ASD group reached this criterion. This difference is statistically reliable 
both at the group level (Z = 2.39, P < .05) and in terms of the difference in the proportion of 
participants within each group who reached the criterion value of 2 (>f = 7.04, df= 1, P < .05). 
It is important to note that, since our indices of acquisition and discrimination are normalized 
against the standard error of the 12 habituation trials, it is possible that our analyses of these 
indices are confounded by group differences in baseline variability of SCRs (Le. SEh). As the 
data set out in Table 1 indicate, however, SEh was similar for the two groups (t = 1.35; df = 
26; ns)1B. 
Several other aspects of these data merit further comment. First, it may seem 
paradoxical that two typical participants, who did not reach the criterion value of 2 for the 
acquisition index, reached this criterion for the index of discrimination. Closer inspection of 
the data for these individuals revealed that they had not fully habituated during the 12 
habituation trials. During the acquisition phase, however these individuals seemed to learn 
that the CS- colours were 'safe' as indicated by a decrease in SCRs during these trials over 
the course of acquisition. In contrast CS+ trials continued to elicit relatively high responses. 
Thus although SCRs for these individuals during CS+ trials did not increase during 
acquisition, the fact that their responses to CS- trials decreased indicates that they 
successfully learned the differential significance of CS- and CS+ stimuli. Although relatively 
few studies report intersubject variability of fear acquisition in paradigms such as the one 
Used here, our observation that 78% of our comparison participants reliably acquired fear 
closely resembles the 80% reported by Phelps, Delgado, Nearing and LeDoux (2004). A 
related issue concerns our observation that 3 ASD and 1 typical participant exhibited reliable 
acquisition scores in the wrong direction. On the basis of these data one may question the 
18 Note: It Is also worth noting that although the indices of a~uisition and discrimination are highly correlated, even 
when the typical individual with indices greater than 30 is excluded (ASD group: r(12) = .723, P < .01; Comparison 
group: r(11) = .762, P < .01 ), an analysis of covariance on the discrimination index with the acquisition index as the 
?ovariate still reveals a main effect of group (F(1 ,24) = 5.02; p < .05). This furthermore confirms a relatively specific 
Impairment in discriminate fear acquisition in our ASD group. 
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validity of the acquisition index as a measure of fear acquisition. However, these negative 
acquisition indices simply reflect that rather than acquiring fear to the CS+ stimulus, the 
individuals continued to habituate to this stimulus throughout the acquisition phase. In other 
words, these individuals simply failed to acquire fear rather than acquiring fear in the wrong 
direction, which would be indicated by a reliable negative discrimination index (i.e. < -2) that 
was not observe for any individual. Finally it is worth pointing out that the ASD individuals 
who did not receive maximum scores on the questions probing their declarative knowledge 
about the experimental contingencies (highlighted in bold font in Table 4.1) are not clearly 
identifiable in terms of their conditioning responses. Thus it seems unlikely that the 
attenuated level of differential autonomic conditioning in the ASD group is due to some of 
these individuals failing to correctly recall the experimental contingencies. 
Discussion 
In the current experiment we examined differentially conditioned autonomic fear 
responses in a sample of participants with a diagnosis of ASD and matched typical 
comparison participants in order to gain further insights into emotional processing difficulties 
and the functional integrity of the amygdala in ASD. On the basis of the relevant literature we 
hypothesised 1) that ASD participants would exhibit typical levels of autonomic responses to 
aversive stimulation 2) that they would exhibit evidence of acquiring autonomic fear 
responses to a previously neutral stimulus and 3) that they would show an attenuated level of 
discriminate fear responses to conditioned and non-conditioned stimuli. 
Our results were largely in line with our predictions. Groups were equivalent in terms 
of their baseline galvanic activity and their autonomic responses to an unconditioned aversive 
noise. An analysis of differential fear responses revealed that although individuals with ASD 
exhibited attenuated fear responses in comparison to typical participants, they did show a 
residual level of differentially acquired fear. In an attempt to identify the source of this atypical 
pattern of differential fear acquisition we carried out additional analyses, which indicated that 
although individuals with ASD were not impaired in acquiring fear per se, their learned fear 
responses to the conditioned stimulus did not differ reliably from autonomic responses to non-
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conditioned stimuli. It is important to note that this pattern of findings was not due to 
individuals with ASD acquiring fear to both the conditioned and non-conditioned stimuli but 
rather the result of significantly attenuated fear responses to the former. 
At first glance, our observation of impaired differential fear acquisition in ASD may 
seem at odds with the intact acquisition of potentiated startle responses reported by Bernier 
et al., (2005). Particularly on the basis of our separate analyses of SCRs to CS+ and CS-
stimuli, one may argue that in the current study ASD is characterised by general impairments 
in acquiring fear. Although the current data do not allow us to refute this possibility 
conclusively, there are several reasons why we argue that individuals with ASD are 
characterised by impairments in fear discrirylination rather than fear acquisition. First, our 
group analyses revealed a residual level of fear acquisition in ASD, which together with the 
findings by Bernier et al. (2005) suggest that a gross impairment in the processes necessary 
for fear acquisition are not likely to be present in this disorder. Second, an assessment of 
individual data indicated that an equivalent number of participants in both groups reliably 
acquired fear to the conditioned stimulus. Most importantly, however, we feel that the 
attenuated level of fear acquisition to CS+ in our ASD group needs to be interpreted within 
the context of the differential fear conditioning paradigm employed here. Such paradigms 
differ from simple conditioning paradigms such as the one employed by Bernier and 
colleagues (Bernier et al., 2005) in that the presentation of the conditioned stimulus is mixed 
with other neutral stimuli (i.e. CS-). In addition, unlike Bernier and colleagues (2005) who 
employed a 100% reinforcement schedule we utilized a 50% reinforcement schedule such 
that the CS+ stimulus was paired with the UCS on only half of its occurrences during the 
acquisition phase. Both of these factors make the CS+ stimulus a less reliable cue for the 
UCS and although additional studies will be needed to clarify what aspects of the 
experimental contingencies contribute to the atypical pattern of fear acquisition in ASD, we 
argue that the additional complexity of differential conditioning paradigms underlies the 
impairment in fear acquisition in ASD. 
As we have noted in our introduction, the additional complexity of differential fear 
conditioning paradigms requires cortical modulation of the sub-cortical amygdala s'ystem that 
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mediates fear responses (Jarrell, et al., 1987; Morris et al., 1997). Our results thus lend 
support to the notion that atypical amygdala function may play a central role in the 
neuropathology characterising the disorder (e.g. Bachevallier, 1994; Bachevallier, 2000; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Fotheringham, 1991; Howard, et al., 
·2000; Sweeten, et al., 2002). However, rather than a basic amygdala abnormality, our 
findings suggest that atypical amygdala function may arise from poor connectivity between 
this structure and functionally associated cortical areas. As noted in our introduction, this 
conclusion is in line with increasing evidence suggesting that ASD may be characterised by 
an underconnectivity of disparate brain regions (e.g. Belmonte et al., 2004; Brock et al., 2002; 
Rippon et al., 2007). The only direct evidence for this suggestion to date stems from 
functional imaging studies involving tasks assessing sentence comprehension (Just et al., 
2004), executive function (Just et al., 2007), working memory (Koshino, Carpenter, Minshew, 
Cherkassky, Keller & Just, 2005) and mental state attribution (Castelli et al., 2002), all of 
Which concluded that intra-cortical connectivity is atypical in ASD. Although Ben Shalom 
(2000) has suggested that poor connectivity between the amygdala and cortical areas may 
constitute a source for the emotional processing atypicalities in ASD, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study constitutes the first behavioural evidence to directly support this view. 
In this context it was unfortunate that we were unable to assess the extinction phase of our 
protocol. Since fear extinction has also been shown to rely on interactions between the cortex 
(particularly the medial prefrontal cortex) and the amygdala (Morgan, Romanski & LeDoux, 
1993; Morgan,. Schulkin & LeDoux, 2003; Phelps, et al., 2004; Quirk, Russo, Barron & 
Lebron, 2000),'· we would predict atypical extinction learning in ASD. However, since the 
majority of ASD participants exhibited marked abnormalities in acquiring differential fear 
... responses in the current paradigm, it would be impossible to interpret results from the 
extinction phase meaningfully. More specifically, any atypicality of fear extinction could either 
reflect atypical extinction processes or be a ,Side-effect of the atypical pattern of fear 
acquisition. Equally, equivalent fear extinction between groups would not necessarily indicate 
typical extinction processes in ASD since the possibility remains that atypicalities would arise 
if both groups acquired fear to similar extents. Future studies may be able to assess fear 
extinction more closely by employing simple conditioning paradigms, which as the study by 
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Bernier and colleagues has demonstrated, lead to relatively typical patterns of fear acquisition 
in this population (Bernier et al., 2005). 
Regardless of the neurological basis of the attenuated differential fear acquisition in 
ASD, our finding that such atypicalities exist at least behaviourally bears some important 
implications for our conceptualisation regarding the role of atypical emotional processes in 
the clinical manifestations of ASD. Since the acquisition of fear is amongst the most basic 
mechanisms by which an individual, and indeed any organism, learns about the emotional 
Significance of sensory stimuli, our findings provide strong support for Hobson's (1989) 
suggestion that individuals with ASD are characterised by difficulties in understanding the 
hedonic value of their sensory-motor environment. Although future research will be needed in 
order to determine when such abnormalities emerge in ASD, it seems likely that this aspect of 
emotional development would play an important role in the aberrant development of affective 
behaviours in this condition. Thus, whilst difficulties in processing faces and theory of mind 
understanding may further contribute to the socio-emotional atypicalities manifest in ASD 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Schultz" 2005), it seems no longer plausible to suggest that 
atypicalities in these relatively complex socio-cognitive capacities are solely responsible for 
the clinically defining feature of this condition. 
Our findings also bear some important practical implications for the design and 
implementation of behavioural intervention programmes. Several programmes that are 
currently in use, especially those based on the findings by Lovaas (1987), draw on operant 
conditioning principles to aid children in their learning. Similar to classical conditioning, 
operant conditioning mediates learning by means of association, although in this case the 
relevant associations are between an individuals own behaviour and an emotionally 
significant consequence (Le. 'reward' or 'punishment') rather than between a neutral and an 
emotional stimulus. Another parallel between classical and operant conditioning, is that both 
types of learning are mediated primarily by the amygdala (see Aggleton, 2000 for detailed 
reviews). Given our findings, the question thus arises whether operant conditioning provides 
an effective way of mediating learning in ASD. Based on our findings we fear that the answer 
to this question might be no. In fact, one of the most common problems therapists working on 
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such programmes report, is that children with ASD often struggle to either generalize their 
learned responses to relevant problems outside of the immediate context, or discriminate 
their responses adequately to different but related stimuli (e.g. learning the names of different 
animals or the letters of the alphabet). Although such reports are merely anecdotal, they 
underline the importance for further investigations in this area. 
Summary 
Acquiring fear responses to a previously neutral stimulus through a process of 
association is one of the most basic mechanisms by which an organism learns about the 
emotional significance of environmental stimuli. The finding that this learning mechanism is 
compromised in ASD, together with the observations of the previous two chapters, lends 
strong support to the suggestion that abnormalities in emotional processes extend to domains 
outside the social sphere. The evidence is also consistent with the idea that abnormalities of 
amygdala function play an important role in the neuropathology underlying ASD. The 
amygdala plays a necessary role in the associative learning process that is responsible for 
fear acquisition and the pattern of abnormality observed in ASD in the current and a previous 
study (Bernier et al., 2005), suggests that a functionally preserved sub-cortical amygdala 
system may be abnormally modulated by cortical areas in this condition. But how do these 
abnormalities relate to the socio-emotional disturbances of the disorder that were outlined at 
the beginning ()f this thesis? And how does the knowledge of such abnormalities influence 
our conceptualisation of the developmental trajectory of ASD? These and other questions will 
be addressed in the final chapter of this thesis, which will attempt to integrate the present 
findings with those of past research in order to formulate a neurodevelopmental framework 
for ASD. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that there is currently insufficient 
evidence to distinguish between competing developmental accounts of the emotional 
abnormalities characterising autistic social behaviour. Although the relevant evidence 
consistently shows that individuals from across the autism spectrum are compromised in 
multiple aspects of reciprocal emotional communication (see Table 1.1) and despite a 
growing consensus that abnormalities in amygdala functioning are most likely involved in the 
neural underpinnings of this facet of the disorder (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Baron-
Cohen et al. 1999; Schultz, 2005), scientists continue to debate whether abnormalities in 
emotional development constitute a primary or secondary feature of the ASD phenotype. 
According to authors such as Baron-Cohen (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; 2005, see also Frith, 
2001; Frith, 2003), the emotional disturbances characterising ASD are a developmental 
sequel of earlier emerging abnormalities in a 'Mindreading' system that is responsible for 
facilitating an understanding of other people's behaviours in terms of non-observable mental 
states such as desires, beliefs but also emotions. According to this view, a child needs to be 
able to understand behaviour in terms of mental states before she can make sense of the 
emotional nuances of reciprocal social behaviour and since a substantial amount of evidence 
indicates that individuals with ASD exhibit difficulties in such mental state understanding, the 
emotional disturbances associated with the disorder are viewed as a consequence rather 
than a cause of the developmental trajectory of the disorder. Hobson (1993, 2002) objects to 
this account and instead argues that much of an infant's cognitive and socio-emotional 
development is anchored in affectively patterned interpersonal contact early in life. According 
to this view, early emotional interchanges provide a mutual experience for an infant and her 
caretaker that allow the infant to come to understand that other people have similar 
propensities to orient psychologically toward the world as she herself does. In relation to 
ASD, therefore, Hobson (2002) suggests that abnormalities in affectively patterned 
interpersonal contact are the cause rather than the consequence of the difficulties individuals 
with ASD experience in terms of understanding the particular characteristics of the mind. 
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In reviewing the evidence relevant to this debate, it became apparent that the 
competing theories can accommodate much of the existing literature with equal plausibility. I 
suggested that we can only get around this theoretical impasse by closely examining the 
concept of 'emotions'. A consideration of this topic revealed that emotional processes and 
behaviours are not only relevant within the context of social interchanges but also in relation 
to our non-social lives. Such processes shape the way in which we remember objects or 
events, for instance, and they alter our perceptions of the world regardless of whether or not 
other people are present. By considering how the concept of emotion is currently 
operationalised, I showed that a distinction between physiological and cognitive response 
mechanisms is crucial in order to understand the diverse phenomenology of emotional 
behaviours and experiences. I also pOinted out that an extensive body of neuroscientific 
evidence implicates the amygdala as a mediator of physiological aspects of emotions. 
Following these observations I returned to the field of ASD and noted that relatively few 
studies have to date attempted to assess the physiological reactivity to environmental stimuli 
of individuals with this disorder. Despite the paucity of research in this domain, I argued that 
the patterning of observations in the relevant studies to date indicates that physiological 
response mechanisms do not always seem to operate typically in ASD. More specifically, I 
suggested that physiological responses in this disorder do not seem to be typically modulated 
by different stimulus parameters and that such responses do not always appear to modulate 
behavioural responses normally. This pattern led me to formulate my principal hypothesis, 
namely that ASD may be characterised by abnormalities in the interaction between 
physiological and cognitive aspects of emotional experiences. Based on relevant 
neuroscientific evidence, I also suggested that the neural substrate of this abnormality may 
be a functional impairment in the connectivity between a relatively basic amygdala system 
that is responsible for modulating autonomic activity, and brain areas that are involved in 
various aspects of cognition. In the following section I will briefly evaluate these ideas in the 
context of the five experiments presented in Chapters 2-4. 
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Critical evaluation of the experimental findings 
The cognitive level: ASD and the interaction between arousal and cognition 
Chapter 2 presented three experiments designed to determine whether memory 
processes in ASD are typically modulated by the degree to which to-be-remembered words 
elicit physiological arousal. Experiment 1 drew on a paradigm developed by Kensinger and 
Corkin (2004) who showed that in typical individuals the influence of arousal on memory can 
be dissociated from other factors known to influence memory by asking participants to study 
a set of words during either a full attention or a divided attention condition. Dividing 
participants' attention at study usually interferes with encoding processes and so results in a 
diminution of performance on a subsequent memory task. Kensinger and Corkin (2004), 
however, showed that recognition memory for arousing words is relatively immune to the 
effects of dividing attention, indicating that arousal modulates memory through relatively 
automatic processes that are qualitatively different from the more generic memory processes 
that normally underlie the encoding of information. Unfortunately the replication of Kensinger 
and Corkin's (2004) paradigm in Experiment 1 failed to confirm this arousal specific effect on 
memory and so provided a poor test for the hypothesis that arousal modulates memory 
atypically in ASD. Nevertheless, this experiment replicated an earlier study by South et al. 
(2008) in demonstrating that individuals with ASD, like typical individuals, exhibit enhanced 
recognition memory for emotionally significant compared to neutral words. In a sense this 
finding may be regarded as evidence against the hypothesis that arousal abnormally 
modulates memory in ASD since the failure to demonstrate arousal-specific effects of dividing 
attention on memory, does not necessarily indicate that arousal did not play a role in 
modulating performance on the recognition task. Thus, arousal may have influenced memory 
in ASD and typical participants similarly. Since arousal was not objectively measured in 
Experiment 1 it was impossible to address this alternative and so it remained possible that, at 
least over short periods of time, memory processes in ASD might be typically modulated by 
arousal. 
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Experiment 2 turned out to be a much more sensitive test of the specific effects of 
arousal on memory. In this experiment participants incidentally encoded emotionally charged 
and neutral words by rating these on a 4-point arousal scale. Skin conductance responses 
(SCR) were also collected during this encoding phase in order to ascertain that arousing 
words actually elicited higher levels of physiological arousal than non-arousing words. 
Following the encoding stage, free recall was assessed at three points in time - immediately 
after the words had been rated, again after 1 hour and once more after at least 1 day. For 
typical partiCipants the results of these recall tests replicated and extended previous work 
(e.g. LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Sharot & Phelps, 2004) in showing that memory for arousing 
words decreased significantly less over time than memory for non-arousing words, regardless 
of whether the latter were semantically interrelated or not. For the ASO group, by contrast, 
memory for arousing words was not immune to the effects of forgetting. This group difference 
could not be accounted for by differences in the degree to which ASO and typical partiCipants 
experienced the emotionally charged words as arousing since both groups provided higher 
ratings of arousal for the emotionally charged compared to the neutral words and both groups 
also exhibited typically enhanced SCR to these words. Most importantly, the arousal specific 
attenuation of forgetting in the typical group and the lack thereof in the ASO group was 
observed regardless of whether memory was assessed as a function of a conceptual 
classification of words or as a function of each partiCipant's SCR. Thus, whilst arousal 
modulated memory consolidation processes in qualitatively distinct ways in typical 
partiCipants, this did not appear to be the case for individuals with ASO, suggesting that the 
processes responsible for this arousal specific modulation of memory are dysfunctional in this 
group. 
Although Experiment 2 lent support to the idea that arousal abnormally modulates 
memory atypically in ASO, it also suggested that not all aspects of memory may be affected 
by this abnormality. More specifically, arousal was found to facilitate memory on the 
immediate recall test to a similar extent in both groups of partiCipants, a finding that emerged 
particularly in an analysis of memory based on participants' actual physiological responses. 
The difference between the groups, therefore, only emerged when free recall was assessed 
after a delay. Thus, whilst the findings provided further evidence for the possibility that over 
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short periods of time arousal might modulate memory relatively typically in ASD, the 
observations also showed that the consolidation of these memories into Long-Term storage 
may be compromised. 
On the basis of the findings from Experiment 2, I suggested that individuals with ASD 
may never acquire the same kind of qualitatively distinct representations of emotional words 
as typical participants. Experiments 3 and 4 provided some support for this suggestion. In 
Experiment 3 participants were required to study a list of words that included orthographic 
neighbours of several emotionally charged and neutral words (Le. Target Lures) that were 
subsequently included in a recognition memory test. Typical participants falsely identified the 
neutral Target Lures as having been on the study list relatively frequently but they were very 
unlikely to experience such illusory memories of the emotionally charged Target Lures. 
Individuals with ASD, on the other hand, falsely endorsed the neutral and emotionally 
charged Target Lures as having been studied with apprOXimately equal frequency. In other 
words, the distinctive nature of emotional words did not prevent individuals with ASD from 
falsely recognising them. In Experiment 4, participants were required to identify two target 
words that were embedded amongst distracter words in rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP). Identification of the second target (T2) in such paradigms is very difficult because 
the rapid presentation of words strains attentional resources. When T2s are emotionally 
charged, however, typical participants identify them more readily than when they are neutral 
and the performance of the comparison group in Experiment 4 confirmed this phenomenon. 
In addition, Experiment 4 showed that the attenuation of the Attentional Blink is unlikely the 
result of the semantic properties of emotionally charged words alone since male first name 
T2s were not identified more easily than non-distinct neutral T2s. Unlike typical participants, 
individuals with ASD in this experiment did not exhibit enhanced identification of emotionally 
charged compared to neutral or male first name T2s. Again, therefore, the special 
characteristics of emotional words did not seem to impact on how individuals with ASD 
responded to them. 
Experiments 1 - 4 suggested that the learning mechanisms responsible for the 
acquisition of hedonically distinct representations of words may be operating abnormally in 
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ASD, leading such individuals to process emotionally charged words as if they were neutral. 
Since these experiments were restricted to the verbal domain, however, it remained possible 
that the findings merely reflected more generic difficulties with the processing of language. 
This possibility gains further weight through the finding in Experiment 4 where the emotional 
attenuation of the Attentional Blink in the ASD group was correlated with participants' verbal 
IQ. As noted in the introduction (pp. 23-24), such associations have also been noted in the 
domain of emotion perception (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1990). Thus, despite the fact that groups of 
participants were matched on verbal ability in the present experiments, the possibility remains 
that individuals with ASD performed atypically because language development does not 
follow a typical trajectory in this population. In fact, since language is acquired within the 
broader context of reciprocal social interactions, one may even argue that an inability to 
process the emotional quality of language is a consequence of early emerging abnormalities 
in socio-cognitive processes such as mentalising. Obviously this alternative would bring us 
right back to the debate that stimulated the experimental work of this thesis in the first place 
and so it was important to turn to a rather different experimental paradigm in Experiment 5 -
fear conditioning. 
Fear conditioning represents one of the most basic learning mechanisms by which 
organisms acquire hedonic representations of environmental stimuli, and learning in such 
paradigms is mediated by a process of association that relies on neither language nor on any 
form of social cognition. Participants in Experiment 5 were presented with a random 
sequence of colours on a computer monitor whilst their skin conductance responses were 
recorded. At a certain point one of these colours was occasionally paired with an aversive 
startling noise. Aversive stimuli such as these, typically trigger innately specified defence 
reactions, which in humans include a rather marked increase in SCRs. Both typical and ASD 
partiCipants in Experiment 5 exhibited such defence reactions, suggesting that the noise was 
similarly aversive for both groups. The critical outcome measure in fear conditioning 
paradigms, however, is whether partiCipants start to exhibit increases in SCR to the colour 
that is predictive of the noise even when this noise is not presented. In this respect ASD 
participants were characterised by marked abnormalities. More specifically, although like 
typical individuals they exhibited increased SCRs to the critical colour after it had been paired 
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with the aversive noise, these acquired fear responses were not sufficiently marked to 
differentiate the critical colour from other colours that had never been paired with the aversive 
noise. In other words, the autonomic responses of individuals with ASD did not distinguish 
between the hedonic properties of the different colours, suggesting that the associative 
mechanisms by which a previously neutral stimulus acquires emotional meaning operate 
differently in ASD. In addition, a significant proportion of individuals with ASD failed to retain 
an awareness of the contingency between the critical colour and the loud noise. That is, after 
the experiment, several ASD participants experienced difficulties recalling which of the 
colours had been paired with the startling noise. This last finding provides a parallel between 
the memory experiments of Chapter 2 by showing that arousal atypically facilitates the 
formation of hedonically distinct memory representations in this group. All in all, the findings 
from Experiment 5 make it seem unlikely that the observations in Experiments 1 - 4 simply 
reflected language difficulties in ASD. 
Experiment 5 not only made it unlikely that Experiments 1 - 4 simply reflected 
atypicalities in language processing in ASD, but it also helped to clarify an apparent paradox 
raised by the findings in Experiment 2. If it is true that individuals with ASD are somehow 
compromised in learning about the emotional significance of environmental stimuli and as a 
result accumulate atypical representations of these stimuli in long-term memory, why would 
they exhibit typical autonomic responses to these stimuli and perceive them as emotionally 
significant? The answer, I believe, lies in the pattern of abnormality observed in Experiment 5. 
The results of this experiment, together with the observations of an earlier investigation of 
fear conditioning in ASD (Bernier et al., 2005), indicated that the learning mechanisms that 
mediate the acquisition of hedonic representations of environmental stimuli are not entirely 
absent in individuals with this disorder. Similar to typical individuals, those with ASD seem to 
acquire fear responses to some extent but this fear acquisition is inadequately modulated by 
specific stimulus contingencies. This makes it possible for individuals with ASD to acquire 
hedonic representations of environmental stimuli, whilst forming atypical representations of, 
and action tendencies toward, them. In this context, it is important to remember that whilst the 
magnitude of SCR to words in Experiment 2 correlated with the subjective ratings of arousal 
of these words for typical participants, this was not the case for the ASD group. Thus, despite 
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quantitative similarities in these measures between the two groups of participants, qualitative 
differences remained. 
In summary, the experimental work presented in this thesis lends some support to 
the hypothesis that cognitive processes in ASD are atypically modulated by stimulus-induced 
arousal. I hasten to add, however, that this conclusion is much too vague to be of much use, 
not least because the concept of cognition can refer to all sorts of processes of the mind and 
brain. Moreover, Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that memory processes that operate over 
relatively short time-spans may be modulated relatively typically by arousal in ASD and two 
recent studies indicate that certain classes of usually arousing stimuli, such as angry facial 
expressions (Ashwin et al., 2006) and snakes (South et al., 2008), may capture the attention 
of individuals with ASD relatively typically, which contrasts the finding of abnormalities in the 
emotional modulation of the Attentional Blink in ASD presented in Experiment 4. Thus not all 
aspects of cognition seem to be abnormally modulated by arousal in ASD and not all classes 
of arousing stimuli seem to be atypically processed by such individuals. Although a great deal 
more research is needed in this area, the evidence seems consistent enough to formulate 
hypotheses that might prove useful in guiding future work in this domain. More specifically: 
1) The learning mechanisms responsible for the acquisition of stable (over 
time) emotionally significant representations of stimuli are functionally 
compromised in ASD. 
2) As a consequence such individuals atypically respond to and act upon at 
least those kinds of stimuli that acquire emotional significance through a 
process of learning. 
3) Objects and events that are emotionally meaningful because of innate 
predispositions may be processed typically in ASD at least in so far as 
that they engage evolutionarily predisposed response mechanisms that 
are designed to ensure an organism's survival (e.g. basic approach and 
avoidance behaviours). 
In seeking verification (or falsification) for these claims, one of the priorities for future 
research should be a thorough assessment of what kinds of stimuli elicit typical physiological 
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arousal responses in ASD and what stimuli individuals with ASD experience as subjectively 
emotional. My prediction would be that such work would highlight a distinction between 
stimuli that are inherently emotional and those that acquire emotional meaning through a 
process of learning. What precisely this distinction might look like is difficult to specify but one 
possibility is that inherently emotional stimuli would elicit a more coherent set of physiological 
and subjective responses than stimuli that acquire emotional meaning through learning. In 
any event, it seems unlikely that a classification of stimuli in terms of their social relevance is 
sufficient to characterise the emotional processing difficulties in individuals with ASD. 
Before I consider a possible neural framework for the above hypothesis, one more 
caveat of the present thesis needs to be addressed and that is the fact that all of the 
experiments presented above involved assessments of individuals with relatively high 
cognitive and intellectual abilities. This leaves open the possibility that the present findings 
may not be representative of the autism spectrum as a whole. Although it will certainly be 
important to try and extend the work of the present thesis to individuals with ASD who are 
characterised by global cognitive developmental delay (and non-verbal paradigms such as 
fear-conditioning tasks would be suitable for such an endeavour), I do not consider it very 
likely that such individuals would exhibit no abnormalities where individuals with typical levels 
of cognitive functioning do. If we adopt a spectrum view of autism, as I do, we must assume a 
certain degree of homogeneity in the causal mechanisms that give rise to the disorder 
regardless of the heterogeneity with which it ultimately manifests. In this context I will make 
the rather strong claim that much of the developmental trajectory of ASD is caused by 
abnormalities in the learning processes responsible for the acquisition of hedonically salient 
representations of environmental stimuli. Before I defend this claim I will briefly address the 
question of whether it is sustainable on the basis of what is known about the neural 
underpinnings of emotion. 
The neural level: ASD and the functional connectivity of the amygdala 
There is absolutely no doubt that the functional integrity of the amygdala is necessary 
for an organism to effectively deal with and respond to emotionally significant events and 
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objects in its environment (e.g. LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux, 2000). If one observes abnormalities 
in this domain, therefore, there is a very good chance that the functional integrity of the 
amygdala has been compromised, either because of abnormalities within this structure or its 
afferent and efferent projections. Given the evidence reviewed in Chapter 1 and the findings 
from the experiments presented in Chapters 2 - 4, it is not surprising that a consensus is 
emerging that abnormalities in amygdala functioning are likely to play a role in the neural 
basis of ASD (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Schultz, 2005; 
Sweeten et al., 2002). Schultz (2005), for instance, suggests that early emerging 
abnormalities in amygdala functioning in ASD disrupt an infant's natural tendency to attend to 
socially relevant information, thereby depriving other brain areas involved in socio-cognitive 
functioning (e.g. Fusiform Gyrus) of sensory input that would normally ensure their functional 
specialisation. Baron-Cohen and colleagues (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) offer a similar account. According to these authors the 
amygdala is involved in directing an organisms attention to the eye-region of faces, and this 
attentional modulation is argued to play an important role in the maturation of a more 
widespread neurocognitive mechanism (including areas such as the Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex and Superior Temporal Sulcus) that is responsible for mentalizing (see also Frith, 
2001; Frith & Frith, 2006). A somewhat different approach is taken by Bachevalier and 
Loveland (2006), who focus not only on the amygdala's involvement in socio-perceptual 
functioning but also on its role in modulating reciprocal social behaviour. Similar to Hobson 
(2002), these authors point out that ASD is not only characterised by difficulties in the 
perception of socio-emotional signals but also by difficulties in the regulation of behaviour in 
accordance with these signals. Their argument, therefore, is that the socio-emotional 
disturbances of ASD result from abnormalities in an orbitofrontal - amygdala circuit since the 
orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in the self-regulation of behaviour (see Bachevalier & 
Loveland, 2006 for a review). 
If one considers the diversity of theoretical starting pOints for the various neural 
accounts outlined above (see the relevant sections in Chapter 1 for further details), it is truly 
remarkable that all come to virtually the same conclusion, namely that it is not necessarily an 
abnormality in amygdala functioning per se that underlies the socio-emotional disturbances of 
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ASD but rather the abnormal functioning of a wider neural system that supports socio-
emotional functioning and of which the amygdala forms a key component. This account is 
consistent with the broader consensus that the neuropathology of ASD is not likely to be 
localised to any particular structure or neural system but rather involves widespread 
atypicalities in neural connectivity that are the result of developmental abnormalities in brain 
maturation (e.g. Akshoomoff, Pierce & Courchesne, 2002; Belmonte, et al., 2004; Belmonte, 
Cook, Anderson, Rubenstein, Greenough, Beckel-Mitchener, et al., 2004; Brock, et aI., 2002; 
Just, et aI., 2004; et aI., 2007; Koshino, et aI., 2005; Rippon, et aI., 2007). There is, however, 
one major problem with these accounts. and that is the implication that the amygdala's 
dysfunction in ASD is restricted to its operation within a social brain network. In fact, one may 
even question the more fundamental assumption of the existence of a social brain, but this is 
an issue for another time. 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest that functional aspects of the amygdala 
in ASD may not only be compromised in relation to socio-emotional behaviours but also in 
relation to basic processes involved in mediating the acquisition of hedonically distinct 
representations of stimuli. Of course, this suggestion is speculative at present since none of 
the experiments presented in this thesis has assessed amygdala functioning directly. 
Nevertheless, the experimental paradigms employed here, particularly Experiments 2 and 5, 
are thought to be sensitive to amygdala functioning (e.g. see Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; 
Hamann, 2001; Phelps, 2004; LeDoux, 2000 for relevant reviews). For instance, it is well 
established that the influence of arousal on memory is mediated by interactions between the 
amygdala and the hippocampus (e.g. Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Dolcos, La Bar & Cabeza, 
2004; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; McGaugh, 2002; Phelps. 2004). Although these interactions 
involve complex neural and hormonal processes (e.g. Abercombie, Kalin, Thurow, 
Rosenkranz & Davidson, 2003; Buchanan & Lovallo, 2001) that operate in areas extending 
beyond these limbic structures (e.g. Maddock, 1999; Maddock. et aI., 2003; Medford, Phillips, 
Brierley. Brammer, Bullmore & David, 2005) few would suggest that amygdalo-hippocampal 
interactions involved in emotional memory formation constitute part of the operation of a 
social-brain circuit (although emotional memory formation certainly plays a role in the context 
of social cognition). The behavioural abnormalities observed in Experiment 2, therefore, 
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suggest that the dysfunction of the amygdala in ASD extends outside the realms of a social 
brain network. Further support for this suggestion stems from the fear conditioning 
experiment presented in Chapter 4. Differential fear acquisition is thought to rely on cortical 
modulation of a subcortical amygdala system (e.g. Jarrel et al., 1987; LeDoux, 2002; Morris 
et al., 1997) and so the observation of abnormalities in this domain in ASD is suggestive of a 
disruption in cortico-amygdala interactions. Again, it is difficult to see how the processes 
involved in fear conditioning would fall under the realms of a social brain and so the amygdala 
dysfunction in ASD again seems to extend outside this neural construct. It is important to note 
that the neural underpinnings of the behavioural abnormalities noted in Experiments 2 and 5 
may not necessarily lie within the neural structures most directly implicated (Le. amygdalo-
hippocampal system; cortico-amygdala system). It is, for example, possible that incoming 
neural signals to these structures carry atypical information that does not permit normal 
processing within them. Similarly, it could be the case that these circuits operate typically in 
principle, but that their outputs are somehow compromised. Whatever the preCise nature of 
the abnormality may be, one thing seems almost certain; A conceptualisation of amygdala 
dysfunction in ASD within the framework of a social-brain network will not suffice to capture 
the full extent of emotional processing abnormalities that characterises the disorder. 
If the idea of a social-brain is inadequate to capture the neural underpinnings of the 
emotional difficulties characterising ASD, what kind of neural framework might be better 
suited? To answer this question, it is necessary to appreciate the complexity of the 
amygdala's connectivity with other areas of the brain. Although it is merely the size of an 
almond, the amygdala comprises more than a dozen interconnected sub-regions that receive 
and transmit neural signals to virtually all cortical and subcortical regions of the brain (see 
Aggleton, 2000 for relevant reviews). In order to understand in what respects this complex 
system is functionally compromised in ASD it is not very useful to start by tackling the 
cognitions and behaviours that mark the pinnacle of this system's evolutionary history. A 
more fruitful strategy would be to start by uncovering phylogenetically older properties of the 
system on which the more complex functions rest. In this respect, the approach taken by 
neuroscientists interested in the neural basis of emotions could serve as a useful heuristic 
model. Rather than trying to uncover the neural correlates of emotions in general, many 
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sCientists in this field have focused their attention on much more fundamental process such 
as those involved in fear conditioning (e.g. LeOoux, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, Phelps & 
LeOoux 2005 for reviews). Through meticulous research of this emotional learning process, it 
has been shown that the amygdala controls the autonomic and humoral responses 
characteristic of defence behaviours through efferent pathways to brainstem and 
hypothalamic nuclei. The sensory information necessary for triggering these responses is 
delivered directly from the thalamus and indirectly from primary sensory and association 
cortices. The direct thalamic pathways allow the organism to respond rapidly to potential 
threat on the basis of crude sensory input whilst the slower cortical pathways can modulate 
these responses according to a more detailed analysis of the stimulus or event that first 
triggered them. Cortical areas, however, not only send information to the amygdala, they also 
receive information from this structure, both directly and indirectly through structures such as 
the hippocampus. This reciprocity means that the amygdala can modulate sensory 
representations in cortical areas in order, for instance, to heighten the organism's sensory 
awareness to potentially threatening stimuli or store relevant information about them. All of 
this we have learned from the study of a process that outdates the phylogenetic origins of 
humans by millennia and the knowledge gained to date stands on firm sCientific ground. So 
what does any of this have to do with A50? 
In the previous section I suggested that the learning mechanisms responsible for the 
acquisition of emotionally significant representations of stimuli are functionally compromised 
in A50. I also proposed that the consequence of this abnormality is that individuals with A50 
atypically respond to and act upon all those stimuli that acquire their emotional significance 
through a process of learning. Stimuli that are inherently emotional, on the other hand, should 
trigger relatively typical automatic response mechanisms. If we take what is known about the 
amygdala's involvement in fear conditioning as a model for how this structure deals with 
emotionally significant stimuli in general, we could predict that subcortical amygdala 
pathways involved in rapidly preparing an organism to deal with an emotionally significant 
stimulus or event are principally spared in ASO. By contrast, the reciprocal connections 
between this system and areas responsible for the consolidation and storage of memories of 
these stimuli may be disrupted. Although at the moment these possibilities remain 
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speculative, they constitute testable hypotheses that can as easily be falsified as verified. 
Together with the fact that these speculations rest on an extensive body of neuroscientific 
evidence, I believe the exploration of these possibilities to be more valuable for our 
understanding of the neural basis of ASD than a continuation of an over-focus on the rather 
vague and speculative concept of a social brain. 
Implications for developmental theory 
Learning is a process that starts the minute we are born and lasts for as long as we 
are alive. Throughout this time it shapes the way in which we interact with the world and how 
we learn things about it. If this process is altered, a vicious cycle can ensue that might 
change the course of development of the organism. The experimental work of this thesis 
suggests that adults with ASD are characterised by abnormalities in the mechanisms 
responsible for the acquisition of stable emotionally salient representations of the sensory 
environment. I have already presented the argument that this disturbance in emotional 
learning may alter the way in which such individuals come to interact with and represent the 
emotional significance of their surroundings. I have also proposed that these disturbances 
may be rooted in dysfunctional interactions between a relatively basic amygdala system and 
areas of the brain responsible for the consolidation and storage of memories (i.e. 
hippocampus and relevant cortical areas). The issue I will consider in this final part of my 
discussion, is what the implications for developmental theories of ASD would be, if these 
arguments turn out to be justified. 
To start with, it is important to note that none of the developmental theories of ASD 
discussed so far offer suitable explanations for why individuals with this disorder should be 
compromised in the acquisition of emotionally distinct representations of sensory stimuli. 
Authors such as Baron-Cohen and Frith (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995,2005; Frith, 2001, 2003), 
for instance, argue that the core deficit in ASD is an abnormality in the development of a 
neurocognitive mechanism responsible for mentalizing. Unless, one considers the processes 
involved in emotional learning to constitute part of this mentalizing system or assumes that 
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such learning processes can be altered as a consequence of abnormalities within it, it is 
difficult to imagine how an abnormal mentalizing system could give rise to abnormalities in 
processes that are as basic as those involved in fear conditioning. It is equally difficult to 
imagine how the acquisition of emotionally salient representations of environmental stimuli 
could be compromised by a disturbance in behavioural self regulation (Le. Bachevalier & 
Loveland, 2006) or how a developmental alteration of affectively patterned interpersonal 
relations (e.g. Hobson, 2002) could compromise the processes involved in emotional 
learning. One might wonder why it should be problematic for current theories if they can not 
accommodate findings such as those presented in this thesis. After all, the principal focus of 
the theories discussed thus far is to try to explain the clinically defining reciprocal socio-
emotional impairments characterising ASD and not the characteristics of the disorder that fall 
outside this domain. As noted in the previous section, however, there is a growing consensus 
amongst theorists that the neural underpinnings of the reciprocal socio-emotional 
disturbances characterising ASD involve abnormalities in the functioning of the amygdala 
(Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; Schultz, 2005; Hobson, 1989) and 
since this structure is known to be involved in the mediation of emotional learning processes, 
the social and non-social emotional processing difficulties in ASD seem to arise from one and 
the same abnormally functioning neural system. Given this common neural denominator, it is 
unlikely that the developmental trajectory of socio-emotional functioning in ASD is 
independent from the development of non-social emotional processes. Thus developmental 
theory must either specify reasons for why social and non-social emotional processes should 
be treated separately or explain how abnormalities in one of these domains relate to the 
atypical functioning in the other. To date, no theory seems able to meet this challenge. 
Since it seems unlikely that abnormalities in emotional learning processes constitute 
the developmental sequel of socio-emotional dysfunction in ASD, what about the reverse? 
Could it be that abnormalities in emotional learning mechanisms disrupt the development of 
socio-emotional functioning to such a degree as to give rise to the developmental trajectory of 
ASD? I believe the answer to be yes. Hobson (2002) has already offered a convinCing 
account of how early emerging abnormalities in emotional development can result in severe 
perturbations of reciprocal social development. Hobson, like all other authors concerned with 
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trying to explain the socio-emotional difficulties characterising ASD, however, has framed his 
account exclusively in terms of emotional processes that are anchored in reciprocal social 
interactions. More specifically, he argues that the developmental trajectory of ASD is the 
result of abnormalities in the innate predisposition to affectively relate to other people. Similar 
to other developmental theories of ASD, this account has difficulty explaining why individuals 
with ASD should be compromised in acquiring emotional representations of environmental 
stimuli through non-social learning processes. Unlike alternative theories, however, the 
suggestions by Hobson (2002) may be brought in line with the evidence presented in the 
present thesis. More specifically, one could suggest that ASD is the result of a disturbance 
not only in the predispositions to affectively relate to other people but in the processes 
necessary to relate to, and learn about, the hedonic properties of environmental stimuli and 
events in general. In order to demonstrate what such a reformulation of Hobson's theory 
might add to our understanding of the developmental trajectory of ASD, the remainder of this 
discussion will consider what role emotional learning processes might play during early infant 
development. As I hope to demonstrate, such a consideration reveals that a single 
disturbance early in life may not only account for the socio-emotional disturbances of ASD but 
also for the non-social characteristics of the disorder's phenotype. 
The role of emotional learning in the development of self-awareness and ASD. 
The arguments I will formulate in this final section are principally anchored in 
neurobiological accounts of the origins of self-awareness and consciousness (particularly 
Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003 and LeDoux, 2002), which suggest that the processes involved in 
emotional learning play an important role in the development of an evaluative awareness of 
our surroundings (this terminology will be explained shortly). These accounts are generally 
compatible with psychologically oriented theories of consciousness and self-awareness (e.g. 
Neisser, 1988; Tronick, 2005; Zelazo, 1996) and I will suggest that they provide a 
neurologically plausible foundation for the notion that an understanding of other people grows 
out of richly emotional interactions between an infant and her environment (e.g. Hobson, 
2002; Trevarthen, 2005; Tronick, 2005). Although the following discussion will digress 
160 
somewhat from the principal focus of the experimental work presented in this thesis, I hope to 
demonstrate that a broader consideration of the role of emotional learning in infant 
development may hold the key to understanding the ontogenetic origin of autistic spectrum 
disorders. 
The starting point for my argument is the assumption that infants are born with 
innately specified propensities to respond to certain properties of the world with changes in 
autonomic activity. The properties of the world in question are those that signal survival 
relevant information such as the presence of potential danger, the opportunity to obtain 
nutrients, or the presence of a con specific, and the changes in autonomic activity triggered by 
such information serve to ready the infant for appropriate action. Infants are also endowed 
with a number of perceptual and cognitive capacities that permit the formation of at least 
primitive sensory representations of the environment. When I use the term representation, I 
am not referring to a psychological or mental abstraction of what the sensory organs perceive 
(or rather what they transduce), but rather a pattern of neural activity that specifies the 
physical properties of the world in a format that permits an infant to respond appropriately. 
Importantly, the infants' perceptual systems not only represent properties of the external 
environment in this manner, but they also represent the homeostatic and kinaesthetic state of 
the infant's own body. Damasio (1994, 2003) makes the important point that the ability to 
represent the body proper and the environment in parallel provides a means for an organism 
to delineate one (Le. the body) from the other (Le. the environment), because representations 
of the environment vary on average more than those of the body proper on the one hand, 
whilst on the other hand, changes in the representations of the body and the environment 
correlate (e.g. small changes in the orientation of the neck muscles can cause drastic 
changes in the visual representations of the environment). Soon after birth (and maybe even 
beforehand), therefore, human infants most probably posses the capacity to represent the 
'Self in the form of a perceptually delineated entity, or what Neisser (1988) might call the 
'Ecological Self (see also Zelazo's, 1996 concept of minimal consciousness). 
Simply representing one's own body as delineated from the environment is far from 
sufficient to give rise to the kind of self-aware thought that characterises human cognition. 
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The key to understanding how this level of self-awareness comes about is to appreciate that 
the representation of one's own body in relation to the environment is not a static but a 
continuously dynamic process. This dynamic allows an infant to discover patterns in the 
relations between the physical properties of the environment as perceived and the body's 
own state as kinaesthetically and homeostatically represented. Importantly, neural 
assemblies in the brain are functionally and structurally altered as a result of experience, thus 
continuously altering the way in which the brain neurally represents the environment. Through 
this neural plasticity the infant starts to perceive properties in objects that are linked to the 
infants own propensities to act toward it. The infant learns that some things are harder and 
heavier than others because they resist different amounts of muscle tension when acted upon 
and the infant learns that objects vary in size and shape because they require different 
orientations of the limbs in order to be explored, reached or manipulated. Actively engaging in 
these actions is not needed in order to perceive these affordances in objects, they have 
become anchored in the perceptual representations of the objects themselves because of the 
experience driven changes in the relevant perceptual neural systems. The infant, therefore, is 
starting to entertain what I will call 'affordance representations' of the environment. 
Affordances, however, are not the only property of objects that infants start to directly 
perceive as a result of experience. The infant also learns that certain objects and affordances 
of objects are more or less desirable than others because they influence the body's 
homeostatic state in a way that triggers the kind of neural responses that are inherently 
appetitive or aversive (see LeDoux, 2002 for further discussion). I will call the resulting 
representations 'evaluative representations' and it is important to note that part of what is 
evaluated is the affordance of objects for action. 
There is an important difference between the ways in which an infant accumulates 
affordance and evaluative representations of the environment. Affordance representations 
arise when an infant's perceptual representations of the stimulus world is altered because of 
a child's interaction with the object. Affordances, in other words, are anchored in the infant's 
own behaviour. More specifically, the motor commands that originate within the child bring 
about a temporally correlated change in the perceptual representations of the object in motion 
and the kinaesthetic representation of the infant's own body and this temporal correlation 
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brings about a change in the perceptual representations of the object that partially reflects the 
body's relation to it. Evaluative representations, by contrast, are not as directly related to 
action because they arise from a temporal linkage between the sensory representation of the 
object and the homeostatic representation of the body. Again this temporal correlation alters 
the sensory representations of the object in a way that reflects the body's own homeostatic 
state but in this instance the infant's actions (and motor programs) are not responsible for 
these changes. The hypothesis I put forward in relation to ASO, is that both the social and 
non-social characteristics of the disorder are the result of abnormalities in the temporal 
linkage between sensory representations of the stimulus world and homeostatic 
representations of the body that is necessary for an accumulation of evaluative 
representations of the world. Before I consider this hypothesis in more detail, however, it is 
useful to briefly consider how an infant becomes consciously aware of her evaluations of the 
world. 
According to Oamasio (1994, 2003) and LeOoux (2002), what makes human 
consciousness special is the fact that the evolution of the cerebrum, especially the prefrontal 
cortex, has resulted in a remarkable working-memory capacity that allows an individual to 
represent presently constructed affordance and evaluative representations of the 
environment in parallel with previously constructed representations of this kind. As this 
working-memory capacity matures during early infancy (see Happaney et al., 2004), a child 
starts to represent multiple versions of her own kinaesthetic and homeostatic relation to the 
stimulus world simultaneously. This creates a situation that is not dissimilar to that which 
gives rise to a delineated representation of the body as separate from the environment (Le. 
the Ecological Self). In other words, across multiple affordance and evaluative 
representations, the child's kinaesthetic and homeostatic relation to objects is less variable 
than the perceptual properties of the objects themselves. Thus something becomes 
delineated, and this particular something is what Neisser (1988) might call the 'Extended 
Self: A relatively abstract but nevertheless neurally anchored representation of an infant's 
temporally stable relation to her stimulus environment. 
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Having formulated an account of what role the homeostatic state of the body (Le. 
arousal) might play during early infant development, I will now return to the hypothesis I 
formulated above, namely that an infant will develop ASD if the processes involved in the 
accumulation of evaluative representations of the environment are disturbed. One of the non-
social characteristics of the disorder that such an abnormality may be able to account for, is 
the presence of stereotyped and repetitive forms of behaviour (SRB). A series of recent 
studies by Noyce and Messer (2008) suggests that certain SRBs in ASD seem to be 
preceded by changes in autonomic arousal whilst other forms of SRB seem to serve an 
arousal modulating function. Individuals with ASD, therefore, seem to seek behavioural 
control over the changes in the homeostatic state of their body. This is preCisely what one 
might expect if during infancy sensory representations of the environment were atypically 
integrated with changes in the homeostatic state of the body whilst action centred 
affordances of objects in the world were accumulated relatively typically. The infant with ASD, 
in other words, may inappropriately associate changes in the body's level of arousal with an 
object-oriented (or self-oriented) behaviour rather than with the appropriate perceptual 
representation of the object. There is relatively little research to date on how young infants, 
who are later diagnosed with ASD, interact with objects. My prediction in this context, 
however, would be that the physiological responses to objects in infants with a later diagnOSis 
of ASD would be atypically modulated by the perceptual properties of the stimulus whilst 
physiological responses during physical interactions with the objects would be relatively 
typical. 
The second non-social characteristic of ASD that would be explained by the present 
account is the heterogeneity of the autistic phenotype. As I noted in Chapter 1, part of this 
heterogeneity is most likely due to an underlying variability in the genetiC, neurological and 
biochemical factors associated with the disorder. A heterogeneous symptom manifestation, 
however, would also be expected if the infant with ASD accumulates atypical evaluative 
representations of the stimulus environment. Damasio (1994) suggests that the homeostatic 
state of the body in relation to the object or event that triggers this state, serves as a 'somatic 
marker' that provides an organism with a prinCipled way for organising experiences. Typical 
infants all share this principled way of learning about the Significance of objects and so they 
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develop a shared understanding of the world and the objects within it. If in ASD this learning 
mechanism is disrupted because the infant's homeostatic representations of the body are 
temporally not adequately correlated with the appropriate sensory representations of the 
environment, every infant with ASD would come to organise experiences somewhat 
differently. They would still share a conceptualisation of the world in terms of the affordances 
for action of the objects within it but every individual would evaluate the objects and their 
associated affordances in a relatively idiosyncratic way. One child might find the sensory 
feedback from the touch of a sticker aversive, whilst another might seek such stimulation, and 
where one individual may develop a fascination for performing calendrical calculations, 
another may wish to use a calendar in order to keep a log of the weather conditions during 
the morning and afternoon of every day of the year. 
A third non-social characteristic of the ASD phenotype that may be explained by 
assuming that the disorder is the result of atypicalities in the accumulation of evaluative 
representations early in life, is the observation that such individuals exhibit a somewhat 
atypical perception of themselves. Recall that the 'Extended Self (Neisser, 1988) emerges 
out of the ability of the infant to represent multiple evaluative representations of the world in 
parallel. In ASD, each of these evaluative representations would be somewhat compromised 
because the necessary association between the object or event in question and the 
homeostatic state of the body would be disrupted. The ASD infant, therefore, would construct 
a qualitatively different representation of the self in time, a representation that is anchored 
more in actions and behavioural affordances than in the relation between the environment 
and the homeostatic state of the body. Evidence of episodic memory difficulties in ASD are 
consistent with this notion (e.g. see Bowler & Gaigg, 2008 & Lind & Bowler, 2008 for reviews) 
as is the finding that individuals with ASD describe themselves with a less varied emotional 
vocabulary than comparison individuals (e.g. Lee & Hobson, 1998) and that they report 
difficulties in introspecting on their own emotions (e.g. Silani, Bird, Brindley, Singer, Frith & 
Frith, 2008). Individuals with ASD have also been found to retrieve fewer specific 
autobiographical memories than typical individuals when cued with emotionally salient words 
(Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel & Patel, 2007), and dream reports of individuals with ASD are 
relatively void of emotional content (Daoust, Lusignan, Braun, Mottron & Godbout, 2008). 
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So far, I have concentrated exclusively on the non-social characteristics of the ASD 
phenotype and so in this last section I will briefly consider how an abnormality in the 
accumulation of evaluative representations of the world may also give rise to the reciprocal 
social atypicalities characterising ASD. I will keep this argument brief because I believe that 
Hobson (2002) has already offered a useful account of how an infant's atypical engagement 
with other people may give rise to the various reciprocal social impairments that characterise 
ASD (e.g. engagement in joint attention, mentalizing, acquisition of language). Rather than 
repeating these arguments here, I will focus on what might underlie an infant's atypical 
engagement with other individuals to begin with. To answer this question, it is important to 
appreciate that other people are the most complex 'object' in terms of the influence they exert 
on a developing infant's homeostatic state. Typical infants soon discover that there is 
something rather special about the way in which perceptual representations of another 
person relate to changes in the body's homeostatic state. Affordance representations of most 
objects are relatively static, directly anchored in the child's own behaviour, and to a certain 
degree independent of the evaluative representations of the objects in question. 
Representations of other people, however, are much more dynamic, their affordances 
sometimes change in anticipation of the infant's behaviours and most importantly, these 
changes in affordances often facilitate the maintenance of a desirable homeostatic state in 
the infant's body (i.e. changes in evaluative representations are associated with changes in 
affordance representations). One moment the other alleviates an undesirable homeostatic 
state by offering an object, and the next he facilitates a deSirable one by maintaining a rather 
pleasant face-to-face interaction. Initially, the infant may not always directly associate the 
other person with the resulting desirable homeostatic state. The infant's perceptual system 
may be more concerned with the representation of the offered object than with the 
representation of the person that offered it. Nevertheless, the other is continuously (or almost 
continuously) present, and he repeatedly alters the environment in a way that facilitates a 
positive homeostatic state. As the typical infant starts to represent multiple evaluations of the 
world in parallel, she discovers patterns in the relationship between the actions of the other 
and the influences these actions have on the body's homeostatic state. The infant, in other 
words, is soon privy to information that allows her to delineate the other person as a rather 
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special kind of object - a kind of proto-person. I call this early form of representing other 
people a 'proto-person' because the infant still has much to learn about many of the non-
observable characteristics of other people such as the fact that their behaviours are guided 
by their own representations of the world. As Hobson (2002) notes, such understanding 
comes through repeated interactions with others, which provide the infant with the necessary 
information to start to directly perceive more obscure properties of others, much in the same 
way as she learned to perceive her own relation to objects in the objects themselves. 
Whatever way an infant comes to ultimately understand other people, the important point to 
stress is that such understanding necessitates that the infant can makes sense of the 
complex dynamic properties of other people. A typical infant's representational systems 
achieve this because every change in the sensory representation of the other person is 
temporally linked to the appropriate change in the body's homeostatic state. For the 
developing infant with ASD, by contrast, other people are about as confusing as objects can 
get. Being compromised in relating representations of bodily changes in arousal with the 
appropriate sensory representations of the environment, the infant is confronted with a 
percept that continuously and unpredictably alters its influences on the body. Encounters with 
others may often turn out to be generally desirable (because other people are very skilled in 
interacting with infants), but the infant has difficulty predicting the changes in the affordances 
that the other person initiates (see also Loveland, 1991; Loveland, 2001) because these too 
are often linked to the infant's homeostatic state rather than her behaviour (as mentioned 
above, these changes in affordances primarily serve to facilitate the infant's homeostatic 
regulation). The infant with ASD, therefore, is starting to experience difficulties in regulating 
his behaviour in accordance with the other person (e.g. Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006), which 
results in the accumUlation of atypical affordance representations in addition to the ·already 
atypical evaluative representations that are accumulating. Ultimately, the infant relates to 
other people in fundamentally different ways (e.g. Hobson, 2002), setting the course for the 
atypical developmental trajectory that characterises autistic social behaviour. 
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